

(b)(6)

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2006 12:42 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: FW: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Hi (b)(6)

Looks like we need to cancel the analysts call tomorrow. Thanks for your willingness to help.

Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(b)(2) fax (b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2006 11:06 AM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC vV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; (b)(6) LTC 4ID Dep PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Todd,

Just came out of the CG's office. He must decline this conference call opportunity due to our current OPTEMPO (transition).

No issues with the Pentagon presser. We're good to go.
v/r

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP (b)(2)
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR

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12/3/2007

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2006 7:01 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Cc: (b)(6) LTC VV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; (b)(6) LTC 4ID Dep PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

(b)(6)

I can't get a line through to you. We haven't sent out the invite yet, but would need to do so by 1630 our time. I'll wait to hear from you.

Thanks,
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(b)(2) fax (b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2006 10:36 AM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC VV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; (b)(6) LTC 4ID Dep PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,

The CG's schedule is iffy and may not accommodate this conference call. We're in the middle of RIP. I'll be getting more guidance tonight. Please call me.

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2006 12:12 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

That's good news. The call-in numbers are (b)(2) or (b)(2) The comm guys here said you have to dial the (412) number if calling from OCONUS, but I don't know if that affects your situation.

Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2) fax (b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 3:11 PM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,

Our G6 says that we can do it via DSN. We just need to know the number to dial into.

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP (b)(2)
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR

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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 9:50 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Let me see if that works. Seems like an easy idea.
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2) fax (b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

12/3/2007

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 1:19 PM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC 4ID G6
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,
What if we call the Army Ops Center and have them patch us in?

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP (b)(2)
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR (b)(6)

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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 8:49 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

(b)(6)

(b)(6) said she'd send you a list of the analysts invited for the call.

I told her 1030 (1830 your time) for the call.

She said they only have a commercial 800 number to call in. If the CG can't get a good commercial number, I'll see what else we can work out. Let me know.

Thanks,
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2) fax (b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 11:20 PM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA

12/3/2007

Cc: Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,

The CG did agree to speak to some military analysts that MG Caldwell approached him about. Do you have any information on who would participate?

v/r

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
 Public Affairs Officer
 Multi-National Division-Baghdad
 Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)

VOIP (b)(2)

Commercial (b)(2)

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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@ (b)(6)]

Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:39 AM

To: (b)(2) LTC 4ID PAO

Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Thanks (b)(6) - we'll stick to the brief. We're 8 hours behind y'all again, so I guess that means we start at 1700 your time on Thursday.

Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
 Defense Press Officer
 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2) fax (b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto: (b)(6)]

Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 2:01 PM

To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA

Cc: (b)(6) LTC vV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA

Subject: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,

Thanks. Given the current environment around here, I think we'll decline the radio interviews. We're in the middle of RIP right now. We'll execute from our DVIDS at the MND-B MOC.

12/3/2007

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP (b)(2)
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: Viclan, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.viclan@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 9:33 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Cc: (b)(6) LTC VV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA
Subject: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Hi (b)(6)

We have all the info on MG Thurman we need for prepping for Thursday's press brief at 0900 EST. Do you need more info from us? Here's the latest list of reporters (a few might have changed since your Boss did the briefing with the press here in September).

Also, will MG Thurman be able to do 1-2 interviews with regional media (radio or TV) following the brief? He can stay in place and we'll use the DVIDS system to arrange these interviews.

Thanks again,
Todd

FORMAT:

- Introduction by Mr Bryan Whitman (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs)
- Opening remarks by briefer (approx 3-5 minutes)
- Q/A from press corps
 - Closing remarks by briefer (1-2 minutes)

PENTAGON PRESS CORPS:

Associated Press (Lolita Baldor, Bob Burns, or Pauline Jelnik)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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Reuters (Kristin Roberts or Andrew Gray)
AFP (Jim Mannion)
UPI (Pam Hess)
McClatchey News Service (Drew Brown)
Bloomberg News Service (Tony Capaccio)
LA Times (Peter Spiegel)
NY Times (Thom Shanker or David Cloud)
Baltimore Sun (Dave Wood)
Washington Post (Ann Scott Tyson)
St Louis Post Dispatch (Phil Dine)
MSNBC (Jim Miklaszewski and Courtney Kube)
ABC (Jon Karl and Luis Martinez)
CNN (Barbara Starr and Jamie McIntyre)
FOX (Mike Emanuel and Nick Simeone)
NPR (John Hendren or Tom Bowman)
VOA (Al Pessin)
Stars and Stripes (Jeff Schogol or Lisa Burgess)
Army Times (Gordon Lubold)
RAI, Al Jazeera, TIME, and a few others attend based on topic.

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2) [redacted], fax (b)(2) [redacted]
DSN (b)(2) [redacted]

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

706

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 11:58 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Gen. Haake Contact Info

(b)(6)

As requested, please find following Gen. Haake's contact info as well as mine. As I said, Gen. Haake is happy to do whatever he can to help and is available whenever needed.

Best,

(b)(6)

Maj. Gen. Timothy M. Haake, USAR (RET)

Attorney-at-Law

Principal, Haake & Associates

Office Phone: 202.408.8700

Cell Phone: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director of Government Affairs

Haake & Associates

Office Phone: 202.408.8703

Cell Phone: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director of Government Affairs

Haake & Associates

202.408.8700

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 8:12 AM
To: (b)(6) DSD PA
Subject: FW: OSD media experts visit proposal

(b)(6)

ISAF is looking for more information about the military analyst group before they move forward with the planning. If you could send me additional information (maybe some of the things that you sent to CENTCOM to sell the idea to them), it would be helpful.

Thanks.

Best,

(b)(6)

Commander (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
European Command Liaison Office
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20318-0520
(b)(2) / DSN (b)(2)
Cell: (b)(2) (NEW)
U.S. European Command <<http://www.eucom.mil/>> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<<http://www.nato.int/shape/index.htm>>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 7:44 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR]
Subject: FW: OSD media experts visit proposal

Classification: NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC Any chance you have more to provide? We have little to add.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 11:52 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: OSD media experts visit proposal

Classification: NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

If there is more information available about this group, PIO JFCBS would appreciate it.

(b)(6)

Major NO A
SO Ops Plans and Policy
Public Information Office
JFC HQ Brunnsun
Tel: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: 02 November 2006 07:20
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: OSD media experts visit proposal

Classification: NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

Ack and thanks. Now that we know what it is we can proceed.

For Brunssum and ISAF: Direct liaison OK by us but keep us info.
Cappy: is there a comprehensive list of these analysts? If yes, we could add them to our master release list.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 8:10 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: RE: OSD media experts visit proposal

(b)(6)

This request came from (b)(6) who is the military analyst program coordinator for the Department of Defense Public Affairs outreach team. They stay in close contact with a group of retired US military officers who have been contracted by media outlets as consultants and often provide them with background briefs so that they may provide informed discussions of ongoing operations. They are often in positions to either act as surrogates or at least provide proper context on various issues that is helpful to our communication efforts. This trip would provide some benefit in communicating our challenges, as well as, progress to this group who has influence with some key US audiences.

They would keep their group to no more than eight to maintain a small footprint. During their recent Iraq trip, this size worked well as they could all fit in one Blackhawk.

Best,

(b)(6)

Commander (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
European Command Liaison Office
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20318-0520
(b)(2) / DSN (b)(2)
Cell: (b)(2) (NEW)
U.S. European Command
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OF4- UK [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 7:06 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: RE: OSD media experts visit proposal

OK. Just tell us when you want them to come, for how long, detailed visit aim, etc. I guess this ought to go through our JVB in the first instance for the necessary authority and deconfliction with other events.

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel UK Army

HQ ISAF Chief PIO

Office (b)(6)

Mobile

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

[mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: 31 October 2006 01:21

To: (b)(6)

OF4- UK

Cc:

Subject: OSD media experts visit proposal

Classification: NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

It is our understanding that OSD wants to send 8 media expert analysts (retired Generals etc) to ISAF to provide them with a better degree of understanding allowing them to comment more knowledgeably.

Cappy: I assume this came from your direction; pls provide more info if you have it.

ISAF: pls provide general comments that will allow some form of planning to begin.

Cheers.

(b)(6)

From: Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO [Harry.B.Harris@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2006 12:58 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Cc: Gordon Cucullu; (b)(6) OSD PA; Leacock, Edward A BG USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO; Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO; (b)(6) CAPT USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: RE: Visit to JTF GTMO

(b)(6)

- dates ok with me, but you will have to run this through SC, DASD/DA and ASD/PA. WRT Commissions, that is not our lane ... Gordon can discuss with BrigGen Tom Hemingway in DC. Coord with Gordon, too, for best dates within the 9-16 window. I will be gone for much of that, but that is OK as BG Leacock will be here while I'm gone.
HH

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2006 11:32 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Cc: Paul E Vallely; Rudy Rudisill; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Leacock, Edward A BG USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO; Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: Visit to JTF GTMO

Hi, (b)(6)

I'd like to start the process on working area clearance and transportation to visit the JTF on 9-16 December 2006. LTC(Ret) John Rudisill will accompany me as he did on our previous visit. I mentioned these dates to Adm Harris and he is comfortable with them.

We've still got some open areas in our research to fill prior to finalizing the manuscript to the publisher. Accordingly if we could meet with the Commander and Deputy, Paul Rester, the new Colonel who is head of the Joint Detention facility, and with the legal people that would be a great start. As is usual, we'll probably discover new leads to follow up once we're on the ground.

Some areas of interest would be any progress on Military commissions or other legal developments.

Please let me know if you will be able to process this request with existing information (i.e., personal data on file from our last visit) or if you will need for us to update it.

We would like to take the Saturday, 9 Dec rotator out of NAS JAX and return there on the 16 Dec flight.

Appreciate your help with this request,

all the best,

Gordon Cucullu

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 11:55 AM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

PM;

(b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: VP Cheney - Waterboarding and torture
Attachments: VP Cheney - Waterboarding and torture

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 11:44 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: VP Cheney - Waterboarding and torture

Those on the Left, the Democrats, Green Party, Socialists and of course Progressive Communist Party are gasping in disbelief at the Vice Presidents comments claiming that the use of an interrogation technique called water boarding is a "no brainer." However.....

A Cheney spokeswoman said Thursday that the vice president was not confirming the use of any specific interrogation techniques.

"He was talking about the interrogation program without torture," spokeswoman Lee Anne McBride said. "The vice president does not discuss any techniques or methods that may or may not have been used in questioning."

I am constantly amazed at the zeal with which the "Lefties" run to the aid of the terrorist's. The Left constantly complains about being called un patriotic when they attack the Bush Administration policies on the war and interrogation. Yet, now, the VP expresses an opinion on an interrogation method, not considered torture by many of us who know the technique, and he is once again lam basted as the torture VP. How many times must it be said that the US does not torture, nor do we find it necessary to torture. Contrary to what the Left would have you believe, the interrogation techniques used by the CIA are successful in extracting "Time Sensitive INTEL" as is evidenced by the Intel extracted from KSM et. al., during their visit with CIA interrogators and before their transfer to Club Gitmo. I have advocated the use narcotics (Narcosis) during interrogations and fortunately for the American people, that option is contained in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. **Propofol**, a short-acting intravenous anesthetic agent used for the induction of general anesthesia in adult patients and pediatric patients older than 3 years of age; is a drug that can extract Intel from a terrorist interrogatee at greater than a 90% success rate. Propofol works by awakening the brain in stages leaving the Pre Frontal Cortex until last. The PFC is where the mechanism that allows humans to lie or exaggerate is housed. It is used thousands of times a day safely in the US in general surgery and yet, there are those that object to using it, or any drug, to extract Intel that will, and has, saved American lives. I can only hope that our CIA interrogators are using Propofol to help protect the American people. I can safely say that, fortunately at this time in US history, we have a President who understands the stakes and has battled the Left to give our military and intelligence professionals the tools they need to continue to protect us.

Take care.
Wayne

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 5:47 PM
To: 'McCausland, Jeffrey'
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow
Attachments: 10-20-06 MG Caldwell transcript.doc

hi. welcome back.
here is a rough transcript of the call. it was actually on the record, but since this hasn't been checked against the tape (and may never be at this point!!) please don't pass along. but, you can use the material as much as you like! :)
thanks

(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 6:47 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6) - Believe it or not I was at the bottom of the Grand Canyon and totally out of cellphone and email contact! If there is a transcript of his remarks I would love to read it.

Best,

Jeff

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thu 10/19/2006 6:03 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,
I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.
In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.
Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

MG Caldwell (from Iraq)
Conference call with military analysts
Friday, Oct. 20, 2006

Note: call was on the record except for some portions on background (those portions not transcribed)

Transcriber: (b)(6)

Caldwell: I guess the first thing to start off with is obviously from the press conference yesterday (Oct. 18) that we did over here in Baghdad. There has been a lot of question about what may or may not have been said, and I just really wanted to help first, clarify that, that there has been a question about whether or not we feel like the plan has been a failure. And that is not the case at all. I think talking to (inaudible) especially everybody understands anytime you devise a plan, you put into implementation of it, you are constantly reassessing and re-evaluating it. That's what we have been doing from the beginning. We are continuing to do that with this plan, and when we said yesterday that we are going back and continuing to refine it, that's exactly what we are doing.

We are going to make adjustments to it. We are talking with the government of Iraq on a weekly basis of what we call the Ministerial Committee for National Security, and then of course the CG (commanding general), General Casey, does it on a even probably informal basis directly with the prime minister, too.

So those are things that are ongoing that perhaps they portrayed it as some kind of just dramatic shift that is going to occur, and it's not. You know I was talking really at the tactical level, tactically what we are looking at within the plan.

We do want to make some adjustments and refinements to it. We are going to do that, and we will continue executing the plan.

Our theme that we keep kind of using is the fact that violence and progress do co-exist here in Iraq. That's something General Casey said back in Washington about two weeks ago. It's something we've recognized over here – that we're not going to have one before the other, that in fact they are both going to have to be worked in parallel to each other.

We're going to have continue working on progress within country – with the rebuilding portion of it, with the governance piece, with the economic piece, simultaneously we're dealing with the levels of violence that we experience at different intensities at different times at different areas.

But obviously, our overall goal is eventually to build the government of Iraq to where it can handle its security itself, where, you know, it's self reliant to handle the levels of violence. And there will be varying levels of violence that are still always going to occur here, even when it reaches a point when we are quote-unquote "successful" and have achieved the desired end state. You'll have heard different people refer to it as, you know, a country that's at peace with its neighbors, lives in peace and security, but in fact we recognize the fact that it's going to be many, many years before this country sees a

level of violence that's more normal to we're used to in America and what Westerners would want to see. There is going to be some sort of level of criminal that is still going to be here, then you're going to have some sort of sectarian violence still at some low level, and you're probably still going to have some level of terrorist activity, insurgent activity that is still going to occur.

What we have to do is develop the Iraqi Security Forces to such that they are able and capable of handling those three various levels of violence, bringing them down to some level to where the security forces are just above them, and can handle it, and that's the point which we'll be allowed – or able – to disengage our forces.

Ultimately what's going on is there's a need for a political solution more than a military solution at this point. Any place we go in and we have conducted operations just as anybody has seen for many, many years, we are able to control the situation where our forces are present. But to ultimately bring the security, the relative security and prosperity this country it's going to take and require a political solution to what's going on.

There is a tremendous amount of dialogue that is occurring. You've heard that the prime minister had this 24-point plan in June; he's had already now two of his national reconciliation conferences, they've announced a third one is going to be on Nov. 4, that they are going to do, we're not sure the final one. We know that he is working his four-point plan he outlined about two weeks ago, figuring out how to put that into place, and working with the various political factions and the different sectarian elements here.

But he is engaged in dialogue and working with all the different sects, and that's exactly what has to occur if we are going to eventually come to some political solution for this country. Because it is ultimately up to the Iraqi people to rebuild and secure their own country; that's not something that we are going to be able to do completely for them; we can only set the stage to allow that to occur.

The prime minister did announce the formation of a special committee here about two days ago – or a couple days ago now – that will address the issue of militias and also take on overseeing the reform of the security ministries, specifically the ministry of defense, interior and the INIS – the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.

And those are ongoing and there was initial reports that were due back out to the prime minister this week. Already we've seen some things occur, such as the two national police division commanders that have been removed from their duties and assigned other duties, which is a very positive step forward with the government doing that type thing, because that needed to occur at the very top in both those cases. It was something we saw that would be a very positive step forward, but they made that on their own. It truly wasn't us forcing anything in the background; that was a decision they took unilaterally and executed. We were in tremendous agreement with the decision they made, obviously, and very supportive of it.

We have said that the spike in violence that we are seeing would occur during the Ramadan period; we announced it well before Ramadan even started. We have seen it for over the last two years; historically, it's about a 20 percent increase in the level of violence in terms of attacks, although that doesn't necessarily equate to casualties, some set number, but it does in terms of the amount of activity. Over the last two years it's increased; we're seeing a 22 percent increase already in the first three weeks of Ramadan compared to the last three weeks before Ramadan. So that is in fact occurring as we thought it would. And we just yesterday got a tremendous spike in VBED (vehicle-borne explosive devices) activity across the country. I want to say it was 17 altogether different activities occurring between vehicle IEDs and suicide-vehicle IEDs. And we can provide more detail – approximately 25 killed, about another I want to say about another 80 wounded, but I can get those exact figures here momentarily for you.

So that did occur, and again, this is on the night of (inaudible) power, and we thought we would see the spike there, in fact we did, just like we thought we did yesterday. But that will (?continue).

You heard what happened at Balad. Initially the press was portraying this as a tough situation that the government showed some kind of failure almost or something when in fact, when it was all finally said and done and I had the opportunity to talk with one of the ground commanders on site, it actually turned out to be a fairly good news story in terms of how the Iraqi leadership in that area reacted and responded to what occurred.

It started with the Iraqi army having killed an AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) figure – a Sunni AQI member. In retaliation for that about 24 hours later, you know, we found a bunch of Shi'a who were killed in retaliation for that, 14 of them to be exact. And then the very next day we saw 26 Sunni that were killed for that. And right away the mayor of Balad placed the city on a curfew. They called together a meeting with team leaders, started talking about how to diffuse this situation. The next day they saw some indirect fire in the city; one more person was killed. And then on the 18th, they had a major conference of just over a couple hundred – 100, 200 people – that came together, including everybody from the provincial governor, the vice governor of the Salah ad Din Province, to the mayor, to the police chief, to some local sheiks – about seven or so local sheiks came in; they brought in the Iraqi army deputy brigade commander, the local Iraqi army battalion commanders, we were present – the Coalition forces were present but not at all involved. And they all came together and signed a pact and agreed to stop what would have been a cycle of violence that would have continued had there not been immediate response and action by the leadership of that province. They took charge; they stopped it; and we have not had another incident since then.

The numbers were grossly exaggerated initially from what we had heard in the news in terms of what the casualties were. We actually went to the local hospitals and verified the numbers, so it was somewhere around about 14 Shi'a and about 26 Sunni, so about 40 people who were killed in the sectarian violence based on that (one mortar?) from the direct fire.

So there was no real reporting on that, although we did talk it at the press conference yesterday, and then stated in fact we were pleased to see them taking charge and going through that piece.

I could go on. I'd be glad to talk to any specifics you all would like to. I can go everywhere from talking legislative actions the governor of Iraq is working and kind of where we are and how we see that playing out. The president, Talabani, did just post on a web site his legislative actions that they want to accomplish through the rest of this year, 2006, and then what they want to work into the beginning of 2007. It's a timeline of events. In fact, it ties in very closely to everything we've been talking – we being the U.S. mission and Coalition forces – have been talking to the leadership over here about. But it's those kind of activities that when you watch them occurring again gives us tremendous hope and promise for the future – the fact that they're government is functioning; the Council of Representatives is meeting, they're having debate. They're going through the first – their second read, and then voting on these laws. They have passed a couple of key critical pieces of legislative actions, such as the investment law, which was huge, and they're now working out also things like paying back debt they owe to the Turkish government which will allow for the border to be reopened and fuel to come across, which they are going to need throughout this winter time period, but they were in arrears for about 200 million dollars, and they've managed to figure out how to get money out of their system and start paying back the government of Turkey.

We see things like an international exposition that took place in late September up in Irbil; about 800 companies from 20 different countries showed up there for that event, you know, people who were interested in investing and establishing businesses over here.

We know that September they also passed their fuel import liberalization law, which is really, really important that they did, and that should start helping with the black market sales, and improve the fuel supply and reduce corruption by opening more the energy sector to private investment, which is something they desperately needed to do, too, because corruption within the whole fuel business was very – was rampant, and things like the fuel import liberalization law will help set better market prices; it will allow for better distribution so the black market – the lucrateness of doing that will now decreasing over time.

Anyway those are – I mean, and I can go on some other things. We can talk about the regions law if you want, that they did pass, although I am not an expert I can at least talk it some. But the two that we're still focused on very heavily is the hydrocarbon law and the de-Ba'athification. Both of those are going to be very important to be dealt with, and discussed, and hopefully addressed by the Council of Representatives before the end of December when they are scheduled to go out of session again for two more months, and then come back in session in March.

With that, I'll take any questions anybody has, and I'll open it up and try and address things. But we were just a little concerned that after the press conference yesterday that it was kind of portrayed as if we felt that the plan was failing; and I think that anybody in

the military that has served a couple of days at all understands that what we do is we in fact revise, which is nothing new. We constantly reassess where we are; we have taken this overall assessment of whether the conditions are still the same under which we developed the plan; if they are not, we make revisions to our plan to adjust to the conditions that exist. And that's exactly what we're going through right now as we continue doing some detailed analysis of this plan.

So we are very comfortable with where we are. We know that we've got to do some work; we've been doing it. And I think we'll see some minor modifications to the plan here in the very near future.

And with that, I'll take any questions anybody has.

Question: You said you were comfortable with the plan, but there was a report in the AP that a major terror leader had been arrested by American forces, and the prime minister had ordered General Casey to release him, and he had been released. I wasn't aware that (Prime Minister) Maliki could order General Casey to release people suspected of murder.

Caldwell: What the person you are talking about is Sheikh – he has a real long name – Sheik Mazen Abdul Khaliz El Saaezi – and we did, we picked him up at about 0330 in the morning of the 17th, for allegedly being involved in illegal activities that are operating outside of the law. And the very next day at the request of the prime minister he was released. And the prime minister made the request and the Coalition forces did release him. I am not sure I would call it being ordered; but the prime minister did make the request that he be released and we released him. He did in fact sign a conditional release form in which he promised to support the government of Iraq and disavow future acts of violence when he was finally released.

But anyway, that did occur, and our position on that is this is a sovereign nation, the prime minister is in charge, if he makes the determination that he wants somebody released from custody and the request comes in, General Casey made the decision, or I should say really, it was probably – I'd have to find out exactly who made it, but it was prime minister, General – I mean the ambassador, General Casey made the decision and (inaudible) their request to go ahead and release the person.

Q: To follow up on that, you know, it has a very bad odor over here, because we understand this guy, you know, has been involved in planning or maybe even making attacks on American soldiers. Is there some protest we made to Maliki? Is there some thing we've said that, you know, you can't demand that we release guys with blood on their hands?

(Off the record)

Q: How would you describe what you are doing right now tactically when we talk about going against the militias? Are you indeed just conducting sweeps for arms and the

torture chambers and that type of thing? Are you actively trying to bring down the militias as U.S. forces?

Caldwell: I'll go back on the back record. I'll tell you, we know that within this city there are, you know, (Army Maj. Gen.) J.D. Thurman probably said it best, there's at least 23 different militia groups that operate within the city of Baghdad. I mean, he's got them all by name, can tell you generally where they are located. We track them as best we can by intelligence to understand who they are, what their goals are and everything else, but we clearly stand by the position that if you are in fact operating outside the law we are going to come after you.

We have a very – we have a special cell that has been formed, put together – General Casey did this several months ago, that does nothing but monitor, track and help us target those who are involved in sectarian violence or extrajudicial killings, specifically within the Baghdad area. And there's a lot of resources that are used in that targeting effort, and that's why on any kind of weekly basis, you are going to find we're picking up several cell leaders and anywhere from 10 to 30 cell members in locations across the Baghdad area. And we do show that normally just about every press conference, or every other press conference, kind of where we are in terms of the operations over the last two weeks.

But I think one of the most important things is we all realize that ultimately this whole militia thing is going to be solved by a political solution, not by a military solution. Kinetically, we'll continue to operate on when we know they're operating outside the law, but we really have are ultimately going to have to have the prime minister, through his efforts, find a political solution to this militia issue here that exists.

Q: As far as the U.S. casualties are concerned, can you give me some estimation of how many of U.S. casualties are a result of IEDs and ambushes and not as a result of direct combat? I mean the questions that we're getting a lot of times are are we killing as many of them as they're killing of us, just to be as plain as we can be?

Caldwell: We don't obviously publicly talk about where the majority of our casualties are coming from, although you could probably put it together by taking all our press releases (inaudible) casualties and you would start seeing a trend that obviously – you know, we are very concerned about IEDs. There are a lot of attacks on us. Most of the attacks that occur against the Coalition forces do not produce many casualties because they're just not very effective against us and it's a variety of factors, you can imagine, from our body armor, to our gear, to our protection, to our responsive, to our suppressive fires, so that – although the largest number of attacks (will?) occur against Coalition forces right now on a daily basis, most are very ineffective in terms of producing the equivalent number of casualties. Although we have seen as we all know as of yesterday there were 73 U.S. casualties – deaths, specifically, already in this month.

We do know that if you go back and you look in the month of September within the Baghdad area detained – I know that the Multi-National Division-Baghdad themselves

detained over 750 people and killed over another 80, but – in the month of September that is.

But we don't normally go through and talk a lot about the casualty figures; we have been very concerned about not getting into some body count. If you go into this month of October we are in a very high glide path having detained already well over 580 at this point and have already killed over 30 insurgent activities within the city of Baghdad itself; this is not countrywide, obviously we've got other operations that are going on by our specialized forces, our Marines out west, and other places, too.

But that's just within Baghdad city. So there's been a tremendous amount of activity within the Baghdad area when you start looking at those kind of figures, if that helps put some of that into perspective for you.

Q: I think there's been an awful lot of misreporting about what the president's said about Iraq versus Vietnam. I understood him to only say that there's a parallel in that the enemy is trying to influence public opinion. I didn't understand him to say anything more than that. What was your understanding of what he said?

Caldwell: That was my exact understanding, too, and I had carefully read the text. It was a question that was given to him and he didn't come up with that, he was responding to somebody asking about that; he said, yeah, I think you could make that analogy or something like that. When asked a question when he specifically was talking about it in terms of the media and how that can turn public opinion and how it was used back then, in fact did turn public opinion. We have already seen on jihadist web sites within the last week, at least I know of two occasions right now – there may be more, we're having our teams look, where in fact they have already come out and stated that elections are going to be occurring in the United States next month, and we need to continue to inflict as many casualties as we can on the American forces, because that will force the American people (inaudible – that will?) want to leave, or something like that, by doing that. So they recognize themselves and are already talking to themselves on their web sites about the importance of the media, inflicting American casualties and how that can be perceived by Americans during the election period. And we did mention that yesterday during our press conference, that we think that's one of the three kind of reasons now why we see an increased focus and effort against Coalition forces in terms of trying to produce casualties against us.

Q: That's great, thanks.

Q: Following up on the detainees, the troops refer to it as the catch-and-release program because something like 80 percent of all the detainees are released within four months. When you're using the word detainee, is that what you mean, that we can expect the vast majority of these people to be released back out on the street? Or do you mean arrests that will actually result in prison terms so these same guys won't be back out in the streets?

Caldwell: Of that number, if you take September and October within Baghdad, you know, we're at 1,300 or so, one thousand three hundred or so that were picked up at least detainees. They will go through the process of producing the evidence that they have against these folks, and if it sufficient then they will put them in the detention system. But you are correct, at this point they are not into the detention system.

I am not quite sure, and I was trying to think – I was talking to Jack Gardner today about where his current statistics stand in terms of how many people – yeah, he right now has about 13,700 people in the detention system. Now those are the folks that are being held because in fact there is sufficient evidence to continue holding for a long period of time and they will not be (immediately?) released.

I think you know that the month of June that we did release – the prime minister did ask and they went through the system and did release quite a few and that's part of the whole reconciliation process, about 1,500 or so as I recall were released. And in fact at that point we were about 14,500, went down to about 13,000.

(Inaudible) how many people do go through the central criminal court of Iraq. They are charged, like last week, they administered one more death sentence and quite a few prison sentences and then they move out of our detention system and into the Iraqi prison system. But right now we do have about 13,000 people in our system.

Q: Do you know how many the Iraqis have?

Caldwell: Boy, I don't know that answer. I can try to find out; I've just not asked that question before. I know we don't readily have it here; I've not seen it in anything before, but we can ask that question.

Q: Thank you.

(cross talk)

Q: Sir, I just want to let you know that everybody back here on this call and all the wounded soldiers I talk to on a weekly basis couldn't be prouder of what you're doing and what the rest of you guys do from over there. We truly appreciate you've got our back and warm hearts and support and regards to what goes on.

Q: Here, here.

Q: Amen.

Caldwell: Well, that's great. I sure appreciate that. You know it does amaze me when you go out and talk to young kids, at least one day a week I get out and spend time with some unit out here just so that I am maintaining my situational awareness and can talk from anecdotal stories from young men and women out there. I am just continually – they see the difference down at their level. When you talk to them, they actually feel like they

are making a difference. They can see it; they can feel it. And as I keep telling them that's the most important thing. Well, that's great to hear. Thanks.

Q: Hooah.

Q: On the other side, you know, I talked to a sergeant the other week, and I am hearing more and more that these rules of engagement have restricted the soldiers far too much; that our forces can't be ruthless enough, even to the point back to releasing these detainees, the sergeant told me he was with the Iraqi forces and they still get fire from mosques and they can't do anything about it. So that's on the other side of the equation, that we are just not ruthless enough on bringing this enemy down. The government leadership over there is so weak that they can't even disarm the militias or order them disarmed to the point where anybody caught with a weapon would be basically eliminated.

So that's the other thing that we're getting back; and that's frustrating to hear that we're running the same routes and getting more wounded and killed by IEDs and there's nobody seizing the momentum or changing the momentum enough. It's visual, anyhow. That's just a comment and observation.

Q: Well you know, you are right. I can understand your frustration. One of the real challenges is the nature has changed over here. In the last six months I've been here it truly has gone from more to a non-kinetic fight to a kinetic fight. And that's a difficult and hard thing because there's still places where you need to be very violent and very kinetic, but there's more than ample other situations where we need to keep asking ourselves do we need to be – do we actually need to bust that door down that house when we go in, or can we knock on the door? I mean, (inaudible) intelligence that unless we blow the door off the hinges and knock it down with a battering ram or whatever the case, we are putting ourselves at grave risk. And when we have seen in Baghdad when different units have done it differently, but one of the Stryker units, I was just amazed at the attitude of the people, the atmospherics. You know we do a lot of internal atmospherics out there in the neighborhoods.

I was amazed at the difference between one and the other, it was truly by the attitude the commander had taken, to the point where he tells his people, look, you're not going to run them off the road, I want you every now and then let them go by first, you don't have to make them always yield to you; exhibit a little more courtesy to the citizenry; do knock on the doors when we are doing these searches, don't batter down the doors. And there was actually some real positive results of that that occurred.

Now, true, there is the risk always that there's going to be that suicide element out there, either a vest or a car, that will take advantage of that ability to have a little in closer contact with the Iraqis themselves. But the payoff from that also at least in this one area does appear to be tremendous for the unit that was operating there. So, the nature is changing and that is hard for some of these young troops that have been operating very kinetically to turn and operate less kinetically. Because it is frustrating, because we move

– as we go towards a more political solution now than a kinetic solution that's also a very difficult mindset to change, and it's a lot more frustrating, I know for those in the uniform down there – it gets hard holding, as we watch this political process try to take hold and the prime minister try to move it forward, he and President Talabani and everybody else as they are making these strides. But there are activities – (inaudible) across the board.

You know the conferences two weeks ago the prime minister had, with all the tribal elements from out in al Anbar sitting on that – the prime minister made some promises and he follows through – already I think we delivered about \$11 million out there since that conference now to projects that the money was promised earlier and now finally has moved in and the people out there are seeing that. We see the tribal elements coming together out there – they do not want al Qaeda out there. We see them in fact taking on al Qaeda and fighting them, we're seeing some of that start to occur.

So the dynamics of this whole thing, let the prime minister work these different elements. As you know yesterday he met Sistani and Sadr both down in Najaf. When you look at the comments Sadr made after that conference some very positive in terms of wanting, or at least stating publicly that he was going to let the system work and support the prime minister.

So the prime minister is reaching out trying to touch all these different elements and come to a political solution which is going to be the ultimate – only way this country is going to achieve that unity that it needs.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Is there any sort of – the Iraqis seem to arise to the occasion whenever they have a date certain. I mean, they did very well in the January elections, they did very well in the December elections. Is there any sort of impetus to having maybe a date imposed on when they turn over – or when they assume control of provinces or other milestones along the way so they do seem to perform better under those circumstances?

Caldwell: You're exactly right. There has been if you look historically (inaudible) milestone, they tend to perform a little better. They seem to get focused (inaudible). We are seeing that with some of their legislative initiatives. This thing that President Talabani posted on to the web site, when you look at that, and we've gone through it in fairly good detail over the last few days. If in fact all of these laws that they say they are going to achieve in 2006 – (inaudible) it's a one-law page thing the council president he discusses the security situation the frame of the political timetables what the heading is, but it's everything from the law for the (IECI?), the elections piece, the law concerning the elections and the governance and specifying the date to hold them, a law concerning oil or as we call the hydrocarbon law, a law concerning de-Ba'athification, a law concerning the flag logo and national anthem, a law approving (inaudible) dealing with militias. I mean, if in fact they meet all these timetables like they have just agreed to and (off the record portion).

Q: Can you give us that web site? (Discussion of web sites.)

(other off-the-record discussion)

(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 6:47 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6) -- Believe it or not I was at the bottom of the Grand Canyon and totally out of cellphone and email contact! If there is a transcript of his remarks I would love to read it.

Best,

Jeff

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thu 10/19/2006 6:03 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,
I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.
In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.
Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 11:31 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Fw: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Attachments: image001.gif

Wow. Way to go (b)(6) What a nice vote of confidence in your work

Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF <william.caldwell@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF (b)(6)
CC: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6); Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Banusiewicz, John, AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
(b)(6) COMMS DIV
(b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF
(b)(6) Chief of Staff
(b)(6)
(b)(6) - XO

Sent: Fri Oct 20 23:52:07 2006
Subject: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

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(b)(6) - thanks for making this all come together. Thought it was a very productive session. Jonathan Thompson was right in recommending this venue - one we need to sustain at some frequency which I will talk with Jonathan about.

Again - appreciated your help, and trust you also received the materials to forward onto the Analysts.

V/r - Bill Caldwell

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From: (b)(6) Ms OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)

AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Bryan Whitman
Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Colonel,

Please find attached (and pasted below) the agenda for the call with Retired Military Analysts in a half hour. The RSVP's I have received so far are on the second page. The dial in number is also on the Agenda. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you for your time.

v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.

Conference Call



image001.gif (9 KB)

Ret red Military Analysts

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2006

TIME: 9:00 - 9:45 a.m.

AGENDA

9:00 a.m. Welcome and Introduction (GUIDELINES)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

9:01 a.m. Update on Situation in Baghdad

Major General William Caldwell

9:30 a.m. Q & A

Military Analysts

9:45 a.m. Conference Call Concludes (GUIDELINES)

(b)(6)

Note: Dial-in-telephone numbers are (b)(2) or (b)(2)

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin Spectator	(USAF, JAG) American
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired) Fox News
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired) Fox News
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired) CNN
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 7:41 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA
Subject: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

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Mr Thompson and (b)(6)

Please email to us soonest the transcript of MG Caldwell's Retired Military Analysts Conference call transcript. We'd like to use it to assist GEN Casey for his PC with Ambassador Khalilzad.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Stay informed! <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>

(b)(6) Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief, Strategic Communications
Strategic Effects, MNF-I

DSN (b)(2)
Comm (b)(2)
Int'l (b)(2)
MCI (b)(2)

(b)(6)

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Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
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Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

12/3/2007

Colonel,

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Thank you for your time.

v/r,


(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.



Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2006

TIME: 9:00 – 9:45 a.m.

AGENDA

9:00 a.m. Welcome and Introduction (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6) OSD Public Affairs

9:01 a.m. Update on Situation in Baghdad

- Major General William Caldwell

9:30 a.m. Q & A

- Military Analysts

9:45 a.m. Conference Call Concludes (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

733

Note: Dial-in-telephone numbers are (b)(2) **or** (b)(2)

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG) American Spectator
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired) Fox News
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired) Fox News
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired) CNN
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

735

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 21, 2006 5:19 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sheik Mazen Abdul Khaliz El Saaezi

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 10:31 PM
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

major,

wonder if you can also answer the below question? one of our writers was listening to the tape of the conf call and is trying to make heads or tails.

thanks

(b)(6)

Is the Sheikh that Caldwell referenced Sheikh Mazen al-Saedi? He gave a longer name on the tape (had abdul and the last name sounded more like Saiz, but the papers are all talking about this guy).

Question: You said you were comfortable with the plan, but there was a report in the AP that a major terror leader had been arrested by American forces, and the prime minister had ordered General Casey to release him, and he had been released. I wasn't aware that (Prime Minister) Maliki could order General Casey to release people suspected of murder.

(cue 215) Caldwell: What the person you are talking about is Sheikh – he has a real long name – (Sheikh Mazen al-Saedi?) and we did, we picked him up at about 0330 in the morning of the 17th, for allegedly being involved in illegal activities that are operating outside of the law. And the very next day at the request of the prime minister he was released. And the prime minister made the request and the Coalition forces did release him. I am not sure I would call it being ordered; but the prime minister did make the request that he be released and we released him. He did in fact sign a conditional release form in which he promised to support the government of Iraq and disavow future acts of violence when he was finally released.

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV [mailto:(b)(6)]

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

736

Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I'll check on the number in Iraq prisons ...

Talibani's web site is all in Arabic, which is why we have a translated copy of info.

(b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 6:42 PM
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Cc: (b)(6) CNTR MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

major,
 thanks. i will pass this along. there was also one more pending question from bing west, which mg caldwell said he would try to get the answer for. the question was: what's the number held in prison under long sentences by the iraqis? is that something you can help with?
 also, what is the address for talibani's website?
 thanks tons,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:28 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CNTR MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

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(b)(6)

Attached is the document that MG Caldwell referenced today. This is a translation of the info taken directly from President Talibani's official website. The info is specific to a timetable for critical political and economic measures. If I recall, Jim Garamone asked the question that spurred MG Caldwell to talk to this info.

(b)(6)

Maj, U.S. Marine Corps
 PAO, Multi National Force-Iraq, Baghdad
 Commercial: (b)(2)
 MCI Cell: (b)(2)
 DSN: (b)(2)
 Iraqna: (b)(2)
 Secure VOIP: (b)(2)
 NIPR: (b)(6)

12/3/2007

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737

SIPR: (b)(6)
CENTREX: (b)(6)

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12/3/2007

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738

(b)(6)

From: Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF [william.caldwell@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:52 PM
To: **(b)(6)** OSD PA; **(b)(6)** COL STRATEFF
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; **(b)(6)** Mr OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; **(b)(6)** MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; **(b)(6)** OSD PA; **(b)(6)** OSD PA; **(b)(6)** AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; **(b)(6)** COL STRATEFF; **(b)(6)** COMMS DIV; **(b)(6)** MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; **(b)(6)** - Chief of Staff; **(b)(6)** - XO
Subject: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6) - thanks for making this all come together. Thought it was a very productive session. Jonathan Thompson was right in recommending this venue - one we need to sustain at some frequency which I will talk with Jonathan about.

Again - appreciated your help, and trust you also received the materials to forward onto the Analysts.

V/r - Bill Caldwell

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From: **(b)(6)** OSD PA [mailto:**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: **(b)(6)** COL STRATEFF
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; **(b)(6)** Mr OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; **(b)(6)** MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; **(b)(6)** OSD PA; **(b)(6)** OSD PA; **(b)(6)** AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Bryan Whitman
Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Colonel,

Please find attached (and pasted below) the agenda for the call with Retired Military Analysts in a half hour. The RSVP's I have received so far are on the second page. The dial in number is also on the Agenda. Please let me know if you have any questions.
 Thank you for your time.

v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
 Office of the Secretary of Defense


12/3/2007

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739

(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.



**Conference Call
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Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG) American Spectator
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General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired) CNN
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News

12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 5:29 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Caldwell

Attachments: 10-20-06 MG Caldwell Iraq partial 2.doc



10-20-06 MG
Caldwell Iraq part...

MG Caldwell (from Iraq)
Conference call with military analysts
Friday, Oct. 20, 2006

Note: call was on the record except for some portions on background (those portions not transcribed)

Transcriber: (b)(6)

Caldwell: I guess the first thing to start off with is obviously from the press conference yesterday (Oct. 18) that we did over here in Baghdad there has been a lot of questions about what may or may not have been said, and I just really wanted to help first, clarify that, that there has been a question about whether or not we feel like the plan has been a failure. And that's not the case at all. I think talking to (inaudible) especially everybody understands anytime you devise a plan, you put into implementation of it, you are constantly reassessing and re-evaluating it. That's what we have been doing from the beginning. We are continuing to do that with this plan, and when we said yesterday that we are going back and continuing to refine it, that's exactly what we are doing.

We are going to make adjustments to it. We are talking with the government of Iraq on a weekly basis of what we call the Ministerial Committee for National Security, and then of course the CG (commanding general), General Casey, does it on a even probably informal basis directly with the prime minister, too.

So those are things that are ongoing that perhaps they portrayed it as some kind of just dramatic shift that is going to occur, and it's not. You know I was talking really at the tactical level, tactically what we are looking at within the plan.

We do want to make some adjustments and refinements to it. We are going to do that, and we will continue executing the plan.

Our theme that we keep kind of using is the fact that violence and progress do co-exist here in Iraq. That's something General Casey said back in Washington about two weeks ago. It's something we've recognized over here – that we're not going to have one before the other, that in fact they are both going to have to be worked in parallel to each other.

We're going to have continue working on progress within country – with the rebuilding portion of it, with the governance piece, with the economic piece, simultaneously we're dealing with the levels of violence that we experience at different intensities at different times at different areas.

But obviously, our overall goal is eventually to build the government of Iraq to where it can handle its security itself, where, you know, it's self reliant to handle the levels of violence. And there will be varying levels of violence that are still always going to occur here, even when it reaches a point when we are quote-unquote "successful" and have achieved the desired end state. You'll have heard different people refer to it as, you know, a country that's at peace with its neighbors, lives in peace and security, but in fact we recognize the fact that it's going to be many, many years before this country sees a

level of violence that's more normal to we're used to in America and what Westerners would want to see. There is going to be some sort of level of criminal that is still going to be here, then you're going to have some sort of sectarian violence still at some low level, and you're probably still going to have some level of terrorist activity, insurgent activity that is still going to occur.

What we have to do is develop the Iraqi Security Forces to such that they are able and capable of handling those three various levels of violence, bringing them down to some level to where the security forces are just above them, and can handle it, and that's the point which we'll be allowed – or able – to disengage our forces.

Ultimately what's going on is there's a need for a political solution more than a military solution at this point. Any place we go in and we have conducted operations just as anybody has seen for many, many years, we are able to control the situation where our forces are present. But to ultimately bring the security, the relative security and prosperity this country it's going to take and require a political solution to what's going on.

There is a tremendous amount of dialogue that is occurring. You've heard that the prime minister had this 24-point plan in June; he's had already now two of his national reconciliation conferences, they've announced a third one is going to be on Nov. 4, that they are going to do, we're not sure the final one. We know that he is working his four-point plan he outlined about two weeks ago, figuring out how to put that into place, and working with the various political factions and the different sectarian elements here.

But he is engaged in dialogue and working with all the different sects, and that's exactly what has to occur if we are going to eventually come to some political solution for this country. Because it is ultimately up to the Iraqi people to rebuild and secure their own country; that's not something that we are going to be able to do completely for them; we can only set the stage to allow that to occur.

The prime minister did announce the formation of a special committee here about two days ago – or a couple days ago now – that will address the issue of militias and also take on overseeing the reform of the security ministries, specifically the ministry of defense, interior and the INIS – the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.

And those are ongoing and there was initial reports that were due back out to the prime minister this week. Already we've seen some things occur, such as the two national police division commanders that have been removed from their duties and assigned other duties, which is a very positive step forward with the government doing that type thing, because that needed to occur at the very top in both those cases. It was something we saw that would be a very positive step forward, but they made that on their own. It truly wasn't us forcing anything in the background; that was a decision they took unilaterally and executed. We were in tremendous agreement with the decision they made, obviously, and very supportive of it.

We have said that the spike in violence that we are seeing would occur during the Ramadan period; we announced it well before Ramadan even started. We have seen it for over the last two years; historically, it's about a 20 percent increase in the level of violence in terms of attacks, although that doesn't necessarily equate to casualties, some set number, but it does in terms of the amount of activity. Over the last two years it's increased; we're seeing a 22 percent increase already in the first three weeks of Ramadan compared to the last three weeks before Ramadan. So that is in fact occurring as we thought it would. And we just yesterday got a tremendous spike in VBED (vehicle-borne explosive devices) activity across the country. I want to say it was 17 altogether different activities occurring between vehicle IEDs and suicide-vehicle IEDs. And we can provide more detail – approximately 25 killed, about another I want to say about another 80 wounded, but I can get those exact figures here momentarily for you.

So that did occur, and again, this is on the night of (inaudible) power, and we thought we would see the spike there, in fact we did, just like we thought we did yesterday. But that will (?continue).

You heard what happened at Balad. Initially the press was portraying this as a tough situation that the government showed some kind of failure almost or something when in fact, when it was all finally said and done and I had the opportunity to talk with one of the ground commanders on site, it actually turned out to be a fairly good news story in terms of how the Iraqi leadership in that area reacted and responded to what occurred.

It started with the Iraqi army having killed an AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) figure – a Sunni AQI member. In retaliation for that about 24 hours later, you know, we found a bunch of Shi'a who were killed in retaliation for that, 14 of them to be exact. And then the very next day we saw 26 Sunni that were killed for that. And right away the mayor of Balad placed the city on a curfew. They called together a meeting with team leaders, started talking about how to diffuse this situation. The next day they saw some indirect fire in the city; one more person was killed. And then on the 18th, they had a major conference of just over a couple hundred – 100, 200 people – that came together, including everybody from the provincial governor, the vice governor of the Salah ad Din Province, to the mayor, to the police chief, to some local sheiks – about seven or so local sheiks came in; they brought in the Iraqi army deputy brigade commander, the local Iraqi army battalion commanders, we were present – the Coalition forces were present but not at all involved. And they all came together and signed a pact and agreed to stop what would have been a cycle of violence that would have continued had there not been immediate response and action by the leadership of that province. They took charge; they stopped it; and we have not had another incident since then.

The numbers were grossly exaggerated initially from what we had heard in the news in terms of what the casualties were. We actually went to the local hospitals and verified the numbers, so it was somewhere around about 14 Shi'a and about 26 Sunni, so about 40 people who were killed in the sectarian violence based on that (one mortar?) from the direct fire.

So there was no real reporting on that, although we did talk it at the press conference yesterday, and then stated in fact we were pleased to see them taking charge and going through that piece.

I could go on. I'd be glad to talk to any specifics you all would like to. I can go everywhere from talking legislative actions the governor of Iraq is working and kind of where we are and how we see that playing out. The president, Talabani, did just post on a web site his legislative actions that they want to accomplish through the rest of this year, 2006, and then what they want to work into the beginning of 2007. It's a timeline of events. In fact, it ties in very closely to everything we've been talking - we being the U.S. mission and Coalition forces - have been talking to the leadership over here about. But it's those kind of activities that when you watch them occurring again gives us tremendous hope and promise for the future - the fact that they're government is functioning; the Council of Representatives is meeting, they're having debate. They're going through the first - their second read, and then voting on these laws. They have passed a couple of key critical pieces of legislative actions, such as the investment law, which was huge, and they're now working out also things like paying back debt they owe to the Turkish government which will allow for the border to be reopened and fuel to come across, which they are going to need throughout this winter time period, but they were in arrears for about 200 million dollars, and they've managed to figure out how to get money out of their system and start paying back the government of Turkey.

We see things like an international exposition that took place in late September up in Irbil; about 800 companies from 20 different countries showed up there for that event, you know, people who were interested in investing and establishing businesses over here.

We know that September they also passed their fuel import liberalization law, which is really, really important that they did, and that should start helping with the black market sales, and improve the fuel supply and reduce corruption by opening more the energy sector to private investment, which is something they desperately needed to do, too, because corruption within the whole fuel business was very - was rampant, and things like the fuel import liberalization law will help set better market prices; it will allow for better distribution so the black market - the lucrateness of doing that will now decreasing over time.

Anyway those are - I mean, and I can go on some other things. We can talk about the regions law if you want, that they did pass, although I am not an expert I can at least talk it some. But the two that we're still focused on very heavily is the hydrocarbon law and the de-Ba'athification. Both of those are going to be very important to be dealt with, and discussed, and hopefully addressed by the Council of Representatives before the end of December when they are scheduled to go out of session again for two more months, and then come back in session in March.

With that, I'll take any questions anybody has, and I'll open it up and try and address things. But we were just a little concerned that after the press conference yesterday that it was kind of portrayed as if we felt that the plan was failing; and I think that anybody in

the military that has served a couple of days at all understands that what we do is we in fact revise, which is nothing new. We constantly reassess where we are; we have taken this overall assessment of whether the conditions are still the same under which we developed the plan; if they are not, we make revisions to our plan to adjust to the conditions that exist. And that's exactly what we're going through right now as we continue doing some detailed analysis of this plan.

So we are very comfortable with where we are. We know that we've got to do some work; we've been doing it. And I think we'll see some minor modifications to the plan here in the very near future.

And with that, I'll take any questions anybody has.

Question: You said you were comfortable with the plan, but there was a report in the AP that a major (JAM? Leader inaudible) had been arrested by American forces, and the prime minister had ordered General Casey to release him, and he had been released. I wasn't aware that (Prime Minister) Maliki could order General Casey to release people suspected of murder.

Caldwell: What the person you are talking about is Sheikh – he has a real long name – (Sheikh Mazen al-Saedi?) and we did, we picked him up at about 0330 in the morning of the 17th, for allegedly being involved in illegal activities that are operating outside of the law. And the very next day at the request of the prime minister he was released. And the prime minister made the request and the Coalition forces did release him. I am not sure I would call it being ordered; but the prime minister did make the request that he be released and we released him. He did in fact sign a conditional release form in which he promised to support the government of Iraq and disavow future acts of violence when he was finally released.

But anyway, that did occur, and our position on that is this is a sovereign nation, the prime minister is in charge, if he makes the determination that he wants somebody released from custody and the request comes in, General Casey made the decision, or I should say really, it was probably – I'd have to find out exactly who made it, but it was prime minister, General – I mean the ambassador, General Casey made the decision and (inaudible) their request to go ahead and release the person.

Q: To follow up on that, you know, it has a very bad odor over here, because we understand this guy, you know, has been involved in planning or maybe even making attacks on American soldiers. Is there some protest we made to Maliki? Is there some thing we've said that, you know, you can't demand that we release guys with blood on their hands?

(Off the record)

Q: How would you describe what you are doing right now tactically when we talk about going against the militias? Are you indeed just conducting sweeps for arms and the

torture chambers and that type of thing? Are you actively trying to bring down the militias as U.S. forces?

Caldwell: I'll go back on the back record. I'll tell you, we know that within this city there are, you know, (Army Maj. Gen.) J.D. Thurman probably said it best, there's at least 23 different militia groups that operate within the city of Baghdad. I mean, he's got them all by name, can tell you generally where they are located. We track them as best we can by intelligence to understand who they are, what their goals are and everything else, but we clearly stand by the position that if you are in fact operating outside the law we are going to come after you.

We have a very – we have a special cell that has been formed, put together – General Casey did this several months ago, that does nothing but monitor, track and help us target those who are involved in sectarian violence or extrajudicial killings, specifically within the Baghdad area. And there's a lot of resources that are used in that targeting effort, and that's why on any kind of weekly basis, you are going to find we're picking up several cell leaders and anywhere from 10 to 30 cell members in locations across the Baghdad area. And we do show that normally just about every press conference, or every other press conference, kind of where we are in terms of the operations over the last two weeks.

But I think one of the most important things is we all realize that ultimately this whole militia thing is going to be solved by a political solution, not by a military solution. Kinetically, we'll continue to operate on when we know they're operating outside the law, but we really have are ultimately going to have to have the prime minister, through his efforts, find a political solution to this militia issue here that exists.

Q: As far as the U.S. casualties are concerned, can you give me some estimation of how many of U.S. casualties are a result of IEDs and ambushes and not as a result of direct combat? I mean the questions that we're getting a lot of times are are we killing as many of them as they're killing of us, just to be as plain as we can be?

X (checked to this point except the sheik's name – trying to confirm that via Tara with Caldwell's people).

Caldwell: We don't obviously publicly talk about where the majority of our casualties are coming from, although you could probably put it together by taking all our press releases (inaudible) casualties and you would start seeing a trend that obviously – you know, we are very concerned about IEDs. There are a lot of attacks on us. Most of the attacks that occur against the Coalition forces do not produce many casualties because they're just not very effective against us and it's a variety of factors, you can imagine, from our body armor, to our gear, to our protection, to our responsive, to our suppressive fires, so that – although the largest number of attacks (will?) occur against Coalition forces right now on a daily basis, most are very ineffective in terms of producing the equivalent number of casualties. Although we have seen as we all know as of yesterday there were 73 U.S. casualties – deaths, specifically, already in this month.

We do know that if you go back and you look in the month of September within the Baghdad area detained – I know that the Multi-National Division-Baghdad themselves detained over 750 people and killed over another 80, but – in the month of September that is.

But we don't normally go through and talk a lot about the casualty figures; we have been very concerned about not getting into some body count. If you go into this month of October we are in a very high glide path having detained already well over 580 at this point and have already killed over 30 insurgent activities within the city of Baghdad itself; this is not countrywide, obviously we've got other operations that are going on by our specialized forces, our Marines out west, and other places, too.

But that's just within Baghdad city. So there's been a tremendous amount of activity within the Baghdad area when you start looking at those kind of figures, if that helps put some of that into perspective for you.

Q: I think there's been an awful lot of misreporting about what the president's said about Iraq versus Vietnam. I understood him to only say that there's a parallel in that the enemy is trying to influence public opinion. I didn't understand him to say anything more than that. What was your understanding of what he said?

Caldwell: That was my exact understanding, too, and I had carefully read the text. It was a question that was given to him and he didn't come up with that, he was responding to somebody asking about that; he said, yeah, I think you could make that analogy or something like that. When asked a question when he specifically was talking about it in terms of the media and how that can turn public opinion and how it was used back then, in fact did turn public opinion. We have already seen on jihadist web sites within the last week, at least I know of two occasions right now – there may be more, we're having our teams look, where in fact they have already come out and stated that elections are going to be occurring in the United States next month, and we need to continue to inflict as many casualties as we can on the American forces, because that will force the American people (inaudible – that will?) want to leave, or something like that, by doing that. So they recognize themselves and are already talking to themselves on their web sites about the importance of the media, inflicting American casualties and how that can be perceived by Americans during the election period. And we did mention that yesterday during our press conference, that we think that's one of the three kind of reasons now why we see an increased focus and effort against Coalition forces in terms of trying to produce casualties against us.

Q: That's great, thanks.

Q: Following up on the detainees, the troops refer to it as the catch-and-release program because something like 80 percent of all the detainees are released within four months. When you're using the word detainee, is that what you mean, that we can expect the vast majority of these people to be released back out on the street? Or do you mean arrests

that will actually result in prison terms so these same guys won't be back out in the streets?

Caldwell: Of that number, if you take September and October within Baghdad, you know, we're at 1,300 or so, one thousand three hundred or so that were picked up at least detainees. They will go through the process of producing the evidence that they have against these folks, and if it sufficient then they will put them in the detention system. But you are correct, at this point they are not into the detention system.

I am not quite sure, and I was trying to think – I was talking to Jack Gardner today about where his current statistics stand in terms of how many people – yeah, he right now has about 13,700 people in the detention system. Now those are the folks that are being held because in fact there is sufficient evidence to continue holding for a long period of time and they will not be (immediately?) released.

I think you know that the month of June that we did release – the prime minister did ask and they went through the system and did release quite a few and that's part of the whole reconciliation process, about 1,500 or so as I recall were released. And in fact at that point we were about 14,500, went down to about 13,000.

(Inaudible) how many people do go through the central criminal court of Iraq. They are charged, like last week, they administered one more death sentence and quite a few prison sentences and then they move out of our detention system and into the Iraqi prison system. But right now we do have about 13,000 people in our system.

Q: Do you know how many the Iraqis have?

Caldwell: Boy, I don't know that answer. I can try to find out; I've just not asked that question before. I know we don't readily have it here; I've not seen it in anything before, but we can ask that question.

Q: Thank you.

(cross talk)

Q: Sir, I just want to let you know that everybody back here on this call and all the wounded soldiers I talk to on a weekly basis couldn't be prouder of what you're doing and what the rest of you guys do from over there. We truly appreciate you've got our back and warm hearts and support and regards to what goes on.

Q: Here, here.

Q: Amen.

Caldwell: Well, that's great. I sure appreciate that. You know it does amaze me when you go out and talk to young kids, at least one day a week I get out and spend time with

some unit out here just so that I am maintaining my situational awareness and can talk from anecdotal stories from young men and women out there. I am just continually – they see the difference down at their level. When you talk to them, they actually feel like they are making a difference. They can see it; they can feel it. And as I keep telling them that's the most important thing. Well, that's great to hear. Thanks.

Q: Hooah.

Q: On the other side, you know, I talked to a sergeant the other week, and I am hearing more and more that these rules of engagement have restricted the soldiers far too much; that our forces can't be ruthless enough, even to the point back to releasing these detainees, the sergeant told me he was with the Iraqi forces and they still get fire from mosques and they can't do anything about it. So that's on the other side of the equation, that we are just not ruthless enough on bringing this enemy down. The government leadership over there is so weak that they can't even disarm the militias or order them disarmed to the point where anybody caught with a weapon would be basically eliminated.

So that's the other thing that we're getting back; and that's frustrating to hear that we're running the same routes and getting more wounded and killed by IEDs and there's nobody seizing the momentum or changing the momentum enough. It's visual, anyhow. That's just a comment and observation.

Q: Well you know, you are right. I can understand your frustration. One of the real challenges is the nature has changed over here. In the last six months I've been here it truly has gone from more to a non-kinetic fight to a kinetic fight. And that's a difficult and hard thing because there's still places where you need to be very violent and very kinetic, but there's more than ample other situations where we need to keep asking ourselves do we need to be – do we actually need to bust that door down that house when we go in, or can we knock on the door? I mean, (inaudible) intelligence that unless we blow the door off the hinges and knock it down with a battering ram or whatever the case, we are putting ourselves at grave risk. And when we have seen in Baghdad when different units have done it differently, but one of the Stryker units, I was just amazed at the attitude of the people, the atmospherics. You know we do a lot of internal atmospherics out there in the neighborhoods.

I was amazed at the difference between one and the other, it was truly by the attitude the commander had taken, to the point where he tells his people, look, you're not going to run them off the road, I want you every now and then let them go by first, you don't have to make them always yield to you; exhibit a little more courtesy to the citizenry; do knock on the doors when we are doing these searches, don't batter down the doors. And there was actually some real positive results of that that occurred.

Now, true, there is the risk always that there's going to be that suicide element out there, either a vest or a car, that will take advantage of that ability to have a little in closer contact with the Iraqis themselves. But the payoff from that also at least in this one area

does appear to be tremendous for the unit that was operating there. So, the nature is changing and that is hard for some of these young troops that have been operating very kinetically to turn and operate less kinetically. Because it is frustrating, because we move – as we go towards a more political solution now than a kinetic solution that's also a very difficult mindset to change, and it's a lot more frustrating, I know for those in the uniform down there – it gets hard holding, as we watch this political process try to take hold and the prime minister try to move it forward, he and President Talabani and everybody else as they are making these strides. But there are activities – (inaudible) across the board.

You know the conferences two weeks ago the prime minister had, with all the tribal elements from out in al Anbar sitting on that – the prime minister made some promises and he follows through – already I think we delivered about \$11 million out there since that conference now to projects that the money was promised earlier and now finally has moved in and the people out there are seeing that. We see the tribal elements coming together out there – they do not want al Qaeda out there. We see them in fact taking on al Qaeda and fighting them, we're seeing some of that start to occur.

So the dynamics of this whole thing, let the prime minister work these different elements. As you know yesterday he met Sistani and Sadr both down in Najaf. When you look at the comments Sadr made after that conference some very positive in terms of wanting, or at least stating publicly that he was going to let the system work and support the prime minister.

So the prime minister is reaching out trying to touch all these different elements and come to a political solution which is going to be the ultimate – only way this country is going to achieve that unity that it needs.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Is there any sort of – the Iraqis seem to arise to the occasion whenever they have a date certain. I mean, they did very well in the January elections, they did very well in the December elections. Is there any sort of impetus to having maybe a date imposed on when they turn over – or when they assume control of provinces or other milestones along the way so they do seem to perform better under those circumstances?

Caldwell: You're exactly right. There has been if you look historically (inaudible) milestone, they tend to perform a little better. They seem to get focused (inaudible). We are seeing that with some of their legislative initiatives. This thing that President Talabani posted on to the web site, when you look at that, and we've gone through it in fairly good detail over the last few days. If in fact all of these laws that they say they are going to achieve in 2006 – (inaudible) it's a one-law page thing the council president he discusses the security situation the frame of the political timetables what the heading is, but it's everything from the law for the (IECI?), the elections piece, the law concerning the elections and the governance and specifying the date to hold them, a law concerning oil or as we call the hydrocarbon law, a law concerning de-Ba'athification, a law concerning the flag logo and national anthem, a law approving (inaudible) dealing with militias. I

mean, if in fact they meet all these timetables like they have just agreed to and (off the record portion).

Q: Can you give us that web site? (Discussion of web sites.)

(other off-the-record discussion)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 1:01 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: question for Caldwell's guys

Importance: High

Is this the sheikh that Caldwell is referencing? He gave a longer name on the tape (had abdul and the last name sounded more like Saiz, but the papers are all talking about the guy below).

Question: You said you were comfortable with the plan, but there was a report in the AP that a major (inaudible) had been arrested by American forces, and the prime minister had ordered General Casey to release him, and he had been released. I wasn't aware that (Prime Minister) Maliki could order General Casey to release people suspected of murder.

(cue 215) Caldwell: What the person you are talking about is Sheikh - he has a real long name - (Sheikh Mazen al-Saedi?) and we did, we picked him up at about 0330 in the morning of the 17th, for allegedly being involved in illegal activities that are operating outside of the law. And the very next day at the request of the prime minister he was released. And the prime minister made the request and the Coalition forces did release him. I am not sure I would call it being ordered; but the prime minister did make the request that he be released and we released him. He did in fact sign a conditional release form in which he promised to support the government of Iraq and disavow future acts of violence when he was finally released.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I'll check on the number in Iraq prisons ...

Talibani's web site is all in Arabic, which is why we have a translated copy of info.

Doug

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 6:42 PM
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Cc: (b)(6) CNTR MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: RE: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

major,
 thanks. i will pass this along. there was also one more pending question from bing west, which mg caldwell said he would try to get the answer for. the question was: what's the number held in prison under long sentences by the iraqis? is that something you can help with?
 also, what is the address for talibani's website?
 thanks tons,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:28 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CNTR MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6)

Attached is the document that MG Caldwell referenced today. This is a translation of the info taken directly from President Talibani's official website. The info is specific to a timetable for critical political and economic measures. If I recall, Jim Garamone asked the question that spurred MG Caldwell to talk to this info.

(b)(6)

Maj, U.S. Marine Corps
 PAO, Multi National Force-Iraq, Baghdad

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

755

Commercial: (b)(2)
MCI Cell: (b)(2)
DSN: (b)(2)
Iraqna:
Secure VOIP: (b)(2)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
CENTREX: (b)(6)

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

756

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:46 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)
Subject: participant list
Attachments: 17471499-list osd pa 159.doc

(b)(6)

Today's participant list is attached.

Any questions give me a call.

Thanks

(b)(6)

To: (b)(6)
Date: Friday, October 20, 2006 9:00 AM
E-Mail Address: On file
Company Name: OSD
Host's Name: (b)(6)
Conference Name: OSD/PA 159 (9:00A) (b)(6)
Conference Title: "Military Analyst"

Participant Information

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. | C (b)(6) | ***** | |
| 2. | Bing West | A freelance writer | Newport, RI |
| 3. | Gordon Cucullu | Fox | St. Augustine, FL |
| 4. | (b)(6) | Pentagon Public Affairs | Washington, DC |
| 5. | Steve Grew-MH has call | Fox News | Eastman, GA |
| 6. | Jed Babbin | American Spectator | Leesburg, VA |
| 7. | Rick Francona | NBC | New York, NY |
| 8. | John Garrett | Fox News | Washington, DC |
| 9. | C/Maj. Gen. Bill Caldwell | retired | Baghdad, Iraq |
| 10. | General Kernan | CBS | Pinehurst, NC |
| 11. | General Shepherd | OSD | New York, NY |
| 12. | General McInerney | Fox News | Washington, DC |
| 13. | Tim Eads | Fox News | Washington, DC |
| 14. | Paul Valleley | Fox News | Big Fork, MT |
| 15. | Chuck Nash | Fox News | Alexandria, VA |

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 11:28 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CNTR MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: [U] document from Caldwell's conference call
Attachments: 061018 GoI Legislative Timetable.doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6)

Attached is the document that MG Caldwell referenced today. This is a translation of the info taken directly from President Talibani's official website. The info is specific to a timetable for critical political and economic measures. If I recall, Jim Garamone asked the question that spurred MG Caldwell to talk to this info.

(b)(6)

Maj, U.S. Marine Corps
 PAO, Multi National Force-Iraq, Baghdad
 Commercial: (b)(2)
 MCI Cell: (b)(2)
 DSN: (b)(2)
 Iraqna
 Secure VOIP: (b)(2)
 NIPR: (b)(6)
 SIPR:
 CENTREX: (b)(6)

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

759

The Council of Presidency discusses the Security Situation in the Frame of the Political Timetable

The Council of Presidency held a meeting in the residence of the President of the Republic, Jalal Talabani, on Monday 16 Oct. 2006. The members of the council discussed the security situations, the latest political developments and actions to be taken in order to complete the implementation for Baghdad Security Plan and the evaluation for its former stages. The Presidency Council also reviewed the steps towards conciliation and the necessity for providing support for the exerted efforts aiming at realizing the national unity and harmony among all ingredients of the Iraqi people.

The members of the Council of Presidency also discussed the suggestions and ideas that aim at containing the sectarian and political congestion, pointing out to the importance of agreements that has been reached to in the framework of the political council for national security.

It is worth mentioning that the political council had acknowledged a timetable that a number of its articles were implemented. Please find hereunder the most important things that were stipulated among of which:

In 2006 the following:

- Agreeing on political timetable (done).
- Forming a constitutional review committee (done).
- Approving the implementation measures law for forming regions (done).
- Approving the Investment Law (done)
- Approving the law for IECL.
- Approving a law concerning elections in the governorates and specify a date for holding them.
- Approving a law concerning Oil.
- Approving a law concerning deba'athification.
- Approving a law concerning the authorities of the Governorates council.
- Approving a law concerning the flag, logo and national anthem.
- Approving order no. 91 that was issued by the interim coalition authority concerning the armed forces and militias in the country.
- Discussing the general amnesty, militias and other armed formations.

In 2007 the following:

- The Constitutional Review Committee ends its tasks.

February

- Forming the independent bodies as stipulated in the Constitution.

March

- A referendum concerning the constitutional amendments (if required).

(b)(6)

From: Bing West (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 10:27 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re:

Interesting call, (b)(6) As followup, can we get Talabani's web site that Gen Caldwell mentioned? Also, might I get the # held in prison under long sentences by the Iraqis?

On Oct 20, 2006, at 8:01 AM, (b)(6) OSD PA wrote:

Gentlemen,
Thanks for your patience. The time for the call has shifted one hour. We will conduct the call at 0900 Eastern Time with MG Caldwell. This call will be on Background. Please dial (b)(2) and ask for the analyst call.
We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Moorman Thomas (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 9:43 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE:

Unfortunately, Gen Moorman will not be able to participate.
Tom

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 8:01 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject:

Gentlemen,
Thanks for your patience. The time for the call has shifted one hour. We will conduct the call at 0900 Eastern Time with MG Caldwell. This call will be on Background. Please dial (b)(2) and ask for the analyst call.
We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 8:51 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re:

I'll be on - Don Shepperd
Sent via BlackBerry from Cingular Wireless

-----Original Message----- (b)(6)
From: (b)(6) OSD PA"
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2006 08:01:12
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject:

Gentlemen,
Thanks for your patience. The time for the call has shifted one hour. We will conduct the call at 0900 Eastern Time with MG Caldwell. This call will be on Background. Please dial (b)(2) and ask for the analyst call.
We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Rick Francona (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 8:42 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re:

I'd like to participate - thanks.

Rick Francona

-----Original Message-----

From: "(b)(6) OSD PA"
Sent: Oct 20, 2006 8:01 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients@null, null@null
Subject:

Gentlemen,
Thanks for your patience. The time for the call has shifted one hour. We will conduct the call at 0900 Eastern Time with MG Caldwell. This call will be on Background. Please dial (b)(2) and ask for the analyst call.
We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 7:08 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Pfeifle, Mark D Mr OSD PA
Subject: Fw: [U] RE:

Sent from the Blackberry of Jonathan Thompson

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF
To: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA
Sent: Fri Oct 20 07:02:40 2006
Subject: [U] RE:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir: As you have heard or will hear from COL (b)(6) MG Caldwell would like to execute with the "Talking Heads" this afternoon as you recommended. He will prep from 1530-1600, execute 1600 and end at 1645 to meet his 1700 hardtime at a scheduled meeting.

Just looking for the details on how this will be executed. We are assuming it will be by phone.

/r

(b)(6)

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From: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA [mailto:Jonathan.Thompson@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 1:12 PM
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: Re:

Yes, 0900.

Tell him to take pass on SVTC, he knows what we'd say today. Call though essential.

(b)(6)

Sent from the Blackberry of Jonathan Thompson

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF
To: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA
Sent: Fri Oct 20 03:33:04 2006
Subject:

Sir: Our schedule shifted early this morning. MG Caldwell will not be on time for the 1515 and we will potentially be a little late for the 1530. We will be there as soon as possible though. MG Caldwell would like to call you immediately after the SVTC. Does a brief phone call after the SVTC fit in your schedule Sir?

/r

(b)(6)

MAJ (b)(6)
Executive Officer, Strategic Effects

DSN (b)(2)
VOICE (b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 10:34 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

I'm in.

From: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 10:24 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Greer is in...I should be back from my Friday a.m. 10 miler by then

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.

In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.

Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 8:30 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Am available - as it will be 6:00AM here!

Thanks, (b)(6)

PV

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
(b)(6)
tel: 406 249 1091
fax: 406 837 0996
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 4:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together. In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available. Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Gordon Cucullu [(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 7:32 PM
To: [(b)(6)] OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

I'd like to participate, thanks, Gordon

----- Original Message -----

From: [(b)(6)] OSD PA
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:03 PM
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.

In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.

Thanks and have a great evening.

[(b)(6)]

[(b)(6)]

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

[(b)(2)]

(b)(6)

From: Nardotti, Michael (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 7:20 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6)

Sorry. I will not be available tomorrow morning.

MJN

Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired
Patton Boggs LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350

(b)(6) (direct)

202-457-6315 (facsimile)

(b)(6)

www.pattonboggs.com

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.

In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.

Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:51 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Will be in NYC on CNN at 0830
Sent via BlackBerry from Cingular Wireless

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA" (b)(6)
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2006 18:03:51
To: undisclosed-recipients;;
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together. In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available. Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:43 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Thanks, (b)(6) I would be interested in taking the conference call.

Kernan

In a message dated 10/19/2006 6:04:02 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, writes:

(b)(6)

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.

In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.

Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Carafano, James (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:36 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

busy until about 1000 am

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thu 10/19/2006 6:03 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together. In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available. Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Chuck Nash (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:21 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6)

May work for me... let's give it a shot.
All the best,
CHuck

(b)(6)

OSD PA wrote:

Gentlemen,
I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.
In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.
Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:17 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6)

I AM INTERESTED.
Tom

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA" (b)(6)
Subj: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow
Date: Thu Oct 19, 2006 6:03 pm
Size: 1K
To: undisclosed-recipients.;

Gentlemen,

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In the meantime, please let me know if you are interested and available.

Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:13 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

(b)(6) Would love to be in on it. Lemme know. Thanks. Jed

Jed Babbin
(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Tim Eads (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:07 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow
Signed By: Verifying the signature. Click the icon for details.

I can attend

Timur J. Eads
Blackbird Technologies Inc.
13900 Lincoln Park Dr.
Suite 400
Herndon, Va. 20171
Office: 703-480-1215
Cell: (b)(6)
Fax: 703-464-9381
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 6:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Possible Conference Call Tomorrow

Gentlemen,
I wanted to give you a heads up that we MAY be able to put together a conference call with a senior u.s. military leader out of Iraq tomorrow morning to talk to you about the increased violence. The call would probably take place first thing in the morning (0800 eastern time), so please mark your calendars if you are able to join us. I will send out call in info as soon as I can confirm that we're able to pull it together.
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Thanks and have a great evening.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 10:10 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Simmons

Dallas:

A note to thank you for everything you have done for the outreach program of DOD. Because of your program and the outstanding work of the WH, I had the honor of sitting in front of the POTUS today while he signed the Military Commissions Act of 2006. For an "old grunt" like me, it was great. Many of the "usual suspects" from your GREAT program were present. Chatted with the SECDEF who knows my sister, (b)(6) DEPUSECDEF. What a great day. Thank you and thank you to (b)(6) who makes it all happen. I look forward to seeing you both soon. Take care.

Wayne

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

(b)(6)

From: Robert H. Scales (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 5:26 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Info for trip

Many thanks. I'm traveling now but will send the info tomorrow.
Scales

From: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tue 10/17/2006 1:01 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Robert H. Scales
Subject: RE: Info for trip

(b)(6) - Many Thanks for the assist. You're awesome.

General - Looking forward to coordinating this with you. I do not know at this moment if I will be accompanying you, or if Col (b)(6) will be. But suffice to say, this will be a great trip. Please call me at your convenience with questions at any time for further details.

VR/ CDR (b)(6)

OASD Public Affairs

Plans, Liaison and Coordination

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 3:47 PM
To: 'Scales, Maj Gen Robert'
Cc: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA
Subject: Info for trip

sir,

i have copied cdr (b)(6) on this email. he will be in touch with you tomorrow morning to work out the logistics.

in the meantime, here is the info we need:

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

(USA, Retired)

SSN: (b)(6)

Clearance: TS

DOB: (b)(6)

POB: (b)(6)

Passport #:

Passport Date of Issue:

Place of issue:

Passport Date of Expiration:

Blood type: (b)(6)

Emergency POC:

- Name:

- Relationship:

- Phone:

- Email:

thanks very much. glad you are able to make it!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 4:01 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; 'Scales, Maj Gen Robert'
Subject: RE: Info for trip

(b)(6) Many Thanks for the assist. You're awesome.

General – Looking forward to coordinating this with you. I do not know at this moment if I will be accompanying you, or if Col (b)(6) will be. But suffice to say, this will be a great trip. Please call me at your convenience with questions at any time for further details.

VR/ CDR (b)(6)

OASD Public Affairs

Plans, Liaison and Coordination

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 3:47 PM
To: 'Scales, Maj Gen Robert'
Cc: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA
Subject: Info for trip

sir,

i have copied cdr hicks on this email. he will be in touch with you tomorrow morning to work out the logistics.

in the meantime, here is the info we need:

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)

SSN: (b)(6)

Clearance: TS

DOB: (b)(6)

POB: (b)(6)

Passport #:

Passport Date of Issue:

Place of issue:

Passport Date of Expiration:

Blood type: (b)(6)

Emergency POC:

- Name:

- Relationship:

- Phone:

- Email:

thanks very much. glad you are able to make it!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, October 16, 2006 10:35 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Subject: military analysts
Attachments: Military Analysts in Iraq 10.16.06.doc

Hi (b)(6)

I have attached an updated report on the four military analysts who went to Iraq. We have not been able to find anything for Bing West or Col. Garret.

(b)(6)

Media Analyst, OSD/PARA
The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Phone: (b)(2)
Email: (b)(6)

12/3/2007

Military Analysts in Iraq

General Wayne Downing

NBC News: Nightly News – 10/1, 18:38:11

KEVIN CORKE: It's a delicate balance for a White House that previously trumpeted the accuracy of Woodward's reporting, notably his 2004 best-seller "Plan of Attack." This time the strategy seems clear, attack the message, not the messenger. On Woodward's claim that then Chief of Staff Andy Card and first lady Laura Bush "tried to convince the president to fire Donald Rumsfeld," the first lady's office said the allegation is "flatly not true." Woodward also describes a 2005 meeting in which he suggests General John Abizaid, who is overseeing the Iraq war effort, said Donald Rumsfeld "doesn't have any credibility anymore." One of the men at that meeting, General Wayne Downing, said today Woodward got it wrong.

General WAYNE DOWNING: I never heard him get into saying that he had no part in the strategy process nor did he think that Secretary Rumsfeld was irrelevant. Never heard him say that, and if he had said that, I believe that I would have remembered that.

CNN: American Morning CNN - 10/11/06, 06:36:03

CNN: American Morning CNN - 10/11/06, 09:07:59

CNN: CNN Newsroom – 10/10, 14:08:35

CNN: Your World Today - 10/10, 12:39:10

Same transcript for all four clips

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

PERRY (voice over): This is the scene after the bodies are found. How bad is the sectarian violence in Iraq? Bodies are the barometer. And in one day, more than 60 were found in the capital. Many of them mutilated, executed, bound. Relatives grieving outside hospitals to collect their loved ones. This, a scene that is played out in the capital more than 280 times so far this month. No end in sight to the tit-for-tat sectarian killings.

COL. JEFFREY MCCAUSLAND, U.S. ARMY (RET.): We have added that deadly mix, inter-sectarian violence, which is the center point of everybody's attention in Iraq. And obviously if we can't dampen down the inter-sectarian violence, the possibility of civil war certainly looms large.

PERRY: Besides the mounting toll of Iraqi casualties, a deadly October continues for U.S. troops. More than 30 killed in combat in the first 10 days of October. Most of them as U.S. and Iraqi forces press ahead with Operation Together Forward, aimed at flushing extremists out of Baghdad. More U.S. troops on the streets means more U.S. casualties.

MCCAUSLAND: We've seen this dramatic upsurge in killing, particularly in Baghdad, and certainly we must get control of that situation. And the next few months will be certainly critical in that effort.

PERRY: Operation Together Forward has yielded its successes, according to the U.S. military, saying that overall attacks are up, but their "effectiveness" is down.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

CNN: American Morning CNN - 10/11/06, 08:50:17

M. O'BRIEN: In Iraq today, more of the familiar violence, a suicide car bombing, an assassination. But a new wrinkle, perhaps, what maybe a mass poisoning of Iraqi police officer. While the violence continues to escalate, there is real concern about what happens in the next month or so in Iraq. Retired Army Colonel and CBS radio analyst Jeffrey McCausland just returned from his third trip to Iraq since the U.S. invasion, his fourth trip overall. He joins us from Washington. Colonel McCausland, good to have you back on the program.

JEFFREY MCCAUSLAND, (RET.) U.S. ARMY: Miles, great to be with you.

M. O'BRIEN: Your third trip, you met with high-ranking Iraqi leaders, including the prime minister. You walked away, I'm told, less optimistic.

MCCAUSLAND: Well, that's certainly the case, Miles. I mean, up until February, with the attack on the Golden Mosque, we were confronted with the security problem of insurgents, terrorists, al Qaeda and

Iraq, and a big criminal problem. There was a lot of euphoria after those elections in January. Now we've added that deadly mix, intersectorian violence, which is the center point of everybody's attention in Iraq. And, obviously, if we can't dampen down the intersectorian violence, the possibility of civil war certainly looms large.

M. O'BRIEN: Another person who visited recently in Iraq is Republican Senator John Warner. Let's listen to what he had to say when he came back.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. JOHN WARNER (R), VIRGINIA: I assure you in two or three months, if this thing hasn't come to fruition and if this level of violence is not under control and this government able to function, I think it's a responsibility of our government internally to determine is there a change of course that we should take?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

M. O'BRIEN: What do you make of that statement?

MCCAUSLAND: Well, I'd have to agree wholeheartedly with Senator Warner. I think we're really at a tipping point in Iraq. You know, we have a new government, the first real long-term sovereign government with Prime Minister Maliki. They've only been in power about 100 days. We've seen this dramatic upsurge in killing, particularly in Baghdad, and certainly we must get control of that situation, and the next few months will be certainly critical in that effort.

M. O'BRIEN: At this point, what, if anything, can the U.S. do about this? Is there a change of tactics? Is there an addition or subtraction of troops that can help?

MCCAUSLAND: We, really, we've to rely more and more, I think, on the Iraqis. Certainly the central effort is in Baghdad, and U.S. military forces are concentrating there, while actually exercising economy of force operations elsewhere. They're moving into neighborhoods, they're seizing a neighborhood, they're clearing it of excessive weapons, trying to do some immediate service assistance, water improvement, electricity, medical and the like, and then hopefully, you know, on the Iraqi security forces. But obviously to buttress the Iraqi government, we must see the Iraqi security forces, army, as well as police, taking more and more of the responsibility as this going on.

M. O'BRIEN: And of course that's problematic. Because as we saw last week, a portion of the Iraqi security forces, 700 or 800 of them, were disbanded because it is believed they were part of death squads essentially. So how much confidence do you have in these Iraqi security forces?

MCCAUSLAND: Well, the Iraqi army, I think, is in pretty good shape. And I spent a lot of time talking with General Dempsey, who's in charge there. He's done a great job. I went out on patrol and talked to a lot of Iraqis, and you get a lot of mixed reviews. Less confidence, of course, in the Iraqi police, which as you rightfully point out, have been accused of being infiltrated by some of the militias. But one could argue we have a new ministry of interior, and actually the identification of those in that brigade is actually good news, as we're starting over time to root out those who are affiliated with the militias, though the timing for this obviously makes it very, very difficult.

M. O'BRIEN: And quickly, how much confidence do you have in Mr. Maliki and his government?

MCCAUSLAND: Well, it remains to be seen. Again, they're only a hundred days into office, and they have an enormous number of problems. Is this going to be a federal state, or a loose confederation of regions. How do we handle de-Baathification? How do we share oil? When will this government have the strength to confront these militias and insist they turn in their weapons? And many of those militia leaders actually provide political support to the Maliki government.

M. O'BRIEN: Retired Army Colonel Jeffrey McCausland, thanks as always for being with us -- Soledad.

MCCAUSLAND: Thanks, Miles.

S. O'BRIEN: In just a moment, a look at the top stories, including the breaking news out of North Korea. The nation says it carried out a nuclear test. What happens now? The president's going to speak live in next hour. We'll have reaction as well from around the world. Stay with us.

Analysis: Retired Army Colonel Jeff McCausland discusses Bob Woodward's book, "State of Denial"

CBS News: The Saturday Early Show - 9/30, 06:06:24

RUSS MITCHELL, co-host: Retired Army Colonel Jeff McCausland is a CBS News consultant who recently returned from his fourth visit to Iraq. This morning he is visiting the United States Military

Academy at West Point. He joins us to talk about the war in Iraq and some of the revelations in Bob Woodward's book. Colonel, good morning to you.

Colonel JEFF McCAUSLAND, Retired (CBS News Consultant): Russ, it's great to be with you.

MITCHELL: We appreciate you being here. As I said, you've just returned from your fourth visit to Iraq, let me ask you the same question I asked Lara. In your mind, is it getting better or worse?

Col. McCAUSLAND: Well, I'm certainly a bit more pessimistic. When I was there last time, it was right before the elections, there was a lot of euphoria, 70 percent of Iraqis turned out to vote, there was a great hope a new government would step forward and take control. And sadly, that still has not taken place in the fullest sense of the word. That government's getting off the ground, and as Lara pointed out, we have this new ingredient, inter-sectarian violence. And so senior military officers that I've talked to describe the situation as the most complex security situation we have faced since the invasion in 2003.

MITCHELL: In Bob Woodward's book, he reports General John Abizaid--of course, the commander of all US troops in the Middle East--referred to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as having lost credibility. Do the US generals that you've talked to respect the job the secretary of defense is doing?

Col. McCAUSLAND: Well, I'd say, by and large, yes. But, quite candidly, that wasn't a topic that I took up with them to any great degree. But of course, earlier this week we saw several distinguished retired general officers--you know Paul Eaton of--a very good friend of mine, John Batiste--testify before Congress just on that particular issue with respect to Secretary Rumsfeld.

MITCHELL: Woodward also reports, as we heard in Mike Wallace's report, that snippet from it, that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is a frequent visitor to the White House, and he's pushing the notion that victory is the only meaningful exit strategy. From your expertise, what do you think of that strategy?

Col. McCAUSLAND: Well, I'm not quite sure what victory looks like in this particular context. You know, we have an insurgent problem, as Lara pointed out, a terrorist problem, a criminal problem, and now, inter-sectarian violence, all ongoing, simultaneously, so it's a bit difficult to describe what victory looks like in that context. And you know, the problem now in many ways reminds me more of my time in Bosnia and Kosovo in the Balkans between inter-sectarian groups, than it does perhaps Vietnam.

MITCHELL: I was going to ask you, from the way you look at it, and, again, going back to that snippet we saw from Mike Wallace's interview with Bob Woodward, the notion is that Henry Kissinger is fighting the Vietnam War once again. And when you look at it, is it turning into another Vietnam in any way at all?

Col. McCAUSLAND: The one way it's like Vietnam is one of the things we never really accomplished, I think, thoroughly, in Vietnam, was convincing young South Vietnamese that there was a legitimate government that they should be willing to fight and die for. And that's the same thing in many ways we and the Iraqis are now doing in Iraq with the establishment of this new government which has a four-year mandate. Only had about a hundred days, but they need to quickly take control, they need to quickly assert their authority, particularly over the militias in Baghdad and provide those services that will win, over time, the allegiance of the population.

MITCHELL: Colonel Jeff McCausland, thank you so much for taking time out of your day to talk to us. We really appreciate it.

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 10/09/06, 18:12:40 - North Korea/threat

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 10/09/06, 16:12:21 - North Korea/threat

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 10/05/06, 08:04:35 - Afghanistan/NATO transfer

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 09/25/06, 11:37:11 - Army funding/equipment

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 09/25/06, 08:03:13 - Army funding/equipment

WCBS-NY (Radio) - 09/25/06, 05:00:41 - Attacks in Baghdad

WCBS-NY (Radio): 09/18/06, 16:31:12

Col. Jeff McCausland (Taped): Just when you thought things in Iraq couldn't get any more difficult, along comes the Pope who makes some comments about Islam which makes things more difficult here in Iraq. About 2 percent of the population of Iraq is Christians and following the Pope's comments, there have been demonstrations in Basra, Karbala, as well as here in Baghdad. The governor today made an

official statement calling on all Iraqis not to attack Christians in response to the Pope's comments. Having said that, one of the militia groups, that is the one headed by [inaudible], have reportedly told his people to attack Christians.

Wayne Downing

MSNBC: MSNBC News Live – 9/29, 14:32:16

Two part interview

MSNBC: MSNBC News Live – 9/29, 14:54:27

Melissa: Retired U.S. Army General and MSNBC Analyst Wayne Downing is live in Washington, D.C. with us, meanwhile. He just returned from Iraq. His eighth visit there. General, one of the more startling allegation from this book printed in the "New York times," is that in November 2003, President Bush was instructing his cabinet not to use the term insurgency. Why was this so important to him then and what went into the decision to start using that term.

Gen. Downing: I think Melissa, the number one assumption that you're making is he in fact did that. This is alleged in that book. I can't imagine why he would. General John Abizaid, the commander of the central command, when he took over one of the first thing he said in the summer of 2003 was that we have an insurgency on our hands not here. So there was recognition by the military. And that's the top military commander that there was a problem. So I'm just not sure what was said. All this is hearsay and Woodward's book is really, a lot of juicy tid bits in it. But it really is almost a gossip column.

Melissa: One of those tid bits is that Woodward is accusing the Bush Administration of ignoring a memo from a top advisor calling for an additional 40,000 troop in Iraq. You've been there. First of all, do you agree that more troops were needed? Or do you disagree? And what do you make of this report?

Gen. Downing: Well Melissa, I do think more troop were needed during the invasion of Iraq. I actually don't think there are more troop needed there now. The passage you're talking about according to the newspaper report that I read was that Ambassador Blackwell, who was on the national Security Council and the Iraq coordinator made this recommendation for 40,000 more troop.

Melissa: You know what? I apologize, General. They're asking Tony Snow about this book right now. Let me just cut you off for just a second and let's hear what Tony Snow has to say about it.

...**Melissa:** Let's go back to "State of Denial" and bring back retired General Wayne Downing. He was facing some tough questions there, Mr. Snow, about first of all about, troop strengths. Also one thing we were talking about earlier before we had to cut you off -- we're sorry about that -- General John Abizaid reportedly, allegedly in this book saying, "Rumsfeld has lost all credibility." in that press conference just then, Tony Snow said we'll let the generals handle that. You probably know these generals. What do you think -- what is their working relationship with the secretary of defense?

Gen. Downing: Well, each one of the generals probably has a different viewpoint on that, Melissa. Certainly, I don't think John Abizaid would be dumb enough to make that kind of a statement in some kind of a public forum. You just don't criticize your chain of command. We've all had difficult bosses before and you have to learn to work with them. Secretary Rumsfeld is a very, very strong man. He's done a lot of thing very, very well, but he is controversial. He has run over some people. And if you're going to deal with him, personally, you've got to stand up to him and talk to him directly. And I believe for example John Abizaid and George Casey who is over in Iraq as our commander do just exactly that.

Melissa: have the generals in command asked for more troops? and has the secretary of defense responded?

Gen. Downing: Well Melissa, I don't know. But I have to think that if John Abizaid and Casey asked for more troops, the Secretary of Defense would take that to the president. The President himself probably talks to those guys -- maybe every other week on this secure video teleconferencing system that they use. I have got to think that those kinds of thing would come out. I doubt knowing how the military works, that those commanders would ask for more troops without talking to the Secretary of Defense before that -- and coming up with a, an opinion, a department of defense position. Not having been there, I don't know if they've asked. But I've got to think if they needed them, they probably would get them.

Melissa: All right. General Wayne Downing, MSNBC analyst and retire Army General. Thank you very much.

MSNBC: MSNBC News Live – 9/19, 13:54:32

Anchor: U.S. and Iraqi forces are implementing dramatic new measures in Baghdad as they try to stop sectarian violence from degenerating into civil war. MSNBC military analyst retired General Wayne Downing was recently in Iraq. He was meeting with senior U.S. and Iraqi officials. And while he was there, he sat down with NBC's Mike Bechter.

Mike Bechter: General, you've been here four days. You've seen what's going on right now. Are we winning, the United States? Is the United States losing? Or is that even the right question to ask?

Gen. Wayne Downing: Tremendous progress on the military front. The Iraqi army has stood up. The units I saw are doing very very well. But, the provision of services to the people has not occurred. Primarily because of security type things. But the other thing is we still have these sectarian political issues that have not been solved.

Bechter: Did the military officials you spoke here, top generals, did they say they think a political process will work here to make that happen?

Gen. Downing: I talked to not only American generals, I talk to British generals, I talked to Iraqi generals, I talked to colonels, people throughout the chain of command. They're doing what they can do. All of them also expect the politicians to do what they have to do.

These political parties, these Sunni and Shia parties, they have got to come together and they've got to solve some fundamental differences that we papered over when we did that constitution, and they've got to come to grips with that

Bechter: I'm told by senior military officials here that since Zarqawi was killed, they've been able to kick the heck out of the insurgency. That the problem is not so much that but the sectarian violence. And we've had 200 people killed in the last five days.

Gen. Downing: It is sectarian violence. It is the death squad. The Sunni death squad, the Shia death squad, it's the Mahdi Army and this is what they have to get after now.

Bechter: They're talking about this new plan to build a ring around Baghdad.

Gen. Downing: it will be several rings, which are primarily checkpoints, barb wire fences, a couple of ditches which will channel people so they can't easily get in and out of the city without going through some kind of a physical check point. It is a technique that won't go on forever but it will support the overall effort to diffuse Baghdad.

Anchor: That was Mike talking to General Wayne Downing in Iraq.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 5:44 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6), CTR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Subject: Military Analysts 10.13
Attachments: Military Analysts 10.13.06.doc

Hi (b)(6)

Attached are three clips, there is Lt. Col. Rick Francona talking about North Korea's nuclear test (10/13), Brig. Gen. David Grange discussing troop levels and violence in Iraq (10/12), and Jed Babbin discussing the Lancet Iraqi death toll study (10/12). We'll continue monitoring for coverage.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

791

Lt. Col. Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)

MSNBC: MSNBC News Live 10/13/06 14:06:19

HOST: Did they or didn't they? The claim that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon last Sunday. Air test results are fueling suspicions that things may not be as they seem. MSNBC analyst and U.S. Air Force retired Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona is here. Let's talk about this air sample. What is it? And what does it mean?

Lt. Col. Rick Francona: This is the only test they've actually finished completing their analysis of. They use an aircraft called a Constant Phoenix, a modified 707. And it basically is a big vacuum cleaner. It goes through the air space in an area where we believe a nuclear test would have been conducted and takes air samples. And those samples are taken back to the laboratory analyze for any particular matter. It would indicate the presence of nuclear activity. The telltale signature of a nuclear detonation. And the first test has been negative. Right now there is nothing to indicate there was anything in the air that would indicate that.

HOST: This is only the first test. How many more do you think there will be?

Lt. Col. Francona: This aircraft takes a variety of samples through different kinds of filters and each will go through a different testing regimen to see if there is anything there. That in itself doesn't mean there was or was not a nuclear detonation. This was an underground test so most of the radioactive would be contained. We believe there is something that gets out.

HOST: There are two lines of thought here today. Some people who believe that the North Koreans may have actually faked this test. In other words, loaded this place up with TNT, but you seem to think that it was probably a fail nuclear test. Is that right?

Lt. Col. Rick Francona: I understand that North Korea wanted everyone to think they successfully detonated a nuclear device, but this would have been such a small detonation that it is raising all these questions. Normally you see yields in excess of 1 kiloton, this one initially came in at 550 tons. So we're way below where it should be. That said, they could have detonated this device and it didn't go into a complete nuclear detonation. That's what we may be seeing. It doesn't take much high explosives to trigger the nuclear reaction.

HOST: Thanks Rick.

Brig. Gen. David Grange (USA, Retired)

CNN: Lou Doggs Tonight 10/12/06 18:35:36

KITTY PILGRIM: The U.S. Army says it's planning to keep current U.S. troop levels in Iraq for the next four years. With this statement, it is unlikely there will be significant withdrawal of troops in the near future. For more on the impact of this announcement and for more perspective on other developments in Iraq, we turn to General David Grange. General Grange joins us from Chicago.

Thanks for being with us.

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Good evening.

PILGRIM: Let's start. Yesterday President Bush responded to pressures that the United States should set a definitive time period for troop withdrawal, and let's talk about what he said.

He said, "they may not use cut and run but they say that a date certain is the way to get out before the job is done. That is cut and run. And maybe their words are more sophisticated than mine but when you pull out when the job is done, it is cut and run as far as I'm concerned."

President Bush very clearly saying that we are not going to cut and run. What is your position on this new announcement and the president's statement?

GRANGE: Well, on the president's statement, I mean, you know, first of all, it's good to let the enemy know that you have the resolve, that you're going to finish this thing through and it's not the American way to lose a war. I mean, we have lost in the past and I don't think we want to do that again.

I mean, it's one of these things that if we leave, I think the whole region will explode, if not right away, immediately after that. And so, I mean, there's no other choice whether you agree with the fact that we went into Iraq or not that we have to win this thing.

Now, to make the statement that we're going to keep the same troop levels for four more years, if that's in fact the case, I'm glad that's an upfront statement. It's better to say you're going to have more than what you have right now and then downsize is good news than keep going back and forth and saying, well, we may have to pull guys, may have to extend them. Put what you need in there to win, even if it takes a long time, and get on with it.

PILGRIM: There was some discussion a phased withdrawal and that was pretty much the way it was discussed up until this point, General Grange. Is it really the failure of the Iraqi forces, both police and army, to fill the gaps?

GRANGE: Well, you know, it takes awhile to train up forces. I mean, I know how long it takes to train the best armies in the world, ours and armies like ours. And so when you're starting from scratch, with a culture like this, especially on the leadership training, you can't do it overnight. And it takes time.

At the same -- while you're doing this training, at the same time you have a lot of militant leaders that don't want this thing to work and they're trying to break it apart. General Casey, we were able to talk to him last week on a teleconference, and he said that, you know, to have prosperity in Iraq, you've got to have security and to have security, you've got to have unity.

And what the enemy is doing is attacking both the security and the unity, the unity of the people, unity of the government and security of the people, attacking those two critical aspects, those two conditions because they know that's what it takes for them to win. And so they have to get on with getting that resolved with the unity and the security, if we have any chance for victory.

PILGRIM: You know, we've been looking at the figures of Ramadan. There have been an average of 36 attacks a day in Iraq now. It's something -- a spike we usually see during this period, but is it worse than ever?

GRANGE: I think it's been pretty bad, as we know, and it's getting worse. And that's because the strategy of the militant Sunni and Shia leaders, as well as the country of Iran, the leaders of Iran, that is their strategy to break this thing apart. And so you have these other influences that the coalition and the Iraqi government did not have to such a degree before.

You were fighting terrorists, you were fighting insurgents, you were fighting criminals. Now you're dealing with these militant militias and advisers and influence from the country of Iran, which is now increasing the violence.

PILGRIM: Thank you very much, General David Grange.

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)

CNBC: Kudlow & Company 10/12/06 17:36:10

LARRY KUDLOW, host: Welcome back here, everybody. Here's a tough one. A new study conducted by Johns Hopkins University to be published in the British Medical Journal The Lancet claims that over 600,000 Iraqis have died since the US' occupation in March 2003. If true, these are staggering numbers. The US didn't even have that many casualties in all of World War II. But the question is, is it true? President Bush didn't seem to think so when he spoke yesterday. Take a listen.

President GEORGE W. BUSH: I don't consider it a credible report. Neither does General Casey and neither do Iraqi officials. This report is one, they put it out before. It was pretty well--the methodology was pretty well discredited. Six hundred thousand or whatever they guessed at is just--it's not credible.

KUDLOW: All right, and another question is, if a report is, in fact, often inaccurate, will it still come to haunt the Republicans come midterms in 26 days? Your money, your vote. Here to debate these questions are **Jed Babbin**, former deputy undersecretary of defense under Papa Bush, author of "Inside the Asylum;" And Jed's favorite adversary, **P.J. Crowley**, former senior Pentagon official and senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Gentlemen, welcome.

Mr. P.J. CROWLEY (Center for American Progress): Hi, Larry.

Mr. JED BABBIN (Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense): Hi.

KUDLOW: P.J., let me begin with you. What is your take? Six hundred thousand in Iraq in three years? More than World War II. It kind of begs credulity, but what do you think?

Mr. CROWLEY: I think it's a little high, Larry. The real truth is probably somewhere around half to two-thirds--to a third of that. But it doesn't mean it's not a number with significance. For example, the population of Iraq, give or take, is 22 million people. If it is, in fact, say one third of that, it's 1 percent of the Iraqi population. To put that in American terms, the equivalent impact for the United States would be around three million to four million people, which is the population of Minneapolis-St. Paul or Atlanta. So the real issue is, there's a very significant and growing death toll in Iraq, all of these killings of--by the ethnic militia, 1500 deaths in the Baghdad mortal--morgue alone last month.

KUDLOW: Jed...

Mr. CROWLEY: So, you know, there is a very significant death toll, but that number, I think, is high.

KUDLOW: **Jed Babbin**, you look inside this report, we got some leaks I guess from NBC News. Mr.--Dr. Gilbert Burnham of Johns Hopkins University, who is one of the authors, he says, actually, they can only prove documentation for roughly 500 deaths. The rest of it is an extrapolation, something called cluster analysis, if I have that right. So, Jed, what's your take?

Mr. BABBIN: Well, I don't remember who it was that first said, maybe it was Mark Twain, there are lies, damn lies, and statistics. I mean, obviously, this thing is another

October surprise, Larry. It's not at all credible. The last time they published this same report, the same group went out and did a similar analysis two years ago, and guess what? They put it out just before the 2004 election. They said then that 100,000 had been killed. Well, I guess, if we believe them, there have been half million people killed in Iraq in the past two years. It's risible. Something here really is very telling that none of the major media outlets are paying much attention to this. I mean, the only place that's given this really significant coverage is Al Jazeera, so that sort of says it all.

KUDLOW: No, no, no, that's not completely fair. The reason why we picked it up, there was a big story in The Wall Street Journal yesterday.

Mr. BABBIN: Hmm.

KUDLOW: There was a big story in The New York Times yesterday. It was all over the Drudge Report. It's out there. I don't know about drum-beating, but it is out there. I mean, Jed, P.J. is saying the number is lower, but I take it he still thinks it's a very high number. As I recall, the US military's been talking about 30,000 deaths. That by itself is still a fairly tragic number, but where do you think the deaths are?

President Bush has estimated that 30K or less have died in Iraq since invasion

Mr. BABBIN: Sure. Well, I don't really know. I think, and brace yourselves, people, I think P.J. is probably right. I think somewhere in excess of 100,000, probably below 200,000. Nobody really knows. The issue here is this doctor you just quoted from Johns Hopkins was saying, 'Well, we really wanted to get this out before the election.' That's what their agenda is. I don't think it's going to have any political effect because I just don't think it has any traction or much credibility.

KUDLOW: Well, Bush trashed it pretty good. P.J., we are going to have our production staff duly note that Jed suggested that he actually agrees with you on an issue.

Mr. CROWLEY: I want to write that down.

KUDLOW: You might want to replay that at some later date.

Mr. BABBIN: It had to happen eventually.

KUDLOW: It had to happen, the laws of probability, but no econometric calculus. P.J., is this an October surprise? Does this group, which I believe, by the way, was financed--it's the Mike Bloomberg, the mayor of New York, he was one of the benefactors. He is an alumnus and major contributor to Johns Hopkins and, I believe, board member. Is this an October surprise? Is there political content on this?

Mr. CROWLEY: Well, I don't know, Larry. I think, you know, we've seen the last couple of elections where pollsters get their polling data, depending on your sample, it has a great impact on what the findings are. It could well be that the cluster they chose, the closer you get to Baghdad, the more you're going to have families with deaths in them. So I'm not sure that was a national sample, who knows. I don't think--I agree with Jed that I don't believe that this by itself is going to have a lot of impact, although I think that Iraq is going to have a significant impact, more than you would normally believe in a midterm election. But I think...

KUDLOW: P.J., is this election a referendum on Iraq? Some believe it is.

Mr. CROWLEY: This election is referendum on George Bush and the decision he made to go into Iraq--when he did, how he did, and why he did. Will definitely be affected.

KUDLOW: **Jed Babb**in, there's a front page story in The New York Sun called "Baker's Panel Rules Out Iraq Victory." First of all, Mr. Baker says we should be negotiating

diplomatically with Iran and Syria as one of the solution avenues to Iraq. Jed, do you agree with that?

Mr. BABBIN: Well, no. But you know, what Mr. Baker is saying is just what Joe Biden has been saying for over a year now, and I'm kind of surprised Mr. Baker would come out at that. What he is saying is essentially we have lost. And the fact is, we can only settle Iraq by dealing with the people who want to take it over, Syria and Iran. My take is just a little bit different. I think you cannot have success in Iraq without dealing with Syria and Iran, but I'm not talking about negotiating with them, Larry.

KUDLOW: Well, JJ, shouldn't we have some diplomacy with Syria and Iran? I mean, look, Jim Baker is a Republican consigliere, sometimes I call him the Cardinal Richelieu of the Republican Party. He's going to have this study right after Election Day. He's saying we should negotiate. I don't know think he's declaring defeat, although it's not clear he's saying we can win. What's your quick take on the Baker program, JJ?

Mr. CROWLEY: We have to have dialogue with Syria, Iran, even North Korea if we're going to succeed and convince them to go at a different course. I think what Jim Baker's ultimately going to say is stay the course. It's not a strategy.

KUDLOW: So you don't see the Baker idea as an exit strategy, JJ?

Mr. CROWLEY: No, I think the Baker idea is a realistic strategy to try to reshape the dynamic in the Middle East and try to get more help with us for Iraq.

KUDLOW: Jed Babbín, real quick, do you see Mr. Baker's idea as an exit strategy or not?

Mr. BABBIN: I think it is. I think Mr. Baker is looking for a graceful way out, and there simply isn't one.

KUDLOW: All right. President Bush was very tough and stern on this yesterday. Jed Babbín, P.J. Crowley, thanks ever so much.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 3:48 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Retired Military Analysts list

Thank you for this invitation. Yes, I would like to be kept informed of talking points of help to DOD. It is highly unlikely that I would be able to participate in conferences and meetings at the Pentagon as I live in Seattle.

Thomas B. Hayward
Admiral, former Chief of Naval Operations

(b)(6)

(h)(b)(6)
(c)
(f)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 11:48 AM
Subject: Retired Military Analysts list

Sir,
Your email was passed to me by (b)(6) of OSD Public Affairs. He said you might be interested in being added to our retired military analysts list. If you are added to the list, you will receive talking points from DoD on current issues as well as periodic invitations to participate in conference calls and occasional roundtable meetings at the pentagon with senior dod officials.

If you are interested, please let me know and provide the following:

- name
- rank at retirement
- affiliation (news organization)
- address
- phone
- cellular
- fax
- assistant's contact info (if applicable)

We will hold the information as confidential and will only use it for the purposes I have stated above.

Thanks for your consideration and I look forward to hearing from you.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: MAJGEN Thomas L Wilkerson USMC (Ret) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Transcripts

Thanks (b)(6)
This is really great and timely for us.

**Semper Fortis,
Fidelis & Paratus**

Tom W

Thomas L. Wilkerson
CEO & Publisher

U. S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Office: 410-295-1060
Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Oct 12, 2006, at 3:57 PM, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote:

Gentlemen,
Please find attached two transcripts from press events in the last several days. The first is the transcript from the media roundtable with General Schoomaker in which he makes comments regarding army planning out to 2010 in Iraq. These comments have been taken grossly out of context and reported as an admission by DoD that we will maintain significant troop numbers in Iraq until then. As you can see from his actual comments, this is not at all what he said. I've highlighted the part with these comments for your convenience.

The second transcript is from the press briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Casey yesterday. I have highlighted the Secretary's comments regarding the misrepresentation of General Schoomaker's remarks. There are quite a few other notable comments made yesterday that we hope you will find useful.

Have a great day,
(b)(6)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

<CSA roundtable transcript-Oct 06.doc>
<DoD News Briefing Sec Def and Casey.doc>

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:45 PM
To: (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: 12 OCT 06 - Laura Ingraham Radio Show - SECARMY Harvey (VIDEO CLIP) (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: 12_OCT_06_SA_Ingraham.wma

(b)(6) and (b)(6)

I am pushing this product out to my bloggers tonight. It might be of interest to the analysts and surrogates too.

Roxie T. Merritt
 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
 U.S. Department of Defense
 601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
 Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
 Phone: (b)(2)
 Fax: (b)(2)
 email: (b)(6)
 www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:35 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Subject: FW: 12 OCT 06 - Laura Ingraham Radio Show - SECARMY Harvey (VIDEO CLIP) (UNCLASSIFIED)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:28 PM
To: 'Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ'
Subject: FW: 12 OCT 06 - Laura Ingraham Radio Show - SECARMY Harvey (VIDEO CLIP) (UNCLASSIFIED)

roxie, can you get this interview fran harvey did with laura today out to some bloggers. he addressed the misreporting about general schoomaker's comments concerning army planning as a force provider, looking at iraq and 2010. is that something you folks do, or is that in another shop? thanks.

From: (b)(6) MAJ OCPA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 10:48 AM
To: (b)(6) COL Sec Army; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) LTC Sec Army; (b)(6) LTC SECARMY; (b)(6) LTC OCLL; (b)(6) (b)(6) MAJ Sec Army
Subject: 12 OCT 06 - Laura Ingraham Radio Show - SECARMY Harvey (VIDEO CLIP) (UNCLASSIFIED)

12/3/2007

Classification: **UNCLASSIFIED**

Caveats: NONE

Sir/Ma'am,
Please see the Audio clip below - I'm getting the content transcribed now.

VR, (b)(6)


Please note: Audio Only!

To listen, click on box below :



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PLEASE NOTE: If given the option to view in Internet Explorer, please click "No".

Video will automatically open in Windows Media Player instead.



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Caveats: NONE

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Caveats: NONE

Classification: **UNCLASSIFIED**

Caveats: NONE

12/3/2007

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801

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:41 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6) CTR,
OASD-PA
Subject: Mil Analysts
Attachments: Military Analysts 10.12.06.doc

Hi (b)(6)

Attached are two clips with Col. McCausland and Gen. Grange. We'll continue to monitor for any additional coverage with the military analysts. Please let us know if you need anything else.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Col. Jeff McCausland (USA, retired)

CNN: American Morning CNN - 10/11/06, 06:36:03

CNN: American Morning CNN - 10/11/06, 09:07:59

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

PERRY (voice over): This is the scene after the bodies are found. How bad is the sectarian violence in Iraq? Bodies are the barometer. And in one day, more than 60 were found in the capital. Many of them mutilated, executed, bound.

Relatives grieving outside hospitals to collect their loved ones. This, a scene that is played out in the capital more than 280 times so far this month. No end in sight to the tit-for-tat sectarian killings.

COL. JEFFREY MCCAUSLAND, U.S. ARMY (RET.): We have added that deadly mix, inter-sectarian violence, which is the center point of everybody's attention in Iraq. And obviously if we can't dampen down the inter-sectarian violence, the possibility of civil war certainly looms large.

PERRY: Besides the mounting toll of Iraqi casualties, a deadly October continues for U.S. troops. More than 30 killed in combat in the first 10 days of October. Most of them as U.S. and Iraqi forces press ahead with Operation Together Forward, aimed at flushing extremists out of Baghdad. More U.S. troops on the streets means more U.S. casualties.

MCCAUSLAND: We've seen this dramatic upsurge in killing, particularly in Baghdad, and certainly we must get control of that situation. And the next few months will be certainly critical in that effort.

PERRY: Operation Together Forward has yielded its successes, according to the U.S. military, saying that overall attacks are up, but their "effectiveness" is down.
(END VIDEOTAPE)

Brigadier General David Grange (USA, Retired)

CNN: The Situation Room 10/10/06 19:06:20

Wolf Blitzer: We're joined on the phone by our military analyst, retired U.S. Army Brigadier General David Grange. The pictures were spectacular. Is it your assumption, we don't know what sparked this, enemy fire or some sort of terrorist attack, insurgency operation could have caused this chain reaction, General?

Gen. Grange: The procedures, Jamie hinted to this, the procedures used to secure ammunition is quite extensive. The depots are set up so if enemy indirect fire comes in it doesn't damage more than maybe a few munitions, if any. So what has to be considered is if it was sabotage, of course it's a very good target for the enemy if it was sabotage that started that. What's exceptional here, is the procedures that the U.S. military uses to, one, sort out different types of munitions to limit the damage to a certain area. Two, the firefighting capability and the explosive ordinance teams that contain the area so people could out, so there's no damage or injury to civilians is quite exceptional. Obviously I think it was set up the correct way if disaster did happen and the cause of course is hard to tell at this time. If it was sabotage it was an excellent target in view of the enemy.

Blitzer: General, thanks very much. General Grange, giving us some perspective.

(b)(6)

From: Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 8:29 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
Subject: RE: Al-Qaida US escapee urges followers: Get nuclear

(b)(6)

We haven't been asked about this, so haven't prepared anything. I would think it just emphasizes how dangerous Al Qaeda is and how critical it is to prevent rogue regimes from developing nuclear weapons.

Mark

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 6:38 AM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) SES OSD PA
Subject: FW: Al-Qaida US escapee urges followers: Get nuclear

good morning,

do we have anything to say about the following ap story?? bob maginnis has been asked by cnn to respond on glenn beck's show this afternoon.

thanks

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded Message: -----

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) (Robert Maginnis)
Subject: Al-Qaida US escapee urges followers: Get nuclear
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2006 11:44:02 +0000

<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1159193413409&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>

Oct. 10, 2006 23:31

Al-Qaida US escapee urges followers: Get nuclear

By ASSOCIATED PRESS

CAIRO, Egypt

An al-Qaida member who escaped from a US prison in Afghanistan urged his followers in a new video aired **Tuesday to acquire nuclear technology.**

Abu Yahia al-Libi, who broke out of prison in July 2005, appeared in a video broadcast by the pan-Arab Al-Arabiya TV, telling his followers "to get prepared by starting with exercise ... then learn technology until you are capable of nuclear weapons," he said.

In the video, al-Libi, who appears to be talking to a group of fighters has a beard and is wearing a long gray robe. The video was the third reportedly featuring al-Libi since he escaped from prison.

12/3/2007

Al-Arabiya showed two minutes of what it said was an hour-long video exclusively obtained by the satellite channel. It also showed footage of what appeared to be a group of Arab fighters training.

--

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net> (b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 10:52 PM
To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF
Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; (b)(6) COL MNF-I CMD GRP XO; (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP (CIG); (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF COMM DIV
Subject: Transcripts from Defense Analysts interview with General Casey 061010
Attachments: General Casey Defense analysts interview 061010.doc

Sir, transcripts from today's interview. Key comments are bolded. vr, (b)(6)

(General Casey opening statement)

The situation is more complex now than in the two-plus years I've been there. What we have been seeing since the elections, especially since the bombing of the Samarra mosque, is the primary conflict is evolving from an insurgency against us to a struggle over the division of the political and economic power among the Iraqis. There are several different groups that are trying to influence that process in negative ways. The Sunni extremists, al Qaeda and the Iraqis that are supporting them, the Shiite extremists, the death squads and some of the more militant Shiite militia.

Then the resistance. When people talk about the insurgency, primarily the Sunni resistance, the ones fighting us, and then Syria and Iran are being are being unhelpful in a lot of different ways. Iran in a more active role, Syria in a more passive role. All of that together makes for a very difficult situation. Add the intensities of Ramadan and the struggle for control there in the Baghdad area and it's a very difficult situation and probably will be a difficult situation for a couple more months.

That's it. **Violence and progress co-exist in Iraq.** If you think it's all just violence you are making a mistake.

The new government has been on the ground here a little under 150 days. And I think you all recognize having three government transitions in two years didn't help with continuity problems. They are working hard building the capacity to govern with our help but it is a slow process. **The Prime Minister is focused on what I think is the most important thing his administration can do and that is and that is reconciliation.** When we talk we talk about three things: unity, prosperity and security. If you want prosperity you have to have security, and if you want security you have to have unity. The prime minister recognizes that and he is moving out and trying to achieve that.

Just a couple of words on the development of the security forces and other growing, positive, concerns there. Right now we have six of the 10 Iraqi Divisions are in the lead. Thirty of 36 brigades and almost 90 of 112 battalions are in the lead. That's a good thing. **I'll remind everybody that puts us a little over 75 percent through what I would say is the second step in a three step process:** First step being the training and equipping. You form them, organize them and give them their weapons; you make units out of them. Then you make them better. You put them in a position where they can conduct counter insurgency operations with our support. Then the next step is what is going to take place over the better part of '07 is putting them in a position where they can do it independently and that will continue to go on. On the police side we're doing OK at the local level in most of the places in the country. Two of the provinces have transferred to provincial Iraqi control. What that says is the police

12/3/2007

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are able to maintain domestic control in that province. We just started the National Police Reform program where we took the 1st Brigade off line and had them training down in Numaniyah where they were basically being re-blued. You'll remember that the National police were formed basically as infantry and didn't have any police training. We're going back and doing that. Unfortunately, I think you saw where approximately 400 of them got poisoned. We've sent some VET teams down there. It looks to be the water, but they are continuing to go through it. There are also some rumors that people have died. Nobody has died; at least that's what I was told this morning. It was a classic case of food poisoning. They gave everybody 96 hours off and we'll restart the training and continue the program. The other thing about the national police I think you read the Iraqi Minister pulled a brigade, the 8th Brigade off line because they were found to be complicit in the kidnapping—or some of the people were found to be complicit in the murder and kidnapping of some people just in the last week or so. That's a big step by the Minister. They have already replaced the brigade commander and he is already having an impact. So that process is continuing

So, bottom line, tough situation. And I suspect through Ramadan and over the next couple of months it's going to continue to be a difficult situation. That said, we continue to make progress at the political level and at the security level all around the country. Tough business, but I think the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are well up to it and doing a magnificent job. With that I'll turn it over to you guys for questions.

(Jeff McCauslin) It was great to see you out there and you're doing well. Question for you: are we moving toward a real confrontation with al Sadr and his militias. We've done a lot of neighborhoods; patrol those neighborhoods in Baghdad. We haven't gone into Sadr City yet. We have this on-going situation in Diwaniyah, which seems, at least the way it's reported over here, focused on Sadr and the Medhi army. Without giving away anything operational, is that the way we are going, is that the next big step to confront his militia?

(General Casey) One, **all militias have to be confronted and disbanded over time.** The prime minister and the leaders in Iraq understand that until the Iraqi security forces are the dominant security forces in the country that they are not going to have the kind of country that they want. That said, the strategy for dealing with the militia is at least two tracks. One is a political track and one is a military track. I think you'll find with the PM as with any political leader is going to try and use all the political means possible to resolve things and use force as a last resort. We'll continue to work with him on that. **My personal view is there are enough of these guys on the militia side that are just hard guys and they are going to fight on until they realize they don't have any military options. So I think force is going to be a part of it.** We are not chomping at the bit to do it and we are working hand in hand with the prime minister so that we have a balanced approach, but it's got to be done.

(Bing West) Thanks again for your gracious hospitality. I just got back from another month in country. I was on the road with 9 battalion and 9 police units, and a universal complaint they had was about the current rules of evidence and the difficulty in arresting insurgents and making the arrest stick. Are there going to be any movements politically to suspend habeas corpus and make it easier to arrest some of these guys?

(General Casey) Bing, I don't know that there are any specific initiatives to remove habeas corpus, but they do have some expanded authority under their emergency law and under their anti-terrorists law that they are using. That said, the rule of law institutions are very under developed. It is difficult to get a guy, with evidence, get him to jail, get him to trail, get him convicted. It happens; I think you have read where they executed the death penalty on a few of these folks. Until we and the Iraqi government make some strides on the rule of law institutions, the court system and then do some work on eliminating corruption at the local level, I mean I'm sure they told you they put a guy in jail, they pay a bribe and the

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guy is back on the street. We have a lot of work to do there with the rule of law program with the Iraqis but I don't know of any initiative to suspend habeas corpus.

(Don Sheppard) The question I get most often – everybody realizes things are going very tough and it takes approaches both on the political and military side. They keep asking, “what new is going to be done” and I tell them there isn't much left that's new to be done. There is no magic bullet. It's steady pressure and sticking with it. Go after these guys and the militias in concert with the politics and the military.

(General Casey) **We are constantly evaluating, re-evaluating and asking ourselves “is what we started out doing six months ago still applicable to the situation that we have now.** We have to balance that for the need for a broad, overarching scheme that gets us where we are going. I started back in July '04. There was like on battalion in the Iraqi Army. Now you got these guys out there, almost 90 battalions leading the effort. That process has got to continue. **Frankly, we are on a developmental timeline with the military and the police and the security institutions and ministries where I think the Iraqis are going to be pretty close to be able to assume security responsibilities I think by the end of '07.** They recognize that and it's part of this Joint Committee for Achieving Iraqi Security Self Reliance (JCAISR) we are work through with the Iraqi's right now. Obviously, conditions based and all the rest of that. The way the process has been moving that's going very well. Now, is anything new and different? We continue to adapt our tactics, techniques and procedures. If you guys have anything idea about a new approach I would be happy to listen to them.

(unknown analysts) A follow up to that, what should we make of the rhetoric attributed to Sen. Warner about the 2-3 months? Is there anything magic about two to three months (referring to a comment that the Iraqi leaders need to get their arms around the problem or Congress might be forced into a situation.

(General Casey) I haven't seen all of Sen. Warner's comments. I talked to him when he was there. I certainly didn't say anything about 2-3 months. **So, there is nothing magic about 2-3 months.** I think if he is expressing a sentiment that the Government needs to get their arms around the sectarian violence problem quickly – I would very much agree with that. **But, I don't think you can put any specific timelines on that and I don't know where that came from.**

(Jeff McCausliin) I don't have any magic solutions for you, but our problem I can tell you is in describing this changed, complex environment. We all keep getting beat up I'm sure by the comment that “as the Iraqis build up we were supposed to build down.” Well, the Iraqi's are building up and we all know the Iraqi Army is a good news story, but we are not building down. The trick is to explain, as you just did, that this is the most complex security situation and that's a tough thing for people to understand back over here. In the short term at least, to you expect an up tick in U.S. forces? We saw where the 172d was extended, at least one other brigade was extended, we are moving one other brigade of the 1st Cav. out early. Is there a possibility in the next few months of an up tick in U.S. force levels to try and get our arms around this sectarian violence problem?

(General Casey) I don't have any plans to do it right now. But, as we've said many times we are constantly looking at this and watching it. I hear the same thing about “standing up and standing down” and “we're not doing anything” I want to remind everybody that: one, we have already off-ramped two brigades with associated support—that's about 12,000 folks less. People get all lost in the rotations. **We are in a state of rotations through December. You'll see the number drop back under 130 thousand once we get done with all the rotations.** One of the things the Iraqi Security Force development allowed us to do is reposition force in Iraq away from areas they had taken control over. So, we were able to do this without increasing the total number of brigades in Iraq. **The other thing to remind them is the “stand up” is a three-part process and we are only 75 percent through the**

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second step. There is more to do.

Frankly, what happened as I look at the situation in late June early July it became clear to me that both the security forces and the government were not at the level they needed to be at to have a quick impact on the overall sectarian situation in Baghdad. Under our own mantra that "we are going to do what it takes to help the Iraqis win here" I reversed myself and put three more brigades into Baghdad and it did have an immediate impact on the situation there.

(Jeb Babbin) What are you hearing back, Maliki and any of his guys in terms of their concerns? Are they worried about our politics, do they see a threat coming up in reductions and so forth being forced on them. Are they feeling the pressure?

(General Casey) **I think they recognize the patience, at least among the American public, may be waning. And that contributes to a sense of urgency that, frankly they already have.** They recognize that this is their best chance here to put their country on an irreversible road to democracy and economic development and they need to take advantage of it in this window. There is a general sense that they need to get on with things and frankly they are stepping up and taking a lot of initiative here and it's hearting to see.

(Jeb Babbin) To follow up on that, in you opening comments you said our great friends in Syria and Iran were being either actively or passively unhelpful, can you give us any more specifics about that?

(General Casey) **I would say the situation coming out of Syria is about the same as it's been. They are giving safe haven to Ba'athists and they are allowing terrorists and foreign fighters to transit Syria and come in to Iraq. We think that is the primary route for terrorists and foreign fighters to come into Iraq. They are not doing anything to stop it that we can see. Frankly, when you talk to Iraqis who have lived in Syria and know what the government is capable of they tell you they could stop it if they wanted to.**

On the Iranian side, again there is no doubt they are providing weapons, training, money to Shiite extremist groups that are being used against the Coalition and against the Iraqi security forces and frankly to kill Iraq civilians.

(Bing West) Relative to reconciliation with the Sunni resistance, throughout al-Anbar you keep hearing the Iranian Shiites and the Iranian Prime Minister. Can we expect over the next months that Maliki will demonstrate something publicly to ally the concerns throughout al-Anbar that he really doesn't care about them?

(General Casey) I think you can Bing. He just chaired a session on Saturday with some al-Anbar Sheiks where he addressed them; he's released some of the money to them that had been promised by the previous government. In my discussions with him he recognizes that bringing al-Anbar into the fold is an important part of the reconciliation strategy. That said, you have been out to al-Anbar as much as anyone, it's going to take a lot of convincing to bring some of those folks in.

(Chuck Nash) Got a friend of mine who was working over there right after the fall of Baghdad. He spent about a year over there, transition over to the State as a contractor. Came back to the states for nine months and he just when back for a three-week trip. His assessment is that the reconstruction efforts are wrapping up and that the Army is packing up and pulling back. It gives him the impression that everybody is packing up to come home. Have we changed anything over there that would give some who was familiar with the way things were several years ago that kind of impression?

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(General Casey) I think probably. We just finished obligating all of the IRRF money by the end of the fiscal year. We have started 3,500 of the total 3,900 projects and finished 2,800-plus of the projects that were paid for by the IRRF. One, we don't need the numbers of people to go out and inspect the projects because there are just less projects going on. I think we will have started all of the projects by next summer. Some of the projects are large-scale projects that require a little more work up front. But yes, we have made very good progress frankly in executing the economic projects. What you are seeing is some down-sizing, but we are going to keep what we need on the ground so we continue to monitor the projects all the way through to completion. That may have been what he was seeing.

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General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
October 10, 2006

(General Casey opening statement)

The situation is more complex now than in the two-plus years I've been there. What we have been seeing since the elections, especially since the bombing of the Samarra mosque, is the primary conflict is evolving from an insurgency against us to a struggle over the division of the political and economic power among the Iraqis. There are several different groups that are trying to influence that process in negative ways. The Sunni extremists, al Qaeda and the Iraqis that are supporting them, the Shiite extremists, the death squads and some of the more militant Shiite militia.

Then the resistance. When people talk about the insurgency, primarily the Sunni resistance, the ones fighting us, and then Syria and Iran are being are being unhelpful in a lot of different ways. Iran in a more active role, Syria in a more passive role. All of that together makes for a very difficult situation. Add the intensities of Ramadan and the struggle for control there in the Baghdad area and it's a very difficult situation and probably will be a difficult situation for a couple more months.

That's it. Violence and progress co-exist in Iraq. If you think it's all just violence you are making a mistake.

The new government has been on the ground here a little under 150 days. And I think you all recognize having three government transitions in two years didn't help with continuity problems. They are working hard building the capacity to govern with our help but it is a slow process. **The Prime Minister is focused on what I think is the most important thing his administration can do and that is and that is reconciliation.** When we talk we talk about three things: unity, prosperity and security. If you want prosperity you have to have security, and if you want security you have to have unity. The prime minister recognizes that and he is moving out and trying to achieve that.

Just a couple of words on the development of the security forces and other growing, positive, concerns there. Right now we have six of the 10 Iraqi Divisions are in the lead. Thirty of 36 brigades and almost 90 of 112 battalions are in the lead. That's a good thing. **I'll remind everybody that puts us a little over 75 percent through what I would say is the second step in a three step process:** First step being the training and equipping. You form them, organize them and give them their weapons; you make units out of them. Then you make them better. You put them in a position where they can conduct counter insurgency operations with our support. Then the next step is what is going to take place over the better part of '07 is putting them in a position where they can do it independently and that will continue to go on. On the police side we're doing OK at the local level in most of the places in the country. Two of the provinces have transferred to provincial Iraqi control. What that says is the police are able to maintain domestic control in that province. We just started the National Police Reform program where we took the 1st Brigade off line and had them training down in Numaniyah where they were basically being re-blued. You'll remember that the National police were formed basically as infantry and didn't have any police training. We're going back and doing that. Unfortunately, I think you saw where approximately 400 of them got poisoned. We've

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 4:16 PM
To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF; Ruff, Eric. SES. OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; (b)(6) COL MNF-I CMD GRP XO; (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP (CIG)
Subject: FW: agenda

Sir,

Your interview today, 1440-1505, with approximately 11 Defense Analysts via telephone conference. Highlighted areas are notable quotes, should make news. Following is a summary of the Qs and As (transcript to follow):

- General started with saying how this is the most complex environment he has seen since taking command. Has evolved from terrorists threat to sectarian violence since the bombing of the mosque in February.
- Syria and Iran are being unhelpful. Add to that the intensity during Ramadan and the threat is very high
- Reminded everyone the Gol has only been in place less than 150 days. The Prime Minister is focused on reconciliation and rightfully so. He understands you have to have security-prosperity-unity for the country to work.
- Violence and progress coexist in Iraq. Making progress against a backdrop of violence.
- Asked if military operations were moving toward a showdown with Sadr forces, CG said all militias need to be confronted via a political and military track. The PM is trying to use all the political means possible before using military options. The military is not "chomping" at the bit, but there are some hard liners and eventually they will need to be engaged.
- Reference removing "habeas corpus" in order to allow Soldiers to arrest, and convict, criminals (current rules too stringent), General Casey said no. Said it's more than just that, there needs to be more work done in the area of Rule of Law such as functioning courts, lawyers, judges. More work there will greatly help.
- Asked what new can be done to win the battle, General Casey said he is constantly adjusting the plan and making adjustments as necessary. He sees the ISF assuming security responsibility by the end of 2007. Processes such as the JICASIR (sp) where provinces and functions are turned over to Iraqis are working and need to continue.
- Regarding Sen. Warner's comments about a change possible in 2-3 months if the situation does not improve, General Casey mentioned there is nothing magic about 2-3 months timeline. He had just met with Sen. Warner in Iraq and that timeline never came up.
- As to the "As they stand up, we'll stand down" saying; seems as if they are standing up and we are staying—CG mentioned we already did two brigade "off ramps" last December. Thinks many people are confused by the "churn" in theater. With all the current transitions. Said that troop levels will drop below 130k in December once dust settles. Right now has not intention of asking for more troops. However, under the mantra "We'll do what it takes" he will do what is necessary.
- Concerning the Gol feeling the pressure to perform as a government, General Casey said they

are very aware and they already have a sense of urgency. They realize this is their last best chance to form a government.

- Regarding Syria and allowing T/FF into Iraq and Iranian influence, General Casey said that Syria is allowing the T/FF into the country and they could stop it if they wanted to, they have control of their borders. Iran is providing money, weapons and training that ultimately kills Iraqi citizens.

Here are the attendees for today's call.

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired) MSNBC

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG) American Spectator, Real Clear Politics, national radio

Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired) Heritage Foundation

Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads (USA, Retired) Fox News

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired) NBC

Brigadier General David L. Grange (USA, Retired) CNN

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired) Fox News

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired) Fox News, CNN, NPR, Moody Radio

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) - CBS

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) – Fox News

Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)

Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired) – Fox News

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) - CNN

Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired) – Fox News

Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired) – Fox News

Mr. Bing West (Fmr ASD, Retired) – National Review, Atlantic Monthly

Major General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired) – U.S. Naval Institute

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 1:26 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

I will be on 2:30 PM Right??????/

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"

(b)(6)
tel: 406 249 1091
fax: 406 837 0996
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:40 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Gentlemen,

If you have not yet RSVP'd please do so. If you have already contacted me regarding your participation, there is no need to do so again.

Thank you and have a great day,

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TUESDAY, October 10, 2006, from 2:30-3:00 p.m.

General George Casey will brief you on current operations in Iraq. His biography is attached for your review. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) on behalf of (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 12:48 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6) thanks for the call. I'll listen in for sure.
Steve

Original Message:

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2006 11:40:06 -0400
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Gentlemen,
If you have not yet RSVP'd please do so. If you have already contacted me regarding your participation, there is no need to do so again.
Thank you and have a great day,

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TUESDAY, October 10, 2006, from 2:30-3:00 p.m.

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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

mail2web - Check your email from the web at
<http://mail2web.com/> .

(b)(6)


From: Delong, Mike (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 12:15 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Can't make it...

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:40 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Gentlemen,
If you have not yet RSVP'd please do so. If you have already contacted me regarding your participation, there is no need to do so again.
Thank you and have a great day,

(b)(6)



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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12/3/2007

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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The Shaw Group Inc.
<http://www.shawgrp.com>

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NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) on behalf of Downing, Wayne A.
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Sorry (b)(6)
Regret
Will be on an airplane

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
To: undisclosed-recipients
Sent: Tue Oct 10 08:40:06 2006
Subject: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Gentlemen,
If you have not yet RSVP'd please do so. If you have already contacted me regarding your participation, there is no need to do so again.
Thank you and have a great day,

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Keith, Laura (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:48 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Hi (b)(6)


I'll be listening in for James Carafano.

Laura

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:40 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: REMINDER: Conference call on TUESDAY

Gentlemen,
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Thank you and have a great day,

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12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

From: Nardotti, Michael (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:47 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY


(b)(6)

Sorry for the late reply. I will join the call today. Thanks.

MJN

Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired
Patton Boggs LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
(b)(6) (direct)
202-457-6315 (facsimile)
(b)(6)
www.pattonboggs.com

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

He's doing the presser tomorrow. It got moved at the SecDef's request so he could join GEN Casey. At least that's what I understand.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:53 AM
To: Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

hi. so, i see he's no longer doing a presser?? are we sure he's still game for the call? oy oy oy.


From: Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:18 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

Would it be okay for me to call in to listen?

Mark

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006

12/3/2007

Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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NY TIMES

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
(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:14 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

I want to be on this. Call my cell if there is any change (b)(6)

jeff

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Fri 10/6/2006 7:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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(b)(6)

12/3/2007

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: Bing West (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 4:26 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: 10 oct


just got off plane from Iraq; yes, will be on tel conf tomorrow.
Thanks again - great trip. Will send you my take. Best Bing

(b)(6)


From: Rick Francona (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 4:01 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

Yes - thanks.

Rick



From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 4:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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12/3/2007

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 11:13 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

Wilco! Thanks

Ken

12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 10:01 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

Dave Grange will join the call. Thank you.

(b)(6)


From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 6:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

From: Joe Lopez (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2006 7:18 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

Regret I will be on travel. -Adm. Lopez

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 5:01 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY


Sorry I won't be able to attend this call - I'm still in Baghdad but will be home mid week

Thanks

Marty

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: undisclosed-recipients;;
Sent: Fri, 6 Oct 2006 7:04 PM
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

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12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 2:41 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: agenda

got it (b)(6) thanks for your help. Nelson

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sat 10/7/2006 2:47 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO
Subject: agenda

hi sir,
here is the agenda for the call, as well as the list of those we invited to join the call. he met with four of them in iraq last month:
general wayne downing (usa, ret)
colonel jeff mccausland (usa, ret)
colonel john garrett (usmc, ret)
honorable bing west (fmr asd)

please let me know if you have any questions or need something more specific/informative.
thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 1:46 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6) the attachment only had the DoD crest on it. The Gen. Casey bio opened up and I got the invite to the Defense Analysts. Please resend. vr,

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" <(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY
Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2006 12:08:07 -0400

Sir, the list is included on the second page of the agenda I sent you. Let me know if you did not receive and I will resend.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Sat Oct 07 12:00:31 2006
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6) thanks for getting this out. Do you have a roster of "usual suspects" I could get to show Gen. Casey who might come? thanks. Have a good weekend.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" <(b)(6)>
To: undisclosed-recipients;;
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2006 19:04:00 -0400

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)

Public Affairs

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

><< att9dcf4.gif >>

><< Casey,GeneralGeorgeW2006.doc >>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 12:01 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" (b)(6)
To: *undisclosed-recipients;*
Subject: *Conference call on TUESDAY*
Date: *Fri, 6 Oct 2006 19:04:00 -0400*

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

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(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

><< att9dcf4.gif >>

><< Casey, GeneralGeorgeW2006.doc >>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 11:28 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6) this will be on the record, not background. vr, Nelson

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" <(b)(6)>
To: undisclosed-recipients;;
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2006 19:04:00 -0400

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Public Affairs
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(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

><< att9dcf4.gif >>

><< Casey, GeneralGeorgeW2006.doc >>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 9:31 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

Admiral Jeremiah is unable to participate.

Thanks -

(b)(6)


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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM

To: undisclosed-recipients

Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



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12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: MAJGEN Thomas L Wilkerson USMC (Ret) (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 9:15 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

I will be on the call -- have a great weekend.

**Semper Fortis,
Fidelis & Paratus**

Tom W

Thomas L. Wilkerson
CEO & Publisher

U. S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Office: (b)(6)
Cell: 703-517-0674

(b)(6)

On Oct 6, 2006, at 7:04 PM, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote:
<att9dcf4.gif>

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

12/3/2007

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **TUESDAY, October 10, 2006, from 2:30-3:00 p.m.**

General George Casey will brief you on current operations in Iraq. His biography is attached for your review. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

<att9dcf4.gif>

<Casey, General George W 2006.doc>

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

854


(b)(6)

From: Chuck Nash [(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 11:49 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

PLease sign me up!
All the best,
Chuck

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote:



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
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12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

856

(b)(6)

From: Tim Eads (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 11:05 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

I will attend

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: undisclosed-recipients <undisclosed-recipients;>
Sent: Fri Oct 06 19:04:00 2006
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

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12/3/2007

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

858


(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 10:10 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

I will be on the call.

Jeff

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Fri 10/6/2006 7:04 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
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Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

860

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 9:07 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: ACCEPT CASEY CC

(b)(6)

I will be on.
Tom

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 8:27 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6): I'll be there. Have a great weekend. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)


From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 8:10 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

(b)(6)

Thanks for the note. I WILL be participating in this call. BTW - Why aren't you at Happy Hour?
Have a nice weekend. Taken care.
Wayne

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: undisclosed-recipients;;
Sent: Fri, 6 Oct 2006 7:04 PM
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY



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Office of the Secretary of Defense
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We hope you are able to participate.

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6)

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

864

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:23 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: FW: Any context to this story?

Attachments: FW: Any context to this story?



FW: Any context
to this sto...

Thanks.

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

[\(b\)\(6\)](http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6))

-----Original message
From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" (b)(6)

> sir,
> this is what i got from Guantanamo. the affidavit is attached for
> your review, but please do not forward or attribute.
> thanks

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTEG TMO
> [mailto:(b)(6)]
> Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 5:19 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Subject: RE: Any context to this story?

> (b)(6)

> Here was my statement:

> Attributable to Commander (b)(6) Director of Public Affairs,
> Joint Task Force Guantanamo:

> The Joint Task Force is aware that the DoD IG has been notified of
> allegations of abuse or harassment.

> The mission of the Joint Task Force is the safe and humane care and
> custody of detained enemy combatants. Abuse or harassment of detainees
> in any form is not condoned or tolerated. The Joint Task Force will
> cooperate fully with the inspector general to learn the facts of the
> matter and will take action where misconduct is discovered.

> I don't have anything to add - have you seen the affidavit? It's
> attached.

> Vr,

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
> Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 3:59 PM
> To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
> Subject: FW: Any context to this story?

> hi there. hope all is well...

> i see you were interviewed for this story... do you have anything to
> add?? maginnis, if you recall, came with us to gitmo, so he's pretty
> well versed in how the detainees are treated. but, if you have
> anything to add on this, i'm sure he would appreciate it.
> thanks - and have a great weekend.

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
> Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 3:47 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Subject: Any context to this story?

> AP Learns Gitmo Guards Brag of Beatings By THOMAS WATKINS, Associated
> Press Writer
> 52 minutes ago

> CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. - Guards at Guantanamo Bay bragged about
> beating detainees and described it as common practice, a Marine
> sergeant said in a sworn statement obtained by The Associated Press.

> The two-page statement was sent Wednesday to the Inspector General at
> the Department of Defense by a high-ranking Marine Corps defense lawyer.

> The lawyer sent the statement on behalf of a paralegal who said men
> she met on Sept. 23 at a bar on the base identified themselves to her
> as guards. The woman, whose name was blacked out, said she spent about
> an hour talking with them. No one was in uniform, she said.

> A 19-year-old sailor referred to only as Bo "told the other guards and
> me about him beating different detainees being held in the prison,"
> the statement said.

> "One such story Bo told involved him taking a detainee by the head and
> hitting the detainee's head into the cell door. Bo said that his
> actions were known by others," but that he was never punished, the
> statement said. The paralegal was identified in the affidavit as a
> sergeant working on an unidentified Guantanamo-related case.

> The statement was provided to the AP on Thursday night by Lt. Col.
> Colby Vokey. He is the Marine Corps' defense coordinator for the
> western United States and based at Camp Pendleton.

> A Guantanamo Bay spokesman said the base would cooperate with any
> Pentagon investigation. A Pentagon spokesman declined immediate comment.
> A call to the inspector general's office was not immediately returned.

> Other guards "also told their own stories of abuse towards the
> detainees" that included hitting them, denying them water and
> "removing privileges for no reason."

> "About 5 others in the group admitted hitting detainees" and that
> included "punching in the face," the affidavit said.

> "From the whole conversation, I understood that striking detainees was
> a common practice," the sergeant wrote. "Everyone in the group laughed
> at the others stories of beating detainees."

> Vokey called for an investigation, saying the abuse alleged in the
> affidavit "is offensive and violates United States and international
> law."
>
> Navy Cmdr. Robert Durand condemned abuse or harassment of detainees
> and said he would cooperate fully with the inspector general.
>
> "The mission of the Joint Task Force is the safe and humane care and
> custody of detained enemy combatants," he said.
>
> Guantanamo was internationally condemned shortly after it opened more
> than four years ago when pictures captured prisoners kneeling,
> shackled and being herded into wire cages. That was followed by
> reports of prisoner abuse, heavy-handed interrogations, hunger strikes
> and suicides.
>
> Military investigators said in July 2005 they confirmed abusive and
> degrading treatment of a suspected terrorist at Guantanamo Bay that
> included forcing him to wear a bra, dance with another man and behave
> like a dog.
>
> However, the chief investigator, Air Force Lt. Gen. Randall M.
> Schmidt, said "no torture occurred" during the interrogation of
> Mohamed al-Qahtani, a Saudi who was captured in December 2001 along
> the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
>
> Last month, U.N. human rights investigators criticized the United
> States for failing to take steps to close Guantanamo Bay, home to 450
> detainees, including 14 terrorist suspects who had been kept in secret
> CIA prisons around the world.
>
> Described as the most dangerous of America's "war on terror"
> prisoners, fewer than a dozen inmates have been charged with crimes.

> --

> Robert L. Maginnis

> (b)(6)

> [http://home.comcast.net/\(b\)\(6\)](http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6))



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
REGIONAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WESTERN REGION
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton
BOX 555240
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5067


IN REPLY REFER TO:
5800
CCV
4 Oct 06

From: Lieutenant Colonel Colby C. Vokey, USMC
To: Inspector General, Department of Defense

Subj: ABUSE OF DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA AND REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

Encl: (1) Affidavit of Sgt [REDACTED], USMC

1. This is to report physical and mental abuse of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detainees by guards serving with the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay.
2. In addition to my regular duties as Regional Defense Counsel for the Marine Corps' Western Region, I have also been assigned as Selected Detailed Defense Counsel for the military commission case of *United States v. Omar Khadr*. I recently traveled to Guantanamo Bay, from 20-27 September 2006, in order to visit my client in the detention camps. After my client visits, I remained on the island for several days while awaiting a return flight to the United States. During this time, it was brought to my attention that both physical and mental abuse of detainees by the guard force at Guantanamo Bay appears to be a regular and common occurrence.
3. As a result of receiving this information, the enclosed affidavit was prepared and is attached for your information and action.
4. The abuse explained in the affidavit is offensive and violates United States and international law. It is requested that your office fully investigate the activities of guard personnel and that the proper steps are taken to both address past offenses and prevent future abuses.
5. If I can provide additional information, please contact me at (b)(2) [REDACTED]


C.C. VOKEY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

AFFIDAVIT

AFFIANT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says of her own personal knowledge:

My name is Sergeant [REDACTED], U.S. Marine Corps. I am on active duty, currently stationed at Camp Pendleton, California. From 20-27 September 2006, I traveled to U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for official duties. I am currently assigned as the [REDACTED] for the Marine Corps' Western Region. I have also been assigned to serve as the paralegal for the Guantanamo Bay commissions case of *United States v. [REDACTED]*.

While at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, I often go to the fitness center on Marine Hill, where the Marine Barracks is located. While exercising at the fitness center, I met some of the Marines stationed there and they invited me to join them at the club on Saturday night to socialize.

On Saturday 23 September, I went to the All Hands Club/Windjammers Club on GTMO to join the Marines I met earlier at the fitness center. I arrived at the club just after 2200. I did not see any of the Marines I spoke with earlier. However, a group of Sailors invited over to their table around 2245. I spent the next hour speaking with this group of people who were in the Navy. There were at least 15 people in this group. I do not recall all of their names but they worked for the Joint Task Force at the detention camps. As far as I could tell, everyone in the group, except one senior noncommissioned officer and one female named Nicole, worked as guards or escorts inside the different prison camps. The one exception worked in the mailroom that handled mail for the detainees. I believe he was a 1st class petty officer. I sat and talked with this group for about one hour.

During my conversations with these people, one Sailor who called himself Bo (rank and last name unknown) told the group about stories involving detainees. Bo was 19 years old and had been working at Guantanamo Bay for almost one year. He was about 5'10" and 180 pounds. He was Caucasian, with blond hair and blue eyes. Bo told the other guards and me about him beating different detainees being held in the prison. One such story Bo told involved him taking a detainee by the head and hitting the detainee's head into the cell door. Bo said that his actions were known by others. I asked him if he had been charged with an offense for beating and abusing this detainee. He told me nothing happened to him. He received neither nonjudicial punishment nor court-martial. And he never even received formal counseling. He was eventually moved to the maintenance section but this did not occur until some time after the incident where he slammed the detainee's head into the cell door.

After Bo finished telling his stories of beating detainees, some of the other guards also told their own stories of abuse towards the detainees. Examples of this abuse including hitting detainees, denying them water, and removal of privileges for no reason. I recall speaking with a guard named Steven. Steven was a Caucasian male, about 5'8", 170 pounds, with brown hair and brown eyes. He stated that he used to work in Camp 5 but now works in Camp 6. He works on one of the "blocks" as a guard. He told me that even when a detainee is being good, they will take their personal items away. He said they do this to anger the detainees so that they can punish them when they object or complain. I asked Steven why he treats the detainees this way. He said it is because he hates the detainees and that they are bad people. And he stated that he

doesn't like having to take care of them or be nice to them. Steven also added that his "only job was to keep the detainees alive." I understood this to mean that as long as the detainees were kept alive, he didn't care what happened to them.

I then started talking to a Sailor named Shawn. Shawn was the petty officer who worked in the mailroom for the detainees. Shawn is African-American, about 6'4", 210 pounds, with black hair and brown eyes. He said that his job included looking through and screening the detainees' mail. He was just finishing a year of service in Guantanamo Bay. I asked Shawn why it often takes 6 months or so for them to get their mail. Shawn replied that there is often a delay because the mailroom personnel have to look through everything and get it translated prior to the mail being forwarded to the detainees. I then asked why it would possibly still take 6 months if the mail matter was printed in English. Shawn said there wouldn't really be a reason and it was not uncommon for them to withhold the mail of detainees until they, the mailroom clerks, decided to forward the mail.

In addition to the above incidents, about 5 others in the group admitted hitting detainees, to include "punching in the face." From the whole conversation, I understood that striking detainees was a common practice. Everyone in the group laughed at the others stories of beating detainees. Most in group were in early 20's. Shawn was oldest. All except Shawn and Nicole were guards or escorts. Nicole was in intelligence.


While at the club, everyone, including me, was wearing civilian clothes. Everyone was drinking alcohol but no one showed signs of being intoxicated at all. I had one drink. After I had been with that group for about one hour, someone asked me about my job. I then told them that I worked for the defense on the [REDACTED] case. Everyone in the group became very quiet after they learned of my job and stopped talking about their own jobs.

(b)(6)

Sgt, USMC


4 OCT 06
date

Subscribed and sworn to before me on 4 October 2006 at Camp Pendleton, California.


P. L. STARITA
LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Judge Advocate
Authorized to administer oaths
and act as notary by 10 USC 936
and 10 USC 1044a. No seal required.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY
Attachments: Casey, General George W 2006.doc



MEMORANDUM

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From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
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To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

12/3/2007



General George W. Casey, Jr. Commanding General Multi-National Force - Iraq

General Casey became the Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq, July 2004.

General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt and the United States. He has

commanded at every level from platoon to Division. His most recent assignment was as the 30th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

His principal staff assignments have been as a: Congressional Liaison Officer; Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff; Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, J5; Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command; Director, J5, Joint Staff; and Director of the Joint Staff. He has also served as a United Nations Military Observer in Cairo, Egypt, with the UN Truce Supervision Organization.

General Casey: commanded a mechanized infantry battalion - 1st Battalion 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; commanded a mechanized infantry brigade - 3rd "Grey Wolf" Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Casey assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq on July 1, 2004.

General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

U.S. Decorations and Badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

(Updated 30 August 2006)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 5:19 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Any context to this story?

Attachments: Complaint of abuse of Guantanamo Bay detainees - redacted.pdf



Complaint of abuse of Guantana... (b)(6)

Here was my statement:

Attributable to Commander (b)(6) Director of Public Affairs, Joint Task Force Guantanamo:

The Joint Task Force is aware that the DoD IG has been notified of allegations of abuse or harassment.

The mission of the Joint Task Force is the safe and humane care and custody of detained enemy combatants. Abuse or harassment of detainees in any form is not condoned or tolerated. The Joint Task Force will cooperate fully with the inspector general to learn the facts of the matter and will take action where misconduct is discovered.

I don't have anything to add - have you seen the affidavit? It's attached.

Vr,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
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Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 3:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: FW: Any context to this story?

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i see you were interviewed for this story... do you have anything to add?? maginnis, if you recall, came with us to gitmo, so he's pretty well versed in how the detainees are treated. but, if you have anything to add on this, i'm sure he would appreciate it. thanks - and have a great weekend.

(b)(6)

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Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 3:47 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Any context to this story?

AP Learns Gitmo Guards Brag of Beatings
By THOMAS WATKINS, Associated Press Writer
52 minutes ago

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. - Guards at Guantanamo Bay bragged about beating detainees and described it as common practice, a Marine sergeant said in a sworn statement obtained by The Associated Press.

The two-page statement was sent Wednesday to the Inspector General at the Department of Defense by a high-ranking Marine Corps defense lawyer.

The lawyer sent the statement on behalf of a paralegal who said men she met on Sept. 23 at a bar on the base identified themselves to her as guards. The woman, whose name was blacked out, said she spent about an hour talking with them. No one was in uniform, she said.

A 19-year-old sailor referred to only as Bo "told the other guards and me about him beating different detainees being held in the prison," the statement said.

"One such story Bo told involved him taking a detainee by the head and hitting the detainee's head into the cell door. Bo said that his actions were known by others," but that he was never punished, the statement said. The paralegal was identified in the affidavit as a sergeant working on an unidentified Guantanamo-related case.

The statement was provided to the AP on Thursday night by Lt. Col. Colby Vokey. He is the Marine Corps' defense coordinator for the western United States and based at Camp Pendleton.

A Guantanamo Bay spokesman said the base would cooperate with any Pentagon investigation. A Pentagon spokesman declined immediate comment.

A call to the inspector general's office was not immediately returned.

Other guards "also told their own stories of abuse towards the detainees" that included hitting them, denying them water and "removing privileges for no reason."

"About 5 others in the group admitted hitting detainees" and that included "punching in the face," the affidavit said.

"From the whole conversation, I understood that striking detainees was a common practice," the sergeant wrote. "Everyone in the group laughed at the others stories of beating detainees."

Vokey called for an investigation, saying the abuse alleged in the affidavit "is offensive and violates United States and international law."

Navy Cmdr. Robert Durand condemned abuse or harassment of detainees and said he would cooperate fully with the inspector general.

"The mission of the Joint Task Force is the safe and humane care and custody of detained enemy combatants," he said.

Guantanamo was internationally condemned shortly after it opened more than four years ago when pictures captured prisoners kneeling, shackled and being herded into wire cages. That was followed by reports of prisoner abuse, heavy-handed interrogations, hunger strikes and suicides.

Military investigators said in July 2005 they confirmed abusive and degrading treatment of a suspected terrorist at Guantanamo Bay that included forcing him to wear a bra, dance with another man and behave like a dog.

However, the chief investigator, Air Force Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt, said "no torture occurred" during the interrogation of Mohamed al-Qahtani, a Saudi who was captured in December 2001 along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Last month, U.N. human rights investigators criticized the United States for failing to take steps to close Guantanamo Bay, home to 450 detainees, including 14 terrorist suspects who had been kept in secret CIA prisons around the world.

Described as the most dangerous of America's "war on terror" prisoners, fewer than a dozen inmates have been charged with crimes.

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/> (b)(6)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
REGIONAL DEFENSE COUNSEL, WESTERN REGION
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton
BOX 555240
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5067

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800
CCV
4 Oct 06

From: Lieutenant Colonel Colby C. Vokey, USMC
To: Inspector General, Department of Defense

Subj: ABUSE OF DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA AND REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

Encl: (1) Affidavit of Sgt [REDACTED], USMC

1. This is to report physical and mental abuse of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detainees by guards serving with the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay.
2. In addition to my regular duties as Regional Defense Counsel for the Marine Corps' Western Region, I have also been assigned as Selected Detailed Defense Counsel for the military commission case of *United States v. Omar Khadr*. I recently traveled to Guantanamo Bay, from 20-27 September 2006, in order to visit my client in the detention camps. After my client visits, I remained on the island for several days while awaiting a return flight to the United States. During this time, it was brought to my attention that both physical and mental abuse of detainees by the guard force at Guantanamo Bay appears to be a regular and common occurrence.
3. As a result of receiving this information, the enclosed affidavit was prepared and is attached for your information and action.
4. The abuse explained in the affidavit is offensive and violates United States and international law. It is requested that your office fully investigate the activities of guard personnel and that the proper steps are taken to both address past offenses and prevent future abuses.
5. If I can provide additional information, please contact me at (b)(2) [REDACTED]


C.C. VOKEY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

AFFIDAVIT

AFFIANT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says of her own personal knowledge:

My name is Sergeant [REDACTED], U.S. Marine Corps. I am on active duty, currently stationed at Camp Pendleton, California. From 20-27 September 2006, I traveled to U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for official duties. I am currently assigned as the [REDACTED] for the Marine Corps' Western Region. I have also been assigned to serve as the paralegal for the Guantanamo Bay commissions case of *United States v. [REDACTED]*.

While at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, I often go to the fitness center on Marine Hill, where the Marine Barracks is located. While exercising at the fitness center, I met some of the Marines stationed there and they invited me to join them at the club on Saturday night to socialize.

On Saturday 23 September, I went to the All Hands Club/Windjammers Club on GTMO to join the Marines I met earlier at the fitness center. I arrived at the club just after 2200. I did not see any of the Marines I spoke with earlier. However, a group of Sailors invited over to their table around 2245. I spent the next hour speaking with this group of people who were in the Navy. There were at least 15 people in this group. I do not recall all of their names but they worked for the Joint Task Force at the detention camps. As far as I could tell, everyone in the group, except one senior noncommissioned officer and one female named Nicole, worked as guards or escorts inside the different prison camps. The one exception worked in the mailroom that handled mail for the detainees. I believe he was a 1st class petty officer. I sat and talked with this group for about one hour.

During my conversations with these people, one Sailor who called himself Bo (rank and last name unknown) told the group about stories involving detainees. Bo was 19 years old and had been working at Guantanamo Bay for almost one year. He was about 5'10" and 180 pounds. He was Caucasian, with blond hair and blue eyes. Bo told the other guards and me about him beating different detainees being held in the prison. One such story Bo told involved him taking a detainee by the head and hitting the detainee's head into the cell door. Bo said that his actions were known by others. I asked him if he had been charged with an offense for beating and abusing this detainee. He told me nothing happened to him. He received neither nonjudicial punishment nor court-martial. And he never even received formal counseling. He was eventually moved to the maintenance section but this did not occur until some time after the incident where he slammed the detainee's head into the cell door.

After Bo finished telling his stories of beating detainees, some of the other guards also told their own stories of abuse towards the detainees. Examples of this abuse including hitting detainees, denying them water, and removal of privileges for no reason. I recall speaking with a guard named Steven. Steven was a Caucasian male, about 5'8", 170 pounds, with brown hair and brown eyes. He stated that he used to work in Camp 5 but now works in Camp 6. He works on one of the "blocks" as a guard. He told me that even when a detainee is being good, they will take their personal items away. He said they do this to anger the detainees so that they can punish them when they object or complain. I asked Steven why he treats the detainees this way. He said it is because he hates the detainees and that they are bad people. And he stated that he

doesn't like having to take care of them or be nice to them. Steven also added that his "only job was to keep the detainees alive." I understood this to mean that as long as the detainees were kept alive, he didn't care what happened to them.

I then started talking to a Sailor named Shawn. Shawn was the petty officer who worked in the mailroom for the detainees. Shawn is African-American, about 6'4", 210 pounds, with black hair and brown eyes. He said that his job included looking through and screening the detainees' mail. He was just finishing a year of service in Guantanamo Bay. I asked Shawn why it often takes 6 months or so for them to get their mail. Shawn replied that there is often a delay because the mailroom personnel have to look through everything and get it translated prior to the mail being forwarded to the detainees. I then asked why it would possibly still take 6 months if the mail matter was printed in English. Shawn said there wouldn't really be a reason and it was not uncommon for them to withhold the mail of detainees until they, the mailroom clerks, decided to forward the mail.

In addition to the above incidents, about 5 others in the group admitted hitting detainees, to include "punching in the face." From the whole conversation, I understood that striking detainees was a common practice. Everyone in the group laughed at the others stories of beating detainees. Most in group were in early 20's. Shawn was oldest. All except Shawn and Nicole were guards or escorts. Nicole was in intelligence.


While at the club, everyone, including me, was wearing civilian clothes. Everyone was drinking alcohol but no one showed signs of being intoxicated at all. I had one drink. After I had been with that group for about one hour, someone asked me about my job. I then told them that I worked for the defense on the ~~XXXX~~ case. Everyone in the group became very quiet after they learned of my job and stopped talking about their own jobs.

(b)(6)

Sgt, USMC

4 OCT 06
date

Subscribed and sworn to before me on 4 October 2006 at Camp Pendleton, California.


P.V. STARITA

LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Judge Advocate
Authorized to administer oaths
and act as notary by 10 USC 936
and 10 USC 1044a. No seal required.

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Friday, October 06, 2006 1:00 PM

To:

(b)(6)

CIV, OASD-PA, (b)(6)

Subject:

Participant list

Attachments: 1643361497-list osd liaison 157.doc

(b)(6)

Today's participant list is attached.

Any questions give us a call.

Thanks

(b)(6)

To: (b)(6)
Date: Friday, October 06, 2006 11:00 AM EST
E-Mail Address: On File
Company Name: OSD
Host's Name: Mr. Gilroy
Conference Name: OSD Liaison 157 (11:00A) (b)(6) Gilr0y
Conference Title: "Analyst"

Participant Information

1. C (b)(6)
2. Robert McGinnis BCP Intl Washington, DC
3. Paul Valley Fox News Big Fork, MT
4. Jeffrey McClausland PBS News Carlisle, PA

(b)(6)

From: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 10:26 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR
Subject: RE: conf call

I am waiting for the P&R to clear the numbers. I don't have a document yet to share. I can speak to the numbers, though. What else can I give the analysts?

Curt

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 10:13 AM
To: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR
Subject: conf call

good morning sir,
as soon as you get a moment, would you mind sending me your brief so that i can get it out to the analysts prior to our call this morning?
thanks much,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

12/3/2007


(b)(6)

From: Nardotti, Michael (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 10:18 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6) My apologies for the late response. I will not be available for the call today. MJN

Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired
Patton Boggs LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
(b)(6) (direct)
202-457-6315 (facsimile)
(b)(6)
www.pattonboggs.com

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 5, 2006
Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **FRIDAY, October 6, 2006, from 11:00-11:30.**

Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director of Accession Policy for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

12/3/2007

Readiness will update you on FY06 recruiting numbers. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, you must agree to **EMBARGO** the information you receive until the start of the press briefing on **TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2006, at 11:15.**

To join the call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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Community Relations and Public Liaison

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Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

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
(b)(6)

From: Rick Francona (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:47 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow


(b)(6)

I will participate.

Rick



From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:51 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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
(b)(6)

From: Tim Eads (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 8:44 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow
Signed By: Verifying the signature. Click the icon for details.

Sorry, I will be on a plane tomorrow morning.

Timur J. Eads
Blackbird Technologies Inc.
13900 Lincoln Park Dr.
Suite 400
Herndon, Va. 20171
Office: 703-480-1215
Cell: (b)(6)
Fax: 703-464-9381
teads@blackbirdtech.com

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

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Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

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887

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) on behalf of (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 8:20 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: steven@greerfoundation.org
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

Hi (b)(6) thanks much, I will call in.
Cheers.
Steve

Original Message:

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2006 12:51:05 -0400
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Conference call tomorrow

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 5, 2006

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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

mail2web - Check your email from the web at <http://mail2web.com/> .

(b)(6)


From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 3:53 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6)

Unfortunately, Gen. Grange will not be available to participate on this call.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 11:51 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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(b)(6)

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(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 3:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

I will be on. Perry Smith

Perry M. Smith, Ph.D.
President
Visionary Leadership, Ltd.
P.O. Box 15666
Augusta, GA 30919-1666
(706) 738-9133
cell (b)(6)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: MAJGEN Thomas L Wilkerson USMC (Ret) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 3:34 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6)

On travel, can't make it. Thanks . . .

**Semper Fortis,
Fidelis & Paratus**

Tom W

**Thomas L. Wilkerson
CEO & Publisher**

U. S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Office: 410-295-1060
Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Oct 5, 2006, at 12:51 PM, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote:

<att4270c.gif>

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 5, 2006
Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

12/3/2007

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

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
(b)(6)

From: Garrett, John (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

Regret I will be right in the middle of a meeting I can't get out of.

How you doin'?

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: iraq stability and security report
Attachments: iraq stability and security report

Yes. I'd like to use some of the charts. Do you have them in a Word format? Thanks.

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net> (b)(6)

----- Original message -----
From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" (b)(6)

sir,
is this the report you're looking for?? this one is current as of 29 august. i will see if there is an update.
thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

**August 2006
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006
(Section 9010)**

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This report to Congress on measuring stability and security in Iraq is submitted pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006, *Public Law 109-148*. This is the fifth in a series of reports on this subject and the third under Section 9010. The most recent report was submitted in May 2006.

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Executive Summary

This report is divided into three sections. The first section, "Stability and Security in Iraq," describes trends and progress toward meeting goals for political stability, strengthened economic activity, and a stable security environment in Iraq. The second section, "Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance," describes progress in the training, development, and readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the forces of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the police and paramilitary forces of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The third section, "Transition," describes the transfer of security responsibility from Coalition forces to the Iraqi government, including prerequisite conditions and criteria for assessing the readiness of provinces to assume responsibility for security.

A classified annex to this report provides data concerning security force training and performance and addresses possible U.S. military force rotations.

The information in this report is made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and the Government of Iraq. The report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress and does not replace them. The intent of this document is to report on the measures of stability and security specified in Section 9010.

Measures of Stability and Security and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

The President's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq lays out the goals and general framework to achieve security and stability in Iraq. The goal of the strategy is to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional

and representative government that respects political and human rights and with sufficient security forces both to maintain domestic order and to prevent Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To this end, the United States is pursuing an integrated strategy along three broad tracks:

- **Political:** Helping the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported compact for democratic government
- **Economic:** Assisting the Government of Iraq in establishing the foundations for a sound market economy with the capacity to deliver essential services
- **Security:** Contributing to an environment where Iraqis are capable of defeating terrorists and neutralizing insurgents and illegal armed groups

Each track is integrated with the other two, and success in each affects success in the others. Security depends, in part, on a democratic political process, which in turn depends, in part, on economic opportunity. Economic progress depends on securing the Iraqi infrastructure against sabotage and attack and protecting the Iraqi people from violence that undermines individual participation in economic development and the political process.

Although the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq is not a detailed plan for achieving specific objectives, consistent with the public nature of that document, it delineates measurable trends along each of these tracks to indicate where programs are achieving success and where it is necessary to increase efforts or adjust implementation of the strategy.

Major Milestones Toward a Democratic Iraq

Oct 15, 2005	National Referendum on the Constitution
Dec 15, 2005	National Elections under the New Constitution
Mar 16, 2006	First Session of Council of Representatives
Apr 22, 2006	Election of Presidency Council by Council of Representatives Nomination of Prime Minister by Presidency Council
May 20, 2006	Naming of Cabinet by Prime Minister Designee Vote of Confidence for Prime Minister, His Cabinet, and His Program
Jun 8, 2006	Nomination and Approval of Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs
Jul 13, 2006	Transfer of Muthanna to Provincial Iraqi Control
Jul 26, 2006	Prime Minister al-Maliki Addresses Joint Session of U.S. Congress

The President's strategy also identifies eight objectives, or pillars, of the integrated political, economic, and security strategy:

- Defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency
- Transition Iraq to security self-reliance
- Help Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government
- Help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services
- Help Iraq strengthen its economy
- Help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights
- Increase international support for Iraq
- Strengthen public understanding of Coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents

Key indicators of progress since the last report are discussed below.

Political Progress. This report marks the first 90 days of the first representative government

in Iraq. The appointments of the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and State for National Security Affairs, on June 8, 2006, marked the completion of a national unity government. Within one month of seating this government, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presented a "National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project" to the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR). This project is a broad initiative aimed at reconciling past inequities; rallying Iraqis around a principle of equality, devoid of sectarian divisions; firmly establishing the basis of national unity via a democratic political process; and creating the conditions for Iraq to assume a leading role both in the region and internationally. Additionally, the CoR began its work in June with an accelerated schedule of sessions. Most of the 24 Council Committees have formed and named chairs. The CoR is making some progress on key legislation required to implement the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution.

Economic Activity. The Iraqi economy continues to show progress, but still needs to overcome serious challenges. As the Government of Iraq was formed just 90 days ago, its institutions are still forming or are immature and consequently struggle with many macro-economic issues. The new government has affirmed its commitment to programs supported by the Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by taking important and decisive measures, notably price increases for refined petroleum products that meet IMF targets. The Executive Board of the IMF subsequently completed its first and second reviews of Iraq's performance under the Stand-By Arrangement on August 2, 2006.

Iraq continues to make progress reducing its Saddam-era debt. As of July 2006, 17 of 18 Paris Club creditors have signed bilateral agreements to forgive 80% of Iraq's sovereign debt. Russia is the only Paris Club creditor that has not yet signed a bilateral agreement with Iraq. It has, however, agreed in principle on debt relief terms and will finalize an agreement shortly. Middle Eastern creditors, which hold the majority of the present debt, have not signed bilateral debt reduction agreements.

Average peak electrical generating output increased 15.8% this quarter to 4,573 megawatts (MW) and continued to increase over the quarter. Iraq averaged 14 hours of power per day this quarter, an improvement of 3 hours per day over the previous quarter.

Crude oil production for the second quarter improved 18% to 2.2 million barrels per day (mbpd), and exports improved by 20%, to 1.6 mbpd. Also during this quarter, Iraq resumed exports from northern fields for the first time since the autumn of 2005. However, oil production and exports still fell short of the Iraqi goals of 2.5 mbpd and 2.0 mbpd,

respectively. Approximately 90% of the Government of Iraq's revenue comes from oil exports, and higher prices for Iraqi oil continue to somewhat offset lower than desired export volumes.

The Security Environment. Setbacks in the levels and nature of violence in Iraq affect all other measures of stability, reconstruction, and transition. Sectarian tensions increased over the past quarter, manifested in an increasing number of execution-style killings, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons. Sunni and Shi'a extremists, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq and rogue elements of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), are increasingly interlocked in retaliatory violence and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their existing areas of influence. Concern about civil war within the Iraqi civilian population and among some defense analysts has increased in recent months. Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq. Nevertheless, the current violence is not a civil war, and movement toward civil war can be prevented. Breaking the cycle of violence is the most pressing goal of Coalition and Iraqi operations.

In the current reporting period the average number of weekly attacks increased 15% over the previous reporting period average, and Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter. Much of this violence occurred in Baghdad, as terrorists, insurgents, and illegal armed groups recognized and exploited the political and economic significance of conducting operations in the capital city. However, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq continued to make progress this quarter, improving the security environment in Fallujah and some parts of northern Iraq. Although sectarian violence threatens the effectiveness of the Government of Iraq, terrorists have failed to derail Iraq's political

process, or to widen their political support among the Iraqi people. Polling data continue to show the confidence of most segments of the Iraqi people in the Iraqi Army and their rejection of al-Qaeda's vision of Iraq's future.

Iraqi Security Forces. MOD and MOI security forces continue to increase in size and capability and are increasingly assuming the lead combat responsibility from Coalition forces.

Training, equipping, and fielding security forces continues. Approximately 277,600 Iraqi soldiers and police have completed initial training and equipping, an increase of more than 14,000 in the three months since the last report. As of August 2006, approximately 84% of the objective end-strength of MOD forces have been trained and equipped, while more than 92% of authorized Iraqi Army battalions have been generated. Remaining train-and-equip efforts will focus on building combat support and combat service support forces.

More Iraqi units are able to take the lead in combat operations against the insurgency and

to assume security lead in their territory. The number of counter-insurgency operations conducted independently by Iraqi forces as a percentage of total combat operations continues to increase steadily. Approximately one-third of the company-sized operations in Iraq during the reporting period were conducted independently by Iraqi forces. As of August 7, 2006, there were 85 Iraqi Army battalions (5 divisions, 25 brigades) that have assumed the lead for counter-insurgency operations, a 35% increase since the last report. All 27 National Police battalions are currently conducting counter-insurgency operations, and 2 National Police battalions have the security lead for their areas of responsibility.

Transition. Iraq achieved a historic milestone on July 13, 2006, with the transfer of security responsibility in Muthanna Province from MNF-I to the Provincial Governor and the civilian-controlled Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Moreover, since the May report, MNF-I has transferred an additional 10 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the Government of Iraq. Forty-eight of 110 FOBs are now under Iraqi control.

1. Stability and Security in Iraq

1.1 Political Progress

The goal of the political process in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic government, thereby isolating enemy elements from the broader public. The United States is supporting this effort by:

- supporting Iraqi leaders in their efforts to include all Iraqis in the political process, through dialogue and inclusive institutions;
- offering advice and technical support for effective governance;
- helping build national institutions that transcend regional, sectarian, and tribal lines; and
- assisting Iraqis in replacing the corrupt and centralized Ba'athist system with effective government bodies at local, provincial, and national levels.

Measures of political progress and stability include:

- achievement of political goals set forth in the Iraqi Constitution, as well as those in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 and the Transitional Administrative Law;
- formation of a national unity government representative of all Iraqi communities;
- participation in the political process by all Iraqi communities and evidence that they view the process as legitimate and effective;
- adherence to rule of law institutions; and
- expansion of international support.

With the seating of its constitutional government, Iraq, with the support of the Coalition, completed all the milestones required under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546.

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq lays out a specific three-pronged political plan to assist the Government of Iraq in building a broadly supported national compact for democratic governance. The plan seeks to:

- ✓ *Isolate* enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq;
- ✓ *Engage* those outside the political process and invite in those willing to turn away from violence through ever-expanding avenues of participation; and
- ✓ *Build* stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq's full integration into the international community."

Building a Government of National Unity

After successful national elections in December 2005, Iraqis made the commitment to establish a broad unity government. Rather than allocating all government positions to the majority party or coalition, this unity government sought to provide fair representation in the ministries and other government posts among all major parties that won seats in the CoR. Consistent with this commitment, Prime Minister al-Maliki announced and won CoR approval for his cabinet, which draws minis-


ters and senior officials from parties representing all regions, sects, and ethnic groups. The announcement met the constitutionally mandated deadline, but Prime Minister al-Maliki opted to delay filling the positions of Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs to ensure broad support within the CoR for these sensitive positions.

On June 8, 2006, after additional negotiations and compromise, the Prime Minister presented his nominees for the two security ministries. The CoR approved the appointments by a majority, confirming Jawad al-Bulani as Minister of Interior and Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji as Minister of Defense. The CoR also approved


the appointment of Shirwan al-Waili as Minister of State for National Security Affairs.

The appointment of the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and State for National Security Affairs marked the completion of Iraq's first representative government. The resulting cabinet is remarkably inclusive. The new government reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people and, with a freely elected parliament and a popularly ratified constitution, is a striking contrast to the oppressive, one-man rule of Saddam Hussein just three years ago.

Poll data indicates that the majority of Iraqis have confidence in the new government; notably, however, confidence levels are lowest in mixed and predominantly Sunni areas, such as Kirkuk and Tikrit/Baquba.



How much confidence do you have in the *new Iraqi government* to improve the situation in Iraq?*



Source: Department of State, Office of Research, June 21-July 6, 2006
 Sample sizes: Baghdad-173; Kurdish Areas-308; Kirkuk-108; Tikrit/Baquba-210; Mid-Euphrates-523; South-437
 Margin of error: $\pm 4\%$ for the overall sample, but varies among regions


* Data from Mosul is not included in this chart. It was determined to be unreliable.

The Iraqi Constitution, adopted by popular referendum on October 15, 2005, requires approximately 55 enabling or implementing acts, in such significant and broad areas as judiciary development and economic reform, to make the Constitution operative. Passing and enforcing this legislation will be a key indicator of progress for the new Government of Iraq.

Additionally, the CoR began its work in June with an accelerated schedule of sessions. Most of the Council Committees have been

formed and have named chairs. The CoR has made some progress on key legislation, including progress toward new Electoral Commission legislation, the first step on the path to provincial elections. However, little substantive legislation was passed in the session that ended in July.

The two critical political events facing the CoR and the Government of Iraq over the next few months are the constitutional amendment process and provincial elections.



The National Reconciliation Process

On June 25, 2006, Prime Minister al-Maliki presented to the CoR a "National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project," a 24-point initiative aimed at reconciling past inequities, rallying Iraqis around a principle of equality devoid of sectarian divisions.

The National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project is intended to open dialogue, reduce sectarian tensions and violence in Iraq, and increase commitment to the democratic process and the new national unity government.

The project will operate on three levels. At the national level, the High National Commission of the National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project will be composed of representatives from a diverse cross-section of political, religious, ethnic, tribal, and cultural groups under the leadership of the Minister of State for National Dialogue. The second level will be provincial subcommittees, and the third

level will be field committees, which will focus on key components of national reconciliation and will evaluate progress.

As part of the National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project, a conference of tribal leaders took place on August 26, 2006, in Baghdad that resulted in a statement condemning sectarian violence, and endorsing the reconciliation plan. In the coming months, the government will convene a conference of religious scholars. The government is supposed to convene a conference of political parties to encourage the democratic process and to solidify support for the Government of Iraq.

Government Institutions

To achieve unity, security, and prosperity, Iraq must develop the capacity to deliver government services to its citizens at the national, provincial, and municipal levels. The Government of Iraq must transform the country from

a centralized state, with delivery of essential services traditionally controlled by powerful bureaucrats, to a responsive federal government with decentralized control. This change will take time, consistent mentorship, and an emphasis on both promoting transparency and reducing corruption. The Coalition is supporting these efforts at all levels of the Government of Iraq.

National Institutions

National institutions and forces are essential to displace illegal armed groups and to serve moderate sectarian and local loyalties. The United States supports the development of non-sectarian institutions and the growth of independent media and civil society institutions, while continuing to encourage the Government of Iraq to proceed with the

announced and planned national reconciliation process.

The diagram below shows the organizations currently helping Iraq develop its capacity to govern effectively. Ministerial capacity development is the main focus of the U.S. Embassy's Ministerial Assistance Teams (MATs). These teams, composed of civilian and military experts in governance and organizational development, mentor and train both the Iraqi ministers and their senior staffs in such areas as budget development and execution, inter-ministry coordination, personnel management, and procurement. Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) officials provide expertise in key sectors, such as oil, electricity, and health, to Iraqi ministers and other high-level government officials.



Assistance to Provincial Governments

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) work with provincial governors and elected councils to improve execution of provincial government responsibilities and to increase citizen participation in governmental decision-making processes. The teams are intended to develop core competencies in public administration, finance, budgeting, planning, and accountability by boosting government capacity and transparency at the provincial level. Four U.S.-led PRTs are fully operational: PRT Tamim (Kirkuk), PRT Ninewah (Mosul), PRT Babil (Hillah), and PRT Baghdad. The security situation in some provinces hampers interaction between the team and provincial leaders.

Promoting the Rule of Law

Political stability in Iraq is predicated on the effective rule of law in the country. (Note: Police and associated institutions are discussed in Section 2 of this report.) Effective rule of law in Iraq, as in any country, requires four conditions to be met: effective laws, police to enforce them, courts to administer them, and prisons to incarcerate offenders. If any one of these institutions fails, or cannot work with the others, the Iraqi regime will be unable to enforce the rule of law. The United States, its Coalition partners, and international agencies are helping Iraq strengthen the rule of law. Although there have been some positive developments, delay in the formation of the Government of Iraq resulted in a loss of momentum; rule of law initiatives slowed, which contributed to the growth of crime, corruption, and illegal armed groups.

Legislation

The Iraqi Constitution sets forth a comprehensive list of rights and freedoms, but additional legislation is needed to implement those guar-

antees. The Constitution maintains the independence of the judicial branch, but vests considerable authority in the CoR to define the functions of the courts, raising the risk of undue influence by political or religious groups. Iraq's criminal legal framework is not presently robust enough to adequately address contemporary criminal activity, such as organized crime, trafficking, and some technology-related crimes. Legal experts from the U.S. Government are assisting Iraqi legal scholars in creating a legal system that can balance the requisites of modern international law with Iraqi cultural and legal traditions. The Coalition continues to provide administrative support as well as technical and legal assistance in drafting legislation.

Judiciary

The Coalition has helped the Government of Iraq improve the judicial system in several areas, including building or renovating courthouses, expanding the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), and improving security. The CCCI, for example, now has 12 panels operating throughout Iraq. It processes, on average, 118 insurgency-related cases each month. Due to the limited capacity of the 11 panels outside Baghdad, the Baghdad CCCI is the primary facility for hearing insurgency cases.

Poor security for judges and judicial facilities, an insufficient number of judges, and an inadequate court infrastructure undermine advancements in the rule of law in Iraq. Judges are subject to intimidation and in many areas are afraid to prosecute insurgents. The U.S. Government, through the U.S. Marshals Service, responded by providing secure housing, personal security details, courthouse protection, and personal protection firearms to some members of the Iraqi judiciary. In Baghdad, the Coalition has provided facilities for 22 judges to reside in the

International Zone. Working in conjunction with MNF-I, the U.S. Marshals Service has begun training an Iraqi Marshals Service. The U.S. Department of Justice, along with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense, is proceeding with plans for the renovation and construction of Iraqi courthouses and other related court facilities, including witness protection buildings. As of July 21, 2006, approximately 20 projects to improve judicial capacity have been completed, and 13 more are under way. Five additional projects are planned.

The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that Iraq needs 1,500 judges, yet only about 740 judges are currently serving. The Iraqi Ministry of Justice's (MOJ) Judicial Training Institute has enrolled a new class of 180 students (40 judges and 140 prosecutors) in a 2-year program to train new judges and prosecutors. When this class graduates in the fall of 2007, there will still be a significant shortfall in judges. To help address this need, the Iraqi Chief Justice recently nominated 200 lawyers to serve as investigative judges. If these judges are confirmed, the number of judges will rise to 940. By the fall of 2007, approximately 980 judges will be serving in Iraq, an increase of 32%, but still well short of the requirement.

Prisons

The MOJ is responsible for imprisoning convicted criminals and insurgents in Iraq. MOJ prisons generally meet international standards, but are already at maximum capacity. As a result, many detainees spend time in MOI or MOD facilities, which generally fall short of internationally accepted standards. To address this issue, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are funding construction of seven new MOJ prison facilities, one each in Basrah, Khan Bani Sa'ad, Nasiriyah, Dahuk, and Baladiyah, and two in Rusafa. Work has

stopped at Khan Bani Sa'ad and Nasiriyah due to problems with the primary contractor. Bridge contracts have been awarded to local Iraqi contractors to provide site security and to perform some continuing construction work. The Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers anticipates that contracts will be issued to a new contractor in September and that both facilities will be completed in April 2007. Construction at the two Rusafa facilities has been delayed due to a title dispute between the Ministers of Justice and Interior. The title dispute is currently in litigation in the Iraqi courts. Dahuk, a 1,200-bed facility in the Kurdish region, is scheduled for completion in February 2007. Construction at Baladiyah was completed and the prison facility there has been activated and is currently in use by the Iraqi Corrections Services. Upon completion in mid-2007, all of these facilities will add a combined 4,800 beds. Even with these additions, however, projections show another 20,000 beds will ultimately be needed. Thus, the Government of Iraq must address insufficient bed space, enactment of custody transfer laws, abuses in MOI and MOD detention facilities, and the need for more guards and trained supervisors. The Government of Iraq also faces the problem of prisoner-detainees awaiting adjudication/resolution of the charges against them. The MOI and MOD are believed to be detaining between approximately 2,000 and 10,000 people in pre-trial status, many in crowded, substandard facilities.

Security Internees

In addition to criminal detainees and convicts held by the Government of Iraq, MNF-I holds security internees (or detainees) under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1637. As of July 16, 2006, Coalition forces held 12,388 such security internees outside the Iraqi criminal system. Detainees in MNF-I custody are treated in accordance with

Geneva Convention principles. The U.S. Government has initiated a dialogue with the Government of Iraq in an effort to transfer these internees to Iraqi custody. However, Iraq currently lacks the legal authority to hold security internees outside of the judicial system. Therefore, neither MNF-I-held detainees nor MNF-I-run detention facilities can presently be transitioned to MOJ control. The Coalition continues to urge the Government of Iraq to accept transfer of security internees in a way that ensures their humane treatment. Those detainees who do not pose a serious threat to the citizenry are released as promptly as possible. (The detainee release program is described in more detail later in this report.)

Anti-Corruption Institutions and Programs

The Government of Iraq has made a public commitment to eradicate corruption and to empower anti-corruption institutions. Coalition support for this effort is focused largely on the three main anti-corruption institutions in Iraq: the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), and the Ministerial Inspectors General (IG). Both the BSA and CPI have new constitutional status, and the CPI has become the lead Iraqi anti-corruption agency. The CPI has investigated 1,158 cases this year.

The CCCI, which has jurisdiction for public corruption cases, does not have the capacity to process all its corruption cases. There are 826 criminal cases pending or under active prosecution. Over the past 20 months, 56 officials in Iraq's ministries were either convicted or subject to arrest warrants. The fact that there is a functioning process for investigating and prosecuting corruption, and that some corrupt officials are being brought to justice, is a positive sign. However, the ability of the government to prosecute corruption cases successfully is hampered by the lack of enabling

legislation, lack of CCCI capacity, and intimidation of investigators and judges.

Obstacles to Political Progress

Since the liberation of Iraq, there have been significant successes in the development of legitimate political institutions and processes. The unfolding of the democratic electoral process over the course of 2005 was a crucial success. Despite these achievements, however, the political process has encountered obstacles.

Violence

The nature of violence in Iraq is multifaceted. Illegally armed groups that reject the political process often do so because of long-standing grievances, extremist beliefs, tribal affiliations, and/or personal vendettas. No one strategy can address every grievance. A vocal minority of Iraqis (e.g., religious extremists) fundamentally opposes the idea of a democratic Iraq. Further, some Iraqis who have joined the political process are condoning or maintaining support for violent means as a source of political leverage.

The continued violence in some areas, especially in Baghdad, hampers the formation of legitimate national institutions. In some towns and neighborhoods, local illegal armed groups are seen as the primary providers of security and basic social and essential services. With the extended delay in formation of the national government and capable ministries, these armed groups have become more entrenched, especially in some primarily Shi'a sections of Eastern Baghdad and certain Sunni neighborhoods in Western Baghdad.

Security issues (e.g., the attempted kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to ministry personnel who work with Embassy teams) have made some ministers reluctant to have

U.S. personnel visit them. This reluctance hampers coordination between the Coalition and some ministry personnel. Internal politics (e.g., political party affiliation) is also an obstacle to progress in some ministries.

Inexperience

Some Iraqi ministers tend to focus on near-term performance, rather than on long-term capacity building. A lack of effective procedures within the ministries, such as policy development, procurement, and budgeting, was endemic to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, and three years is not enough time to reverse decades of organizational incapacity. This situation should improve with time.

Lack of proper “tools,” such as information technology, finance systems, and planning capabilities, inhibit the governing of complex issues. The result is that Iraqi planning, budgeting, and execution processes are less than fully effective. IRMO is currently procuring and developing these tools, but it will take time—years rather than months—before Government of Iraq staff is able to use these tools fully and to manage the ministries to full effectiveness.

Foreign Interference

Iran and Syria undermine the Government of Iraq by providing both active and passive support to anti-government forces that tend to fuel ethno-sectarian tensions. The Coalition and the Government of Iraq have acted to counter the Iranian and Syrian influence by tightening security at the borders. However, the borders are porous, and eliminating the transfer of illegal material and foreign fighters into Iraq is a formidable challenge.

Corruption

Corruption in the ministries has further hampered their capabilities. Experienced or talented employees are often purged and replaced with party elements/cronies as a result of a spoils system. Many of Iraq’s political factions tend to view government ministries and their associated budgets as sources of power, patronage, and funding for their parties. Ministers without strong party ties often face significant pressure from the political factions, and sometimes have little control over the politically appointed and connected people serving under them. Still entrenched in the culture of the former regime, some ministry personnel are reluctant to exercise independent initiative or to take any bold action to address Iraq’s problems of corruption.

1.2 Economic Activity

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq underscores three objectives in helping the Iraqis build their economy:

- Building the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis
- Reforming Iraq’s economy, which has been hindered by war, dictatorship, and sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future
- Restoring Iraq’s neglected infrastructure so that it can meet an increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy

This strategy rounds out the National Development Strategy (2005-2007) of the

Government of Iraq, whose national economic objectives are:

- Strengthening the foundations of economic growth
- Revitalizing the private sector
- Improving the quality of life
- Strengthening good governance and security

Building the Iraqi Economy

The formation of a new government allowed Iraq to refocus on its economic agenda. In the second quarter, the new government affirmed its commitment to the reform program supported by the Stand-By Arrangement and is moving forward with implementation of that program. The new government maintained fiscal discipline, raised domestic fuel prices to the targeted levels in the Stand-By Arrangement, sent a fuel import liberalization law to the CoR, and increased targeted support for the poor. The Executive Board of the IMF subsequently completed its first and second review of Iraq's performance under the Stand-By Arrangement on August 2, 2006.

Although the Government of Iraq missed the March 2006 deadline for the state fuel-price increase required by the Stand-By Arrangement for refined petroleum products, on July 1, 2006, the new Government of Iraq increased prices (reducing subsidies) for regular and premium gasoline, benzene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and diesel products, thus meeting or exceeding the IMF Stand-By Arrangement-mandated price increases.

Inflation threatens the overall macroeconomic stability that Iraq has maintained since the war ended. Ongoing violence and supply disruptions are pushing prices higher. The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) must further tighten monetary and exchange rate policy to

prevent high inflation from becoming entrenched.

Iraq continues to make progress reducing its Saddam-era debt. Iraq's debt was estimated at US\$125 billion after the war. This was almost five times the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004, an unsustainable burden on the Iraqi economy. The historic November 2004 debt relief agreement with the Paris Club members and subsequent agreements with commercial and other official creditors, as well as some non-Paris Club creditors, are helping bring Iraq's debt to sustainable levels.

As of July 2006, all 18 Paris Club creditors except Russia had signed bilateral agreements to forgive 80% of Iraqi sovereign debt owed. Russia is expected to sign an agreement with Iraq soon. In addition, Iraq has completed its program to restructure commercial claims from commercial and other official creditors.

- Paris Club – US\$41.7 billion owed before signed bilaterals; US\$34.2 billion will be forgiven under Paris Club terms, including a future Russian agreement.
- Non-Paris Club sovereign debt – approximately US\$63 billion owed (US\$2.75 billion worth of debt relief agreed to on US\$3.3 billion worth of debt, thus far).
- Commercial and other official creditors – debt relief deals completed on US\$19.7 billion of commercial and other official debt.

As long as Iraq continues its progress on implementing the economic reforms in the IMF Stand-By Arrangement, the country will remain eligible for the final 20% of debt reduction agreed under the Paris Club terms. Sixty percent of the Government of Iraq's debt to Paris Club members has already been forgiven, and continued successful comple-

tion of the Stand-By Arrangement will qualify Iraq for a final tranche of 20% in late 2007 or early 2008. The United States forgave all of Iraq's debt (US\$4.1 billion) and is encouraging other creditors to follow this example. Debt relief from non-Paris Club creditors is expected in accordance with Paris Club terms or better, and Iraq is beginning to approach these creditors to ask for debt forgiveness. The Gulf countries hold the largest amount of Iraq's non-Paris Club debt, estimated to be US\$45 billion.

In addition to loans, Iraq owes nearly US\$32 billion in war reparations (as of May 1, 2006). These reparations are the result of claims against Saddam's regime following the Gulf War in 1991. Every year, 5% of Iraq's oil revenue goes to repayment of war reparations. As of May 2006, Iraq had paid more than US\$20 billion in reparations. The United Nations Compensation Commission, which oversees the payment of reparations, awarded US\$21.5 billion in compensation to oil companies, which lost profits and equipment during the Gulf War. Paying these reparations each year, while simultaneously attempting to rebuild its economy, places a significant strain on Iraq's limited resources.

Building the Capacity of Iraqi Institutions

The economic institutions of the new Iraqi government are still developing. On July 12, Prime Minister al-Maliki outlined his vision for economic reform to build a prosperous Iraq based on private sector activity and investment, economic diversification, and integration into the global economy. The Coalition is working with the Government of Iraq to appoint an Ambassador to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to complete the necessary documentation to hold its first WTO Working Party. In addition, the United States continues to work with the Ministry of Finance to implement a Financial Manage-

ment Information System (FMIS) that will provide greater transparency and accountability in the government's budget and expenditure processes.

As of July 1, 2006, halfway through Iraq's fiscal year, the Government of Iraq's ministries have spent far below their planned capital budget expenditures. Iraq's new ministries do not have experience executing ministerial budgets, and lack of a modern electronic transfer system, which has hampered transferring funds in locations around the country, compounded by security problems, contributes to an under-expenditure. The Government of Iraq's continued inability to execute its budget places delivery of basic services, as well as future economic expansion, at risk, and demonstrates the need for continued joint U.S.-Iraqi capacity development efforts. IRMO will soon develop contracts to install government-wide budgeting and procurement modules to add to the FMIS, which was installed approximately two years ago; however, the Government of Iraq is just now starting to use this system. These new modules will increase the transparency of the financial system and will improve the effectiveness of in-year and forecasted budgeting. It is proposed that the Minister of Finance require all Government of Iraq financial transactions to use this enhanced FMIS system. Budgets are not effectively delegated from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to other ministries and provinces. The procedures to enable contracts through the MOF are proving too cumbersome, and officials are not willing to risk applying perceived "incorrect procedures," as several officials have been detained with investigations pending into possible breaches of regulations. Communications between the CBI and the MOF have all but stopped; several employees at the CBI have been intimidated and have therefore failed to show up for work.

Integrating Iraq into the World Economy

The United States is working with the Government of Iraq to engage Iraq's neighbors and the international community on the future of Iraq and the stability of the region. A sustained dialogue with key international partners remains a critical element in assisting Iraq's nascent democracy. In this context, last month Prime Minister al-Maliki traveled to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to promote his national reconciliation plan and to encourage international support for Iraq.

In late July, the Government of Iraq and the UN, with the strong support of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other donor states and international financial institutions, launched an International Compact with Iraq. The International Compact will, over the next five years, bring together the international community and multilateral organizations to help Iraq achieve its national vision. The government's vision is that, five years from now, Iraq will be a united, federal, and democratic country, at peace with its neighbors and itself, well on its way to sustainable economic self-sufficiency and prosperity, and well integrated in its region and the world.

The International Compact will provide assistance to Iraq under a contractual agreement; Iraq will undertake specific economic and political reforms designed to bring it into the global economy. In return, international donors will increase their financial support for Iraq's reconstruction. Meanwhile, the Government of Iraq will continue to enact political and security measures to achieve national reconciliation and to build an economic environment conducive to sustained economic

growth. The UN now occupies its compound in Irbil, and a UN Liaison Detachment has been established in Kirkuk.

The Arab League issued a strong statement following its November 2005 "Preparatory Meeting for the National Accord Conference," calling for all Iraqi parties and Arab states to support Iraq and respect the political will of the Iraqi people. The United States welcomes the planned Arab League-sponsored Iraqi National Accord Conference (to be scheduled) as an opportunity for Iraqis inside and outside of government to discuss the many crucial issues facing their country and to support a process of national reconciliation. Since the November 2005 conference, the Arab League has opened its office in Baghdad and has appointed Mukhtar Lamani as its envoy.

Macroeconomic Indicators

Economic indicators are collected and published regularly, largely through the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and international organizations, such as the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF, although gathering accurate statistics on which to base such indicators in the present security situation in Iraq is a challenge. As outlined in the table below, projections from the IMF assume that economic growth over the medium term will remain dependent on the performance of the oil sector, as it accounts for more than two-thirds of Iraq's GDP. The outlook also assumes that the Government of Iraq's investment in the oil sector will generate increased oil production and strong GDP growth over the medium term.

GDP Estimates and Projections, 2004-2008					
	2004	2005 e	2006 p	2007 p	2008 p
Nominal GDP (In USD billion)	25.7	34.5	47.0	61.0	71.0
Government Oil Revenue (in % of GDP)	69.6	69.4	68.9	68.5	67.4
Per Capita GDP (USD)	949.0	1,237.0	1,835.0	2,060.0	2,319.0
Real GDP (% change)	46.5	3.7	4.0	14.4	12.9
Primary Fiscal Balance (in % of GDP)	-40.6	9.8	-6.1	-2.1	-0.8
Consumer Price Inflation (annual %)	32.0	32.0	30.0	17.0	10.0

Source: IMF Estimates (e) and Projections (p), July 7, 2006

Estimates of unemployment in Iraq vary widely. The UN World Food Program's 2005 estimate is 13.4%; other estimates are as high as 50%–60%. As of July 2006, the Government of Iraq Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) estimated that unemployment was 18% and underemployment was 34%. The COSIT estimates were corroborated by a 2005 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) survey and recent nationwide polling. This year, the Government of Iraq budgeted to increase employment from 1.1 million to 1.9 million civil servants. State-owned enterprises are expected to add another 100,000 people to their rolls. Although this hiring will reduce unemployment, government and state-owned-enterprise employment is not a long-term panacea; for example, most state-owned enterprises are operating under capacity or are closed. The key to long-term, sustained reduction in unemployment can be achieved only through private sector-led growth. The U.S. Government is working with the Government of Iraq to develop the Iraqi private sector by reforming the banking system, providing micro-credit lending and vocational training, and enacting legislation in

such areas as privatization and investment to spur economic growth.

Using data collected in 2004, the UN World Food Program estimates that 15.4% of the surveyed population in Iraq lacks adequate food. Including both severe and moderate forms, about 25.9% of the Iraqi children examined were stunted in their physical growth, a symptom of chronic malnutrition. The lowest rate observed (14.2%) was in Sulamanyah Province, while the highest (36.5%) was in Salah ad Din Province.


With support from USAID, the Ministries of Finance, Labor, and Social Affairs have developed a more effective social safety net for Iraq's poorest citizens. This initiative helps low-income families manage the effects of subsidy reform, using needs-adjusted cash benefits and services that help families raise themselves above the poverty level. The social safety net program is an essential step in reforming national subsidies as required by the IMF Stand-By Arrangement. The Government of Iraq is still registering eligible households in a continuing effort to reach those Iraqis most in need of help. To date, the

Government of Iraq has enrolled more than 520,000 people in the social safety net program.


High inflation is threatening Iraq's overall macroeconomic stability. Inflation continues to be volatile, with spikes generally caused by commodity shortages and seasonal variations. The annual inflation rate from June 2005 to June 2006 was 52.5%, according to COSIT. The CBI needs to take steps to control inflation. Polling data indicate that the Iraqi public's perceptions of the household financial situation are mixed, although public

perceptions are generally more pessimistic than they were a year ago.

There is evidence that Iraqi private sector activity continues to expand. The IMF estimates that non-oil GDP growth in 2006 will be 10%. Various U.S. Government agencies are attempting to spur private sector activity with microfinance loans, bank lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises, capital market development, business skills development, vocational training, investment promotion, business center support, and creation of economic zones.




How would you rate economic conditions in Iraq today?




Source: Derived from International Republic Institute Polling Data, June 14-24, 2006
 Sample size: 2,849
 Margin of error: ±3% (see IRI website for further methodology)

Monthly Consumer Price Index (% Change)



Source: U.S. Treasury estimates



Sector Indicators


Oil Production, Distribution, and Export

When Coalition forces began Operation Iraqi Freedom, they entered a country whose energy infrastructure had deteriorated over many years. The Coalition set out to help the Government of Iraq restore oil facilities, increase production, improve refining of natural gas production, and maintain pipeline facilities. Poor maintenance, insurgent attacks, slow repair, and corruption have slowed progress. Beyond attacks on various worksites, terrorists have attacked crude export and petroleum product pipelines, impeding exports and the refining and distribution of petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel.

Despite these challenges, crude oil production for the second quarter improved by 18% to 2.2 mbpd, and exports improved by 20% to 1.6 mbpd. Nevertheless, oil production and exports still fell short of the Government of Iraq's goals (2.5 mbpd and 2.0 mbpd, respectively). Due to a combination of increased exports and higher prices for crude, oil revenues improved in the second quarter, and will reach budgeted targets by August 2006.

During the past quarter, Iraq resumed exports from northern fields for the first time since the autumn of 2005, though on a very small scale. Exports are expected to increase once three major crude pipelines from Kirkuk, including a new 40-inch line, are put in service in September 2006.

Demand remains essentially unchecked for state-subsidized refined petroleum products. The Government of Iraq announced reductions in fuel subsidies on June 21, 2006; on July 1, 2006, in accordance with the Stand-By Arrangement, these subsidies started being phased in at government-run stations. In June 2006, the government increased prices for fuel sold through official outlets, in accordance with its commitments under its IMF reform program to decrease fuel subsidies. Regular gasoline (85 octane) in Iraq is currently regulated at about US\$0.55 per gallon, while premium gasoline (92 octane) is regulated at about US\$0.90 per gallon. The premium gasoline price is at the IMF target price. These prices are roughly equivalent to the pump prices in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but substantially less than in Turkey, where gasoline is heavily taxed. This disconnect between supply and demand leads to black market activities and corruption. Efforts are



under way to encourage the Government of Iraq to adopt legislation allowing private imports of premium fuels at market prices. This legislation should allow the refined fuel market to clear and help ease the frequent shortages. It should also help reduce the rampant crime and corruption associated with the current fuel production and distribution process.

The Bayji refinery in northern Iraq is a critical element in Iraq's national oil infrastructure. Built in the 1980s, the Bayji refinery is Iraq's largest and newest refinery. This refinery typifies many of the challenges Iraq faces as it attempts to modernize its aging infrastructure and increase its oil exports. Bayji has a nominal production capacity of 310,000 barrels per day. However, since May 2006, the refinery has not produced more than 170,000 barrels per day, and recent production has been as low as 7,500 barrels per day. Four primary factors have limited production at the Bayji refinery: maintenance issues with key components in the refinery, an inefficient refining

process, an unreliable flow of crude oil into the refinery, and security threats to personnel.

Maintaining the refinery's outdated equipment is a challenge. Two of the refinery's three plants have been shut down since May 2006 due to mechanical breakdowns, scheduled maintenance, power outages, and fires. One power outage damaged the refinery's US\$20 million hydrocracker, a critical piece of equipment used to convert heavy fuel oil to usable products.

A second factor limiting production at Bayji is inefficiency in its refining process. For every two barrels of crude oil brought into the refinery, Bayji produces about one barrel of usable product, for an efficiency rate of about 50%; modern refineries can have efficiencies of 90% or higher. The result of the inefficient refining process is a large amount of heavy fuel oil (HFO) byproduct. Bayji does not have adequate facilities to refine further, store, or dispose of this byproduct; the excess HFO thus interferes with production and storage of usable products.

Production at Bayji is also affected by the interrupted flow of crude oil into the refinery from Kirkuk through three key pipelines. The flow has been periodically halted by corrosion, fires, maintenance, and attacks, all of which serve to hamper production of refined products and crude oil for export. Construction of a new 40-inch line is scheduled to be completed in September 2006.


Electricity Production and Distribution


The electrical generation and distribution system in Iraq suffers from unscheduled downtime due to the fragile condition of the electric grid, sabotage, and poor maintenance practices. In addition, shortfalls in petroleum production and distribution lead to occasional fuel shortages for electric generators.

Despite problems, peak capacity and hours of power continue to improve. During this reporting period, peak generating output was 5,283 MW on July 17, 2006, with an average peak generating output of 4,573 MW over the

period. This is an improvement of 15.8% over the previous reporting period. Iraq averaged 14 hours of power per day this quarter, an improvement of 3 hours per day over the previous quarter. Baghdad averaged 8 hours of power per day, twice what it had averaged six months earlier.

As Iraqis purchase additional electric appliances, demand for electricity continues to increase. Estimated demand over the 30-day period ending July 15, 2006, was 8,928 MW. To date in 2006, the highest daily peak supply was 5,283 MW, 2% below the 2005 peak of 5,389 MW. With all state-owned generators running, theoretical maximum output is 8,551 MW, or 96% of this estimated new demand. However, that level of output has not been achieved, nor could it be sustained if it were achieved. The Government of Iraq's goal for average peak generating output by the end of December 2006 is 6,000 MW per day. During times when state-generated electricity is not available, many Iraqis meet their electricity requirements through private





generators. Electricity usage in Iraq appears to be in accordance with or less than regional norms. Nonetheless, the data support the contention that the current connected capacity is not sufficient to support a growing economy.


The subsidized state distribution rate affects electricity demand, and current electricity rates are nominal, well below regional averages. In addition, not all Iraqis pay for their state-supplied electricity. About 70% of homes have meters and are billed. Of those, about 70% pay their electric bills. The rate billed is equivalent to US\$.002/kwh. Owners of private neighborhood generators bill their customers at a rate about 40 times higher, around US\$.08/kwh.

Communications

The communications sector continues to expand, although this expansion is slowing down in comparison with its explosive growth immediately after the fall of the previous regime. Whereas the number of landline sub-

scribers is relatively stable, the three major cell phone companies continue to enroll subscribers. IRMO reports that, as of July 25, 2006, there were 7.1 million cellular telephone subscribers and 1 million landline connections. This reflects an increase in cellular subscribers since the last report. The number of cellular telephone subscribers has doubled over the last nine months. The state-owned Internet service provider (ISP) currently serves 197,310 subscribers, a slight decrease since May 2006. This figure excludes private ISPs and public Internet cafes. It is unknown whether expansions of private sector ISPs drew customers from the state-owned service.

U.S. Government projects continue to support improved communications among Iraqi ministries. Thirty-five of 42 government sites in Baghdad, the CBI, and two state-owned banks are now connected via the wireless broadband network. The U.S. Government continues to train Iraqi telecommunications engineers on proper operations and maintenance procedures to maintain and broaden this network.



Water

New projects have “added capacity to provide an estimated 4.2 million people with access to potable water—an increase of 1.2 million people since the May 2006 report—but direct measurement of water actually delivered to Iraqis is not available.”¹ Additional projects currently under way should increase infrastructure capacity to provide access to clean water to as many as 5 million more people.

Obstacles to Progress

There is significant black market activity in Iraq, much of it in oil products. Although crude oil can be sold on the black market, refined product requires less handling, can be sold almost anywhere, and is more difficult to trace, thereby making it more profitable. Much of the black market and corruption activity centers on refined products, such as gasoline, benzene, LPG, and diesel.

Although the increases in the official prices have reduced the economic incentive to smuggle fuel, smuggling fuel for resale inside

and outside the country remains a serious issue. Turkey, where high taxes keep gasoline priced near US\$5 a gallon, is a lucrative target for smugglers. However, a significant portion of illegal trade results in constraining the supply of gasoline in Baghdad, giving motorists few alternatives to purchasing black market fuel at increased prices. Some pipeline interdictions are due to insurgent attacks, while some are botched attempts to steal fuel by tapping into a flowing product line. Other incidents include deliberate acts of sabotage intended to manipulate the fuel supply to spur increased profits for black marketeers and corrupt officials.

Black market prices for fuel vary by refined fuel type: Benzene typically sells for 3–5 times the government established price, while LPG has recently been selling for 10–20 times the official price. This gap between the official price and the black market price provides a strong incentive for corruption. The U.S. Embassy has engaged the Government of Iraq to follow through on their stated commitment to encourage liberalization of the retail fuel market through enactment of the Fuel Import Liberalization Law being considered by the CoR. This reform will allow the private sector to import fuel and sell it at

¹ Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report, 30 April 06, <http://www.sigir.mil>.

market prices. This step is viewed with controversy in Iraq. Economists predict that private sector retail vendors of petroleum products would undercut the illegal market, thus driving them out of business once the Government of Iraq passes the import liberalization law.

1.3 The Security Environment

Defeating the enemy, breaking the cycle of violence, promoting reconciliation, and transitioning security responsibility to the Government of Iraq remain the top goals in the security track. To achieve these goals, the United States, its Coalition partners, and the Government of Iraq are focused on objectives that include:

- neutralizing enemy effectiveness, influence, and ability to intimidate;
- rapidly reducing sectarian violence and eliminating death squads;
- increasing the capacity of the Government of Iraq and its security structures and forces to provide national security and public order; and
- helping Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities in the areas of law enforcement, justice, and the corrections system.

Indicators of the security environment include:

- composition, strength, and support for groups that threaten security and stability: anti-government and anti-Coalition forces (the "enemy");
- activity, support, and efforts to disband, disarm, and reintegrate militias;
- attack trends (including the number of attacks and their effectiveness);
- levels of sectarian violence;


- Iraqi public perceptions of security and security institutions; and
- capabilities of the ISF and Iraqi institutions.

Information about the ISF is presented later in this report.

Overall Assessment of the Security Environment

During this reporting period, attacks and civilian casualties have risen, characterized by ethno-sectarian attacks and reprisals. Violence escalated notably in Baghdad, which, as the political, population, and media center of the country, is a high-value target for terrorists. Violence in Basrah also rose, partly in response to British actions against the JAM. The death of terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June was a major success for the Coalition and the Government of Iraq, but al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations due to its resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and control. Terrorists have failed to advance their primary objectives, which include derailing Iraq's political process and widening their political support among the Iraqi people. The Iraqi Army took the lead in more counter-insurgency operations and assumed security responsibility in more areas since the last report. The Iraqi people continue to express confidence in the Iraqi Army to provide for their security and to reject al-Qaeda in Iraq's vision of Iraq's future, but they are increasingly turning to militias and neighborhood watch groups to provide security from sectarian violence.

Overall attack levels are higher than last quarter. In particular, attacks have increased in southwestern Diyala Province and in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Extremists seeking to stoke ethno-sectarian strife have increasingly focused their efforts on civilians, inciting a cycle of retribution killings and



driving civilian casualties to new highs. Much of this violence is focused on Baghdad, as terrorists, insurgents, and illegal armed groups recognized the political and economic significance of the capital city. As described below, the Government of Iraq and the Coalition are taking significant steps to reverse the upward trend of violence in Baghdad.

Recent Developments in the Security Environment

Rising sectarian strife defines the emerging nature of violence in mid-2006. Since the last report, the core conflict in Iraq changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their own respective political and religious agendas. Death squads and terrorists are locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife, with Sunni and Shi'a extremists each portraying themselves as the defenders of their

respective sectarian groups. However, the Sunni Arab insurgence remains potent and viable, although its visibility has been overshadowed by the increase in sectarian violence.

On June 14, 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki announced the government's plan to provide improved security conditions in Baghdad. Operation Together Forward, or *Amaliya Ma'an ila Al-Amam* in Arabic, consists of increased checkpoints, curfews, and enforced weapons bans to reduce sectarian violence in focused areas within Baghdad. Security forces are also conducting raids against terrorist cells and death squads. As part of this operation, Iraqi police, the Iraqi Army, and National Police, supported by Coalition forces, increased patrols and checkpoints in all areas of Baghdad, while concentrating on areas of the city that have witnessed increases in violence and sectarian killings. Security forces also worked to block terrorist entry into the capital city.

The confluence of high attack levels—many targeting civilians—and the increased sectarian violence, combined with the need to ensure that the Government of Iraq maintains momentum in political progress and counter-insurgency, made Baghdad security a decisive element in the campaign. Given the complexity of the security situation in Baghdad, the Iraqi government planned to execute and complete *Amaliya Ma'an ila Al-Amam* over a period of months, not weeks. After the first month of *Amaliya Ma'an ila Al-Amam*, the operation had arrested but had not reversed the high attack levels seen in May and June. The average of 23.7 attacks per day across Baghdad's 10 districts was virtually unchanged from the 23.8 average daily attacks that occurred the month prior to the operation. Moreover, the rate of sectarian-motivated murders and execution-style killings continued to rise, primarily in and around Baghdad.

In July, during the prime minister's first visit to the United States, Prime Minister al-Maliki and President Bush announced an adjustment to the Baghdad Security Plan. One of the key changes is an increase in security force levels in the city. Elements of the Call Forward Force were brought forward from Kuwait and other Coalition and Iraqi units were repositioned from less active areas of the country. In addition, the Secretary of Defense extended the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team's deployment in Iraq for up to 120 days. Because the 172nd was largely successful in working with the ISF to improve security in northern Iraq, it has been repositioned into Baghdad.

In addition to increasing force levels in Baghdad, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq developed and refined tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to reduce the sectarian killings. A primary focus is eliminating the death squads responsible for the

predominance of the execution-style killings and other murders in the city. The death squads have fomented sectarian violence, as killings prompt further killings of revenge. Coalition forces and the ISF are also targeting the death squads and other illegal armed groups using checkpoints, patrols, driving bans, curfews, weapons-law enforcement, intelligence-driven operations, and other methods. The ISF will rely on their training, experience, and familiarity with Baghdad's milieu to focus on neighborhoods with the highest levels of violence. Coalition forces remain in a supporting role and will be employed as requested by Prime Minister al-Maliki and directed by the MNF-I commanding general.

The two primary objectives of the security operations in Baghdad are rapidly reducing sectarian violence by de-legitimizing the illegally armed groups and establishing the ISF as the dominant security presence. The changes described above represent a concerted, focused effort by the Coalition and the Government of Iraq. By strengthening the capacity of the Government of Iraq and spurring economic growth in Baghdad, the United States will help the Government of Iraq succeed in protecting its population and restoring the confidence of the Iraqi people in their future.

The Nature of the Conflict

Violence in Baghdad is the most prominent feature of the conflict in Iraq in this period, as Sunni and Shi'a extremist death squads pursue their sectarian agendas. The resulting violence overwhelmingly targets civilians, causing segments of the populace to tolerate or even endorse extremist actions on their behalf as an effective means to guarantee their safety, undermining both the Government of Iraq's ability to deliver security and its pursuit of a reconciliation program. Although

Baghdad remains the focus for sectarian and terrorist violence in Iraq, violence tied to the Rejectionist insurgency, terrorist intimidation, political and tribal tensions, and criminality continue in other regions. Sectarian violence is gradually spreading north into Diyala Province and Kirkuk as Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish groups compete for provincial influence. Conflict in Anbar Province remains centered on the Sunni insurgency. Although al-Qaeda in Iraq continues its intimidation to coerce passive Sunni support, tribes are pushing back to eject al-Qaeda in Iraq and re-establish their dominant role. In the southern, predominantly Shi'a region of the country, political and tribal rivalries are a growing motive behind violence, particularly in Basrah, with limited anti-Coalition forces attacks likely undertaken by rogue Shi'a militia with Iranian support.

The Enemy

Violence against the Iraqi people and Coalition forces is committed generally by a combination of both Sunni and Shi'a groups, who are overwhelmingly Iraqi but with a small yet significant component of foreign suicide operatives. Sunni groups include Rejectionists—many of whom were members of, or associated with, the former regime—and terrorists groups, including al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al Sunnah (AS), and other smaller groups. Shi'a groups include elements of militias and illegal armed groups, many of whom receive Iranian support. The threat posed by Shi'a illegal armed groups, filling perceived and actual security vacuums, is growing and represents a significant challenge for the Iraqi government. The appearance and activity of death squads is a growing aspect of the violence in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shi'a death squads adding to the violence by targeting civilians and inciting reprisal. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and elements of JAM (nominally under the control of Muqtada

al-Sadr) are among most prominent groups engaging in a continuing pattern of attacks and reprisals against individuals or communities representing the other's sectarian affiliation. Thus, the violence in Iraq cannot be categorized as the result of a single organized or unified opposition or insurgency; the security situation is currently at its most complex state since the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, Iraqi or Coalition security strategies must be tailored for the different objectives, methods, and support structures of each particular threat.

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters

Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates in the Mujahadeen Shura Council consist of both foreigners and Iraqis motivated by an extremist Sunni Islamist ideology, which rejects the West, attacks moderate Islam, and seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq. AS is another significant, mostly indigenous terrorist group that objects to al-Qaeda in Iraq's wanton targeting of Muslim Iraqis. Foreign fighters continue to enter Iraq and constitute the majority of those conducting suicide attacks. Sunni extremists continue their efforts to force Coalition withdrawal, perpetuate sectarian violence, and make Iraq ungovernable as a means of establishing the Caliphate. The death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has dealt a significant blow to al-Qaeda in Iraq, though the cellular nature of its robust network allowed decentralized operations to continue. Since then, al-Qaeda in Iraq has fomented sectarian violence through high-profile attacks against Shi'a civilians and is engaged in a cycle of retaliatory violence involving elements of JAM. Al-Qaeda in Iraq recently announced that its "Umar Brigade" that would begin targeting JAM in retaliation for death squad activities in an effort to portray al-Qaeda in Iraq as a protector of the Sunni. Additionally, al-Qaeda in Iraq leadership is increasing convergent with al-Qaeda

senior leaders on goals and strategy following Zarqawi's death. The recent statement from Usama bin Laden on June 30, 2006, in which he addresses the Iraqi "jihadists," frames the conflict in terms of attacking those who support the Government of Iraq. He also warns Shi'a in "southern Iraq" that they are not safe, if they continue to support Coalition operations against Sunni urban centers in Anbar Province. This is a clear attempt to recast al-Qaeda in Iraq as the most effective defender of Sunni interests.

Sunni Rejectionists

Sunni Rejectionists use violence and coercion in an attempt to force withdrawal of Coalition forces, prevent Shi'a economic and territorial dominance, and reverse Sunni political marginalization by regaining a privileged or protected status within a unified Iraq. The 1920s Revolutionary Brigade is the most prominent of these Rejectionist groups. Sunni Rejectionists continue to target Coalition forces at rates higher than Sunni extremist or Shi'a militia groups. The bulk of the Rejectionist insurgency will likely continue to attack Coalition forces while they remain in Iraq. Some elements are indicating an interest in Prime Minister al-Maliki's new reconciliation effort, while still employing violence against the Coalition forces and the ISF from a sense of honor and as a means to force meaningful political accommodation. Moderates say they will accept reconciliation inducements and disarm only after death squads are eliminated; Shi'a militias are disarmed; and key security, amnesty, and political demands are met. Other hard-line elements of Rejectionist groups provide professional military skills to al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremists to achieve common tactical objectives. Other Rejectionists, including some in Anbar and Baghdad, are weary of al-Qaeda in Iraq's violent intima-

tion tactics and actively oppose al-Qaeda in Iraq, sometimes mounting their own anti-al-Qaeda in Iraq attacks and raids.

Death Squads

Death squads are armed groups that conduct extra-judicial killings. Death squads are formed from terrorists, militias, illegal armed groups, and—in some cases—rogue elements of the ISF. Both Shi'a and Sunni death squads are active in Iraq, and are responsible for the most significant increases in sectarian violence. Death squads predominantly target civilians, and the increase in death squad activity is directly correlated with the increase of civilian casualties. Coalition forces and the ISF are actively targeting elements that participate in death squad activity.

Militias and Other Armed Groups

Militias and small, illegally armed groups operate openly and often with popular support. This is especially true in areas where the Government of Iraq is perceived as unable to provide effective social and security services for the population. Militias—whether legal or illegal—provide an element of protection for select portions of the populace, usually on an ethno-sectarian basis, resulting in, overall, a more dangerous environment for the Iraqi community. Some militias also act as the security arm of organizations devoted to social relief and welfare, lending these armed groups further legitimacy. Whether operating within or outside the law, these armed groups operate separately from formal public safety structures. Their continued existence challenges the legitimacy of the constitutional government and provides a conduit for foreign interference. An effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program is essential to meeting near- and long-term security requirements for Iraq.

Although a number of militias and illegal armed groups have operated in Iraq since before the liberation, the groups that are affecting the current security situation the most are the Badr Organization and JAM.

The Badr Organization is an authorized militia under the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law that pre-dated the present Constitution, and the organization actively participates in the Iraqi government. The Badr Organization has not engaged in active violence against Coalition forces or the Government of Iraq; it attacks Sunni targets and in the past has also confronted JAM in an effort to prevent its expansion of power and influence among the Shi'a. The Badr Organization receives financial and materiel support from Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death squads.

JAM is not a legal militia under Iraqi law. However, it is well known and supported popularly in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq, and has achieved a measure of tolerance from elements of the Government of Iraq. JAM is closely associated with the Office of the Martyr Sadr and is nominally responsive to his direction. Most, but not all, JAM elements are following Sadr's order not to engage Coalition forces or the ISF except in self-defense. Still, violence between JAM, the Iraqi Army, and to a lesser extent Coalition forces, is frequent. Rogue JAM elements are among the main perpetrators of sectarian violence, and JAM members frequently participate in death squad activities. As described above, JAM and Badr Organization members have periodically attacked one another in the past and are political rivals, but intra-Shi'a conflict has taken a back seat to the ongoing battle of violence and revenge between al-Qaeda in Iraq and elements of JAM. Like Badr, JAM receives logistical support from Iran.

The *Peshmerga* are, technically, not a militia, but have the status of an authorized armed force. The *Peshmerga* maintain security independently within and along the borders for the Kurdish Regional Government. Some elements are integrated into the IPS. The *Peshmerga* predominantly operate in Kurdish regions, but have also been employed in the private security company role outside of Kurdistan. The *Peshmerga* do not attack or oppose Coalition forces or the ISF. In some cases, *Peshmerga* provide security for Coalition reconstruction efforts. Over the long term, however, the perceived dual allegiance of the *Peshmerga* is potentially inconsistent with effective national security and governance.

Unlike the Kurdish and Shi'a militia groups, Sunni Arabs do not have formally organized militias, but rely on neighborhood watches, Rejectionists, and, increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The presence of *Peshmerga*, Badr Organization, and JAM individuals in the IPS and the National Police contributes to Sunni concerns about the potential for persecution and partisanship. The rise of sectarian attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi'a civilians in Baghdad and the mixed-ethnic provinces to support militias. Such support is likely to continue in areas where Iraqi institutions and forces are perceived as unable to provide essential services or meet security requirements.

Criminals

Without an apparent political motive, conventional criminal elements are also capitalizing on the instability in Iraq, although it is increasingly difficult to distinguish among activities conducted by criminal, insurgent, and terrorist groups, as all are engaged in kidnappings, extortion, assaults, and other illegal behavior. In some cases, criminal

gangs work with terrorist organizations, with the former abducting hostages and selling them to the latter, which can use their captives for publicity or to obtain ransom. The various groups involved in illicit activity are doing so to generate revenue, expand their influence, and facilitate further criminal, terrorist, or insurgent operations.


Attack Trends and Violence

For this report, the term “attacks” refers to specific incidents reported in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Significant Activities database. It includes known attacks on Coalition forces, the ISF, the civilian population, and infrastructure.


In the government establishment period beginning May 20, 2006, the average number of weekly attacks increased 15% compared to the previous reporting period. Weekly attack levels in July 2006 were the highest to date. Coalition forces continued to attract the majority (63%) of attacks. However, the ISF and civilians continued to suffer the majority

of casualties. Overall, Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter. Most attacks targeting Coalition forces were “stand-off” attacks, not involving close-up confrontations between Coalition forces and insurgents. Such attacks typically consisted of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms fire, and indirect fire weapons. The number of car bombs this quarter increased to levels last seen in the summer of 2005. Over the last quarter, car bombs were largely centered on Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and the Western Euphrates valley, and primarily targeted civilians or ISF checkpoints.

Although the overall number of attacks increased in all categories, the proportion of those attacks directed against civilians increased substantially. Nationally, in April 2006, civilians were the target of 11% of attacks; this increased to 15% in June 2006. Baghdad showed a more pronounced shift in the targeting of civilians compared to the national trend. In Baghdad, civilian targets comprised 15% of total attacks in April and




Average Daily Casualties* – Iraqi (including ISF) and Coalition 1 Apr 04–11 Aug 06



* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elements responding to an incident; the inconclusivity of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

Source: Derived from MNC-I

Total Attacks by Province 20 May–4 Aug 06



Source: Derived from MNC-I

22% in June. The increase in attacks over the past two quarters reflects heightened sectarian tension following the Golden Mosque bombing and increased death squad activity.

Four of Iraq's 18 provinces (Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din) continue to experience the majority of attacks. Anbar and Baghdad are the worst affected provinces,

accounting for 55% of all attacks. Further, Ninewah and Tamim have seen significant increases in attacks over the last quarter.


Infrastructure Attacks

The average weekly number of attacks on critical infrastructure providing essential services to the Iraqi people, such as electrical power, water, and fuel, continued to decline over the past quarter, decreasing from an average of five per week to an average of two per week. However, the effect of these attacks has been disproportionate to their numbers for several reasons. Most notable among these is the slow rate of repair to damage from previous attacks. At other times, Iraqi officials may be slow in initiating repairs. Infrastructure repair is often hampered by insurgent or other criminal intimidation of maintenance workers. Not all attacks and intimidation are the result of insurgent or other anti-government activity, as described in the economic section. Criminal activities, such as extortion and black marketeering, also have outlets in

disrupting public essential services. Although the number of attacks is decreasing, the essential services infrastructure will continue to be a high-value target for enemy elements. Successful attacks on the infrastructure adversely affect the legitimacy of government in the minds of the civil population by reducing the supply of essential services.

Concerns of Civil War

Sustained ethno-sectarian violence is the greatest threat to security and stability in Iraq. Breaking this cycle of violence is the most pressing immediate goal of Coalition and Iraqi operations. Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq, specifically in and around Baghdad, and concern about civil war within the Iraqi civilian population has increased in recent months. Notwithstanding this concern, there is no generally agreed upon definition of civil war among academics or defense analysts. Moreover, the conflict in Iraq does not meet the stringent international legal standards for civil war. However



defined, movement toward civil war can be prevented. The U.S. and Iraqi governments are continuing the military, diplomatic, and political actions needed to prevent a civil war and bring the situation in Baghdad under control. Sectarian violence is largely confined to the communal level. Furthermore, the Iraqi institutions of the center are holding. Iraqi leaders must take advantage of the popular support for democracy, a unified Iraq, and opposition to violence to form institutions that take responsibility for Iraq's security.



Sectarian tensions increased over the past quarter, demonstrated by the increasing number of executions, kidnappings, attacks on civilians, and internally displaced persons. According to an estimate by the United Nations, 22,977 families—137,862 individuals—have been displaced in Iraq since the February 22, 2006, Samarra Mosque bombing. Sectarian violence is concentrated on the boundaries of mixed and ethnically dominated areas of Baghdad and in southwestern Diyala Province.

According to MNC-I reporting, civilian casualties increased by approximately 1,000 per month since the previous quarter. Executions in particular reached new highs in the month of July. The Baghdad Coroner's Office

reported 1,600 bodies arrived in June and more than 1,800 bodies in July, 90% of which were assessed to be the result of executions. This is due to increased targeting of civilians by al-Qaeda in Iraq and the increase in death squad activity.

Sunni and Shi'a extremists, particularly rogue JAM elements and al-Qaeda in Iraq, are, as noted, interlocked in retaliatory violence and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their areas of influence. Throughout the past quarter, rogue JAM members continued a campaign of overt executions and mass kidnappings of Sunni civilians. At the same time, Sunni extremists continued to respond by carrying out large-scale and mass-casualty bombings of Shi'a gatherings and culturally significant sites.

Attacks on Shi'a by al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni elements are apparently designed to inflame sectarian tension, which in turn generates and results in retaliatory attacks on Sunni civilians by rogue Shi'a elements. These rogue Shi'a actions increasingly appear intent on securing Shi'a enclaves and establishing control of contested areas of Baghdad. Coalition forces and the ISF are responding by increased targeting of both Sunni and Shi'a death squads.



Public Perceptions of Security

Ultimately, stability and security in Iraq depend on the support of the Iraqi people. In general, Iraqis have had an optimistic outlook on their future and the overall security situation. However, as time has passed, their optimism has eroded. The aftermath of the Golden Mosque bombing and the growing sectarian violence continue to shape their perceptions. As sectarian violence increases, the view of the security situation worsens. With the view that Baghdad is the key to Iraq, a similar sentiment toward security exists there.


An indication of support for the Government of Iraq within the country is the level of confidence that the Iraqi people expressly place in the ISF Forces, especially when compared against militias or other illegal armed groups. Since the previous report, confidence in the Iraqi Army has remained generally constant, with the notable exception of Baghdad, where public confidence improved. Despite the increase in violence, confidence in the Iraqi Army rose from 69% to 78%. Despite the recent violence in Basrah, polling data that

include the Basrah area indicate increased confidence in both the police and the Iraqi Army over the last reporting period. Confidence in militias is mixed, with a rise in confidence in Baghdad countering an overall downward confidence trend elsewhere.

The perceptions of the Iraqi population will slowly respond to visible, effective actions performed by the IPS. It will take continued diligence on the part of the Iraqi Police to be seen as actively patrolling their areas and arresting individuals for criminal activity, while paying particular care to avoid the appearance of sectarianism.

Another indicator is Iraqi use of the intelligence hotline for providing tips to authorities about suspicious activity. The population has continued to demonstrate its willingness to report such activity and thereby support the government's efforts against terrorism. Since mid-March, the number of tips has increased (see following chart). Continued timely and effective response of the IPS to these tips should increase the confidence of the population.


How concerned are you about an increase in sectarian or ethnic violence in Iraq?





Source: Department of State, Office of Research, June 21-July 6, 2006
 Sample sizes: Baghdad-173; Kurdish Areas-308; Kirkuk-108; Tikrit/Baquba-210; Mid-Euphrates-523; South-437
 Margin of error: $\pm 4\%$ for the overall sample, but varies among regions

* Data from Mosul is not included in this chart. It was determined to be unreliable.


TREND: Thinking about the future, do you feel that things will be...



Source: International Republic Institute Polling Data, June 14-24, 2006
 Sample size: 2,849
 Margin of error: $\pm 3\%$ (see IRI website for further methodology)



Total TIPS Actionable Calls



Source: MNF-1 (includes tips reported to multiple sources)

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2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

The ISF continue to grow in strength and capability as indicated by:

- progress in the training and equipping of ISF personnel;
- assessed capabilities of operational units; and
- progress in assuming responsibility for security of areas within Iraq.

Institutional capability within the MOD and the MOI is an increasingly important indicator of the transition to Iraqi security self-reliance. As the MOD and the MOI continue to staff, train, and equip forces, increased emphasis is placed on the development of institutional capacity to direct, support, and sustain the ISF.


2.1 Progress in Training and Equipping the Iraqi Security Forces

Force generation continues on schedule this quarter. More than 14,000 additional Iraqi soldiers and police have completed initial training and equipping since May 2006, bringing the total number of ISF trained and equipped to 277,600.

More than 92% of authorized Iraqi Army battalions are assembled. Train-and-equip efforts remain focused on building combat support and combat service support forces providing key enablers to Iraqi combat forces. When fully established, these units will provide critical combat enablers, such as logistics and transportation support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. More than 65% of authorized personnel in the Iraqi Army support forces have been trained and equipped. Logistics units and overall logistics capability continues to improve.


Current Status of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces			
Ministry of Defense Forces		Ministry of Interior Forces	
COMPONENT	OPERATIONAL	COMPONENT	TRAINED & EQUIPPED
ARMY*	~113,200	POLICE**	~113,800
AIR FORCE	~700	OTHER MOI FORCES	~48,800
NAVY	~1100	TOTAL	~162,600
TOTAL	~115000	OBJECTIVE	188,000
OBJECTIVE	137,500		
Total Trained & Equipped ISF:			
~277,600			
<small>* MMTTC-4 expanded the train and equip mission from 4 to 11 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) on 29 Mar 06. This change is reflected in the adjusted Iraqi Army authorization. ** The Ministry of Interior dissolved the National Highway Patrol into the regular Police on 17 Mar 06. This change is reflected in the adjusted Iraqi Police trained and equipped numbers.</small>			
<small>Date as of 7 August 06</small>			

MOI security forces are overall 64% trained and equipped. Baghdad, the other 10 critical cities, and the National Police are at 90% trained and equipped and are expected to reach 100% next quarter. Progress continues to support achieving Objective Civil Security Force goals by December 2008.




Data as of 15 July 2006

MOD Forces' Assessed Capabilities



Data as of 7 August 2006

MOI National Police Forces' Assessed Capabilities




Data as of 7 August 2006

2.2 Progress in Assuming Leadership in Counter-Insurgency

The ISF are increasingly taking the lead in operations and assuming primary responsibility for the security of their nation, as Iraqi army and police forces demonstrate an increased capability to plan and execute counter-insurgency operations. The following charts depict this progress. As of August 7, 2006, 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, and 85 battalions, and 2 National Police battalions assumed lead responsibility for security in their areas of operation.

In total, there are 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 8 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) conducting operations at varying levels of assessed capability. Another three combat battalions are in the process of forming. In addition, 27 National Police battalions are now operational and active. The green shaded areas on the maps above depict areas where Iraqi Army units have assumed the lead for security responsibility. A unit can

assume the lead once it has been thoroughly assessed and has demonstrated that it is capable of planning and executing combat operations. Although these units lead security operations, most still require support from Coalition forces because their logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities are not fully developed. The Coalition's primary force development objective to date has been to produce trained, equipped, and capable combat units; there has been less emphasis placed on enablers, including logistics and command and control. Now that more than two-thirds of the Iraqi Army combat units are in the lead, the Coalition's focus will shift more toward helping the Iraqis develop these enablers. MNF-I will also continue to help improve the capacity of the MOD to organize, train, equip, sustain, and modernize its forces, with the goal of eventually eliminating the Iraqi Army's reliance on Coalition support.



2.3 Ministry of Interior

The objective for the MOI, in partnership with the Ministry of Interior Transition Team (MOI-TT), is to become a forward-looking ministry that is effective, efficient, accountable, representative, appropriately structured to deal with the prevailing security conditions, and staffed by people who are committed to upholding the rule of law. The MOI forces consist of the IPS, the National Police, the border forces, and the Center for Dignitary Protection.

The MNF-I initiative to develop professional civil security forces able to assume the lead for the security of the Iraqi people has been dubbed the "Year of the Police." The focus is on creating a force loyal to the people of Iraq and its Constitution, and committed to guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law. This was designated as one of MNC-I's main efforts in 2006.

Mentoring of civil security forces is conducted by Police Transition Teams (PTTs), National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), and Customs and Border Protection Teams (CBPTs). More than 160 PTTs are assisting the development of the IPS. Because of the large number of police stations dispersed throughout Iraq, the PTT program has initially focused on provincial headquarters, district headquarters, and Iraqi police stations in key strategic cities, but will spread to other stations throughout the country as more stations achieve a higher level of readiness. To conduct their mission, the PTTs travel to their assigned stations to train, teach, and coach the Iraqi police and to conduct joint patrols with their Iraqi counterparts.

The integration of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) into the PTTs significantly increased the Coalition force's ability to

develop the IPS. The IPLOs provide the civilian police with expertise in all technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management. The deployment of five additional Military Police companies in July 2006 added extra PTTs, enabling the expansion of the program to assess and assist in the development of the IPS.

Twenty-seven BTTs mentor and enable development of border forces. Additionally, Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Patrol Teams (CBPTs) provide critical mentorship at ports of entry, while 38 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) continue to support the development of the National Police units. These transition teams are intended to improve the readiness and capability of their MOI partner units.

The Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is on track to meet the goal of recruiting and training the authorized number of MOI forces by the end of December 2006. The force generation of the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the IPS will occur in November 2006 and December 2006, respectively. Specialized police units, such as the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the National Information and Investigative Agency (NIIA), will be trained by the end of 2006.

Iraqi Police Service

The IPS is composed of patrol, traffic, station, and highway police assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level.

CPATT has trained and equipped approximately 113,800 IPS personnel, an increase of 12,600 since the May 2006 report. CPATT projects that it will have trained and equipped 135,000 IPS by December 2006. Although the

force will be manned in the aggregate by the end of the year, proper distribution is a challenge. Certain areas have a shortage of trained officers while additional hiring in other areas has resulted in an overage in the force.

As of July 24, 2006, 71,324 police recruits have received training in the 10-week basic course. Police officers with prior experience attend a 3-week course, the Transitional Integration Program (TIP), instead of attending the full 10-week basic course. Originally intended only for police trained during the Saddam regime, the TIP was expanded in July to include serving police officers who have not been trained but who have served on the force for at least one year. The TIP includes training on human rights, crime defensive tactics, democratic policing, first aid, patrol procedures, firearms (9mm and AK-47), and anti-terrorism. The Officer Transitional Integration Program (OTIP) course curriculum includes democratic policing, human rights, first aid, police ethics, supervision and leadership, use of force, firearms (9mm and AK-47), communications and problem-solving skills, anti-terrorism, patrol procedures, critical for officers, and police investigations. Some 41,051 police officers have graduated from the TIP and OTIP programs.

IPS Operations

The IPS constitutes the majority of MOI forces in the country. Each month, PTTs assess the operational readiness of a portion of the police forces, using the Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA) process. The TRA evaluates the police on the core functions required for effective law enforcement and community policing. Shortages of PTTs has limited observation of the IPS in Anbar, Babil, Basrah, Tamim, Wasit, Karbala, Maysan, Ninewah, Qadisiyah, Salah ad Din, Irbil, Dahuk, and Sulamanyah provinces.

However, the recent arrival of five additional Military Police companies will greatly increase the ability to assess the IPS.

IPS Recruiting and Vetting

More than 230,000 MOI employees have been screened by the Iraqi Police Screening Service, which checks fingerprints against Ba'ath Party records and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these, 5,300 were reported as possible derogatory matches, and 74 have been dismissed. There is currently no screening process to ascertain militia allegiance. More than 54,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy by Morris & McDaniel, 73% of whom passed and were allowed to enter basic training. Currently, no method exists to track the success rates of these or other police officers.

IPS Equipment

The IPS is equipped with AK-47s, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, individual body armor, high frequency radios, small and medium pick-up trucks, and mid-sized SUVs. The IPS in Baghdad and the nine other key cities had been provided with 99% of their authorized equipment at the end of June 2006. They will have received 100% by mid-August 2006. The IPS in all 18 provinces have been provided with 66% of their authorized equipment and will receive 100% of their authorized equipment by the end of December 2006.

IPS Leadership

Leadership in the IPS is the cornerstone for success. The IPS currently has three leadership courses to develop high-quality leaders. The First Line Supervisor Course is designed for company grade officers. The Intermediate-Level Course is designed for field grade officers, and the Senior-Level Course is designed for General Officers. Each course is

two weeks long. Program topics are designed for the target audience and include human rights, discrimination, right to life, code of conduct, democratic policing, modern policing, the role of the supervisor, communication and the supervisor, delegation, change management, ethics, police corruption, problem employees, community policing, field training police leadership, history of management, modern supervision in today's law enforcement organizations, crime scene management, civil disorder, records management, budgeting, logistics, equipment and facilities management, group problem solving, mission values, six-step problem-solving models, overview of law enforcement planning, strategic planning, motivational theory, and analyzing employee performance problems. A plan is in place to develop a more extensive Intermediate-Level Officers course, slated to begin in the fall of 2006.

The Officer Education System has been successful in developing junior leaders loyal to the Iraqi people. However, certain senior leaders are products of the former regime and continue to view leadership as an entitlement, not a responsibility. As these officers are identified, they are removed.

National Police

Organized into a National Police Headquarters, two National Police Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the National Police are charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed.

The National Police Headquarters provides command and control, staffing, equipping, training, and sustainment for these National Police Forces. It also commands the two training and professional development academies at Camp Solidarity and Camp Dublin.

The 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions reached 99% of equipping and authorized manning by July 2006 and will continue to progress through TRA levels, with the completion of force generation by December 2006.

Unprofessional and, at times, criminal behavior has been attributed to certain units in the National Police. This behavior and the decrease in public confidence in these forces has been the impetus for a National Police reform program. Each unit and its leaders will be assessed by a joint (Coalition and Iraqi) committee. Substandard leaders at all levels will be removed and units will undergo re-training.

National Police Training and Personnel

There are currently approximately 24,300 trained and equipped National Police, an increase of approximately 1,600 since the last report. They are trained in Iraqi law, human rights, the rule of law, and democratic policing techniques at the National Police Academy.

New recruits undergo six intense weeks of training at the academy in northern Baghdad. Training includes weapons qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, vehicle checkpoints, and IED characteristics and recognition.

National Police Operations

All National Police battalions are currently conducting counter-insurgency operations, with two battalions having security lead for their areas of responsibility. NPTTs are embedded at all levels of the National Police units, down to the battalion level. All National Police units work in Combined Operations

Areas (COAs) and partner with Coalition forces who provide support and advice.

National Police Recruiting and Vetting

The MOI recruits and vets the National Police force. Coalition forces provide advisors for the recruiting process, but neither actively recruit nor provide lists of names of recruits to the MOI. A National Police officer is recruited and provided an academy start date; upon arrival at the National Police academy, the candidate is interviewed by a senior staff officer (either a Colonel or Brigadier General). If he or she passes the interview, the officer is admitted to the academy. The individual's personnel file is then forwarded to the MOI, where a vetting team reviews it. If the officer is certified by the vetting process, he or she will be retained and allowed to complete the academy. If the candidate is disapproved, the officer is immediately removed from the academy.

National Police Equipment

The National Police have received 92% of their authorized equipment and will have received 96% of their authorized equipment by the end of November, missing its goal of 100% by a small margin. They will have received 100% of their authorized equipment by the end of December. The police are equipped with small arms, medium machine guns, and RPGs, and they patrol in light trucks. The mechanized battalions are equipped with Armored Security Vehicles and REVAs, a South African wheeled APC.

Department of Border Enforcement and Department of Ports of Entry

The DBE and the Department of Ports of Entry (POE) are collectively charged with controlling and protecting Iraq's borders.

DBE Training and Personnel

The DBE has 23,900 trained and equipped personnel, an increase of 1,800 since the previous report. The DBE is organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and 38 battalions, and includes the forces that staff 258 border forts.

Three academies, each with a capacity of approximately 800, train border patrol forces. The Iraqi Border Patrol Basic Training Course focuses on an introduction to law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons qualification, combat life saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling.

DBE and POE Operations

The DBE is supported by 27 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The 11-man BTTs mentor and support the development of the border units. The BTT members are trained in various specialties, including logistics and communications, and provide critical assistance to the border force commanders in the areas of personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting, equipment accountability, and maintenance. Additional BTTs deployed in early June to support the development of the POE at critical high-threat border crossings. In February 2006, MNF-I supported the accelerated development of the POE through the deployment of a combined Border Support Team (BST), consisting of customs border protection agents and BTTs. In March 2006, most DBE units reached TRA Level 3, but remained short of equipment and key personnel. The DBE and POE are a higher priority for allocation of critical equipment; and cross-leveling of personnel has occurred to raise units to TRA Level 2. By November 2006, the DBE and POE are expected to have 28,360 trained and equipped personnel.

There are 14 land POEs, of which 13 are functional. Efforts continue to improve POE security. Progress in designation of POE standard organizations, delineation of responsibilities, and development of detailed policies and procedures has continued. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), has continued its rotation of Customs and Border Patrol Teams. These border security experts have had an important impact on the POEs, particularly along the Syrian border. The increased emphasis on BTTs and the Customs and Border Patrol Teams has improved DBE readiness levels, as the Coalition's expertise and mentorship affects the Iraqi border forces.

DBE and POE Equipment

Organizational equipment includes small and medium pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, generators, and radios. Personal equipment, including AK-47s, medium machine guns, and individual body armor, complete the outfitting of the border forces. The DBE currently has received 81% of its authorized equipment. They will have received 97% of their authorized equipment by the end of August, just short of the 100% goal for that date. They will reach the 100% goal one month later. Iraqi POEs will have received 100% of their equipment by the end December 2006.

Center for Dignitary Protection

Training and equipping of the Center of Dignitary Protection (CDP) is complete. The force of approximately 600 people has been prepared to serve as the Protective Security Details (PSDs) for Iraq's new government leaders. It is unknown how many of these personnel remain employed by MOI. An Iraqi training team assumed responsibility for training future PSD personnel in June 2006.

Facility Protection Service

In addition to the regular MOI forces, there are an estimated 145,000 Facility Protection Service (FPS) personnel who work directly for each of the 27 ministries. These forces act as security guards at government buildings and allow the IPS to police the communities. They are minimally trained and equipped, generally without Coalition oversight, and lack centralized control. FPS personnel have not always proven reliable, and some have been responsible for violent crimes and other illegal activity. Unfortunately, the FPS uniform looks similar to the police uniform, which causes many Iraqis to confuse the FPS with the better-trained IPS, undermining the reputation and credibility of the IPS. The Coalition and the Government of Iraq are establishing a program of reform to better regulate the FPS.

MOI Capacity Development

The MOI overall TRA remains at TRA 3-Partly Effective. The MOI Transition Team is working daily in the MOI, stressing planning and programming resources. The new Minister of Interior, Jawa al-Bulani, is embracing the need to reform the ministry. Logistics is the only essential system still assessed as ineffective. Improvement of the logistics system is a focal point for the next 90 days. All other major functional areas and systems are considered partly effective. Over the next 90 days, emphasis will also be placed on building a solid framework of plans, policies, and processes to ensure that the MOI can manage personnel efficiently, conduct policing operations effectively, and maintain and sustain capability.

MOI Logistics


Logistics capabilities continue to be an area of significant concern for the IPS, particularly


with respect to vehicle maintenance. However, accountability of equipment continues to improve as verified by reports submitted by PTTs. CPATT/MOI-TT continues to provide logistical support in both an advisory and financial capacity to assist with sustainment operations. Recently, a Director General for Logistics and staff were put in place. A 6-month vehicle maintenance contract for the National Police and the Baghdad IPS was agreed upon. Currently, there is a US\$950,000 vehicle spare parts contract for MOI forces, and a US\$350,000 vehicle spare parts contract for the National Police is in place. The average monthly logistical life support provided from April through June was US\$20,266,121, for a total of US\$60,798,363 during that timeframe. Construction of a MOI National Storage and Maintenance Facility was started in June 2006, with an estimated completion in December 2006. Currently, we are in the process of conducting a test case to hand over an LDI storage warehouse (one of seven) to

Iraqi control in August 2006. A plan is being formulated to hold a National Logistics Conference in September 2006.

MOI Equipment

MOI security forces are on track to reach December 2006 Objective Civil Security Force equipping goals. The following graph depicts the equipping status and key shortfalls of Baghdad and the 9 other key cities, 18 provinces, the National Police, the DBE, and the POEs. Equipment-issue priorities focused on equipping Baghdad, the 9 key cities, and the National Police, while simultaneously building initial functionality in the provinces, borders, and ports of entry. In general, these goals were met. However, the MOI does not currently have an effective equipment management system in place. As a result, it is unknown what percentage of the equipment issued to the MOI is still serviceable.





The equipping effort did experience unforeseen delays.

- Large shipments of Russian weapons were delayed clearing customs while exiting Russia and entering Iraq.
- Glock pistol delivery delays occurred when a U.S. manufacturer challenged the award of the pistol contract to a non-U.S. company.
- Communications gear was delayed due to shipping problems.

All matters have now been resolved and items have either arrived or are inbound. All equipment fielding goals are on track to be met by December 2006.

MOI Attrition and Absenteeism

The MOI does not currently have an effective personnel management system. As a result, it is unknown how many of the forces trained by CPATT are still employed by the MOI, or what percentage of the 146,000 police thought

to be on the MOI payroll are CPATT trained and equipped. CPATT estimates attrition to be at least 20% per year going forward. The MOI reports paying death benefits for more than 6,000 police officers since the fall of the Ba'athist regime in May 2003.

In addition to the overall number of police in Iraq, there are some issues with distribution of the police among the various provinces. For example, by the end of the year, Diyala Province will have recruited its authorized force, but will not have trained the entire authorized number. In the case of Diyala, the provincial leadership has resisted sending 100% of the force to training due to security concerns and the reluctance to take its police off the streets. Anbar, Basrah, and Ninewah may also miss their training targets for the same reason. Rather than let training seats go unfilled, other provinces were permitted to send some of their untrained personnel to training. As a result, those provinces will have more than the authorized force trained in their provinces.

As with the IPS, the National Police payroll is significantly larger than its authorized end-strength. There are currently more than 29,000 National Police on the MOI payroll, but it is unknown how many of these have been trained and equipped. Absenteeism among National Police units generally follows the same pattern as in the military. Leave policies and immature personnel management policies account for 30%–40% of personnel not present for duty. Absenteeism in the IPS is difficult to quantify because shift schedules preclude PTTs from ascertaining which police officers are absent and which are simply off-duty.

The DBE payroll is also larger than its authorized end-strength, with 25,832 DBE personnel on the MOI payroll. It is currently unknown how many untrained DBE personnel are on the rolls and how many of the trained and equipped border personnel have left the MOI. As with the other personnel issues, an effective personnel management system will help resolve these reporting and accountability deficiencies.

Sectarian Issues at MOI

The U.S. Government is committed to helping the Government of Iraq create an MOI that reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people. The goal is to create ethnically integrated units at the national level, while still allowing local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the communities in which they serve. The former Police Commandos, now part of the National Police, are becoming increasingly diverse. The former Public Order Battalions, also now part of the National Police, tend to be disproportionately Shi'a, due to a lack of Sunni participation when these units were being formed in preparation for the January 2005 elections. Merging the National Police Commandos and the Public Order Battalions into one National Police force has helped produce a more repre-

sentative National Police. Recruiting initiatives targeting Sunnis have improved the diversity. Unlike the National Police, local police forces tend to be of the same ethnic mix as the communities in which they live and work.

Corruption in MOI

In 2005, the MOI IG conducted 790 corruption-related investigations. Of these, 472 (60%) were closed. Of the 472 closed investigations, 118 (25%) were forwarded to the CPI or to a court for adjudication, 350 (74%) were closed because of "insufficient evidence," and 4 (1%) were handled as internal MOI discipline. To improve the IG's capability to investigate, the Specialized Advance Training Unit at the Baghdad Police College will train new MOI investigators. It will take approximately 18 months to train the Investigations Directorate at the basic investigator level. Beyond the IG training, improvements in leadership oversight, accountability, and reductions in sectarian and militia influence are required before Iraqis become confident that MOI forces can ensure security and uphold the rule of law in Iraq.

Foreign/Political/Militia Influence

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian bias have constrained progress in developing MOI forces. Inappropriate tolerance of and infiltration by Shi'a militias, some of which are influenced by Iran, is the primary concern of the Government of Iraq. A lack of effective leadership and policies to stem corruption through accountability for actions, equipment, and personnel have enabled the theft of pay and equipment, unlawful detentions, and reported cases of abduction and torture or execution of Sunnis. The minister is committed to changing corrupt leaders and instituting policies to eliminate corruption.

An additional 45 transition teams were deployed in July to increase PTT coverage across the country. As stations begin to reach TRA Level 2 in August, transition teams will expand their coverage of nearly 1,000 total stations across Iraq. This will limit infiltration by militias, improve adherence to the rule of law, and prevent complicity and participation in sectarian violence.


2.4 Ministry of Defense


The Iraqi MOD forces consist of Army (including Special Operations Forces), Air Force, and Navy (including Marines) personnel. The end state of the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force will be an approximately 137,500-person force based around an Army with 9 infantry divisions and 1 mechanized infantry division consisting of 36 brigades and 112 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units (RSUs), and 91 Garrison Support Units (GSUs) are intended to provide

logistics and support for each division, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and resupply. Each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters will be supported by a Headquarters and Service Company (HSC) providing logistical and maintenance support to its parent organization. The Army will also include 17 SIBs and a Special Operations Forces Brigade consisting of two special operational battalions. The Air Force will consist of six squadrons, and the Navy will consist of two squadrons and a Marine battalion.

Army

The Iraqi Army includes approximately 115,000 trained and equipped combat soldiers (including SIB personnel and around 9,600 support forces). The capability of Iraqi Army units continues to improve, facilitated by the mentoring by embedded advisors at the battalion, brigade, and division levels, and partnership with Coalition force units.





Force generation of Iraqi Army units is increasingly focused on combat enablers and continues in accordance with the force development plan. All three planned Iraqi Training Battalions are formed and fully operational. These battalions allow the Iraqis to train soldiers independently in sufficient quantities for force generation completion and replacement needs. New recruits attend a 13-week program of instruction. Upon graduation, soldiers receive additional training specific to their military occupation. Depending on their military occupational skill assignment, the length of training ranges from three to seven weeks. Other training initiatives, such as the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms Branch School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School, contribute to the growing professionalism of the Iraqi Army through teaching diverse specialties necessary to conduct and sustain counter-insurgency operations.

Three of the nine planned Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs) are approaching full operational capability. While a shortfall of fully competent maintenance personnel adversely affects full capability, these MTRs provide improved mobility and sustainment support for Iraqi forces. Progress has been made in establishing HSC units for each combat battalion, brigade, and division to provide transportation, communications, medical, supply, and maintenance support. Approximately 80% of the planned HSCs have been formed; one-third are operational, and the remaining planned HSCs are scheduled for completion by December 2006.

Currently, 17 SIBs are being trained and equipped. Although the Iraqi Army maintains operational control of the SIBs, at present only 1 SIB is capable of planning and executing independent operations, and all 17 require Coalition logistical support. Training of these battalions continues to employ a "train-the-

trainer" model that focuses specifically on squadron- and platoon-level tasks.

The capability of the SIBs is growing as they receive training and more modern equipment. MNC-I is partnering the more capable SIBs with locally deployed Iraqi Army units to provide them with counter-insurgency experience and to accelerate their leaders' professional development. Evaluation of their effectiveness in securing infrastructure, particularly oil pipelines in northern Iraq, is ongoing.

The Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (IASSI) at Taji plays a critical role in training the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to fill support and combat service support positions in the Iraqi Army. The IASSI has trained more than 5,000 officers and NCOs who serve as leaders in the MTRs, RSUs, and HSCs. The IASSI continues to support the development of critical Iraqi Army support and combat support capabilities.

Special Operations Forces

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) are composed of approximately 1,600 soldiers organized into the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force, the Iraqi Commandos, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.

Navy

The Iraqi Navy is tasked with defending Iraq's coast, territorial waters, vital ports, and offshore oil platforms. The Iraqi Navy has more than 1,100 trained and equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and five Marine companies. The Iraqi Navy is developing independent capabilities for surface surveillance, maritime interdiction, oil terminal protection, and support operations.

The Iraqi Navy Training Department continues to develop unit-level refresher training and naval skills improvements, including basic seamanship and maritime security operations. In June 2006, the Training Department independently conducted basic training and successfully graduated 324 naval recruits. Its training efforts range from mentorship, as conducted by the Naval Transition Team, to active skills training, as conducted by Coalition Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard Forces.

Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force continues to evolve toward supporting the counter-insurgency force, but progress has been slowed by difficulty in recruiting qualified applicants. There are currently 750 personnel in the Iraqi Air Force, with development plans calling for a concentrated recruitment effort over the next 18 months to at least double the personnel by the end of December 2007. This effort is intended to provide a satisfactory corps of professionals as a foundation for future growth.

The Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft at Kirkuk Air Base (7th Squadron with five CompAir 7SLs) and Basrah Air Base (70th Squadron with two Seekers and six CH-2000s) are performing operational missions. These aircraft are primarily deployed to patrol oil pipeline infrastructure in the north and south, with occasional missions conducted in support of Iraqi Army units. There have been recent airworthiness issues with the CompAir 7SL aircraft, and the Coalition is working with the Iraqi Air Force to develop solutions and alternatives to continue supporting the mission.

Helicopter operations from Taji Air Base in central Iraq are still in their infancy, but the

next six months should see a marked improvement. The 2nd Squadron is expected to receive the first 6 of 16 Huey IIs from a modification factory in the United States by the end of January 2007 and the remainder before April 2007. The 2nd Squadron will primarily be used for casualty evacuation. It is expected to reach initial operational capability by the third quarter of FY2007.

Three C-130Es from 23rd Squadron at New Muthanna Air Base round out the Iraqi Air Force fleet. Early complications with low mission capable rates have been solved, and fleet-wide readiness was measured at 72% in July 2006. The Iraqi Air Force has requested an additional three aircraft from the U.S. Government to bring the fleet total to six. These additional aircraft reflect the Coalition Air Force Transition Team's force generation plan and efforts are under way to identify additional funding to meet this request.

Assessing MOD Capability

Operational/Unit Readiness

Embedded Transition Teams continue to provide monthly TRAs measuring the staffing, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipping, and leadership of their partnered Iraqi units.

Personnel and Equipment Status

The total number of MOD military personnel trained and equipped is currently more than 115,000, approximately 84% of the objective end-strength.

With the generation of Iraqi Army battalions more than 92% complete, the focus of the Iraqi Army's train-and-equip effort shifted during this reporting period toward building combat support and combat service support forces. More than 65% of authorized per-

sonnel in the Iraqi Army's support forces are trained and equipped.

Equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces continues as planned since the May 2006 report, with 92% of authorized equipment issued to the 10 Iraqi Army Divisions and subordinate formations. MNSTC-I is on track to issue all currently authorized equipment by the end of December 2006. Equipment is distributed and filled according to the commander's operational assessment. MNSTC-I is currently working with the MOD to transition maintenance capabilities to the Iraqi Army. To date, two Regional Support Units facilities have been transitioned to the Iraqi Army.

Leadership

The lack of junior officers and NCOs continues to be one of the biggest factors impeding development of MOD forces. There is a shortage of school-trained officers and NCOs to fill lower-level staff and leadership positions. The shortage of leaders will abate as officer recruits are commissioned and they join their units. For NCOs, qualified soldiers are being "grown from within" through development and schooling to achieve promotion to NCO leadership positions.

The Regional Training Centers (RTCs) and the NCO Academy focus on junior leader development that is critical to building a professional force. The RTCs conduct Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses. Newly formed Sergeants Major and Chief Warrant Officer Courses have been added to the NCO Professional Education System. Specialized leadership courses, such as Logistics Supervisor, are being conducted at the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute at Taji. Three Iraqi Military Academies at Zahko, Qalachwalan, and Ar Rustimiyah continue to train future officers.

The institutional leadership courses are complemented and reinforced through partnership with Coalition Military Transition Teams. These teams, embedded with every Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division, provide daily guidance and mentorship. In addition, Iraqi units are partnered with Coalition force units. These partnerships, combined with the expertise and leadership taught through the institutional base, are critical for development of both unit proficiency and leadership essential to increased operational effectiveness.


The importance of ethics, human rights, and leadership in the Iraqi Armed Forces has engendered a concept for a Center for Ethics and Leadership to provide institutional oversight for ethics education, training, and assessment.

A promising trend is that military leadership has become more involved with civic leaders and sheiks in their areas of operation. This activity will continue to reinforce and establish the importance of Iraqis leading and

taking responsibility for their own security and interests.

MOD Capacity Development

The new Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji, is confronting the challenges he faces and is already making his mark. Previous logjams in acquisitions and contracting are being eased, and he is working closely with MNSTC-I to proceed on force development, force expansion, and logistics support. The MOD Transition Team grew to meet this accelerated pace of business and expanded to more than 50, half of whom are Military Professional Resources Incorporated contractors. Close and effective relationships are being forged by team members with all senior MOD headquarters officials, and the confidence, and thus capacity, of these officials is strengthening. The ministries and the Joint Headquarters are expected to be in the lead with Coalition support by the end of 2007. However, a partnership with these institutions will be



required through at least the first peaceful transfer of power in 2010.

Coalition Support Requirements

MNC-I continues to provide logistical support to the Iraqi Armed Forces where the established system falls short. Although there has been some success with Iraqi Army units using their own processes, there is still a great deal of institutional development remaining. MNF-I is working with both MNC-I and MNSTC-I to aid the Government of Iraq in developing a defense logistics system, but in the absence of a self-reliant system, MNF-I must provide extensive support to Iraqi forces.

MNSTC-I processed life support contracts in a total amount of approximately US\$7.8 million for the months of May and June 2006. Currently, all life support contracts have been transitioned to the MOD. MNSTC-I has formed a Transition Working Group tasked

with ensuring that the MOD properly supports all Iraqi Army life support requirements.

DOD requested US\$151 million for MOI sustainment in the FY2007 Budget Amendment request, but did not ask for funding for MOD sustainment.

Coalition forces are also supporting the Government of Iraq with fuel. In June 2006, all Iraqi Army units submitted requisitions for fuel; MTRs provide the majority of the fuel distribution. Storage capacity will not be fully fielded until December. Additionally, the GSUs will not be fully on-line until March 2007. Until the MTRs and GSUs are in place, the Iraqi Army units will not be fully self-sufficient in terms of bulk fuel transportation and storage.

Coalition forces supported the Iraqi Army units with the combined fuel report listed below.

APRIL 2006		MAY 2006		JUNE 2006		TOTAL	
Fuel Type	Gallons	Fuel Type	Gallons	Fuel Type	Gallons	Fuel Type	Gallons
DIESEL	133,590	DIESEL	964,598	DIESEL	352,042	DIESEL	1,450,230
MOGAS	89,935	MOGAS	83,936	MOGAS	73,613	MOGAS	247,504
JP8	42,347	JP8	29,101	JP8	34,955	JP8	106,403
Quarterly Subtotal	265,872		1,077,603		460,610		1,804,085

Obstacles to Progress

Absenteeism

In the Iraqi Army, approximately 15% attrition is the norm for initial training. When a unit is fully trained and employed in combat operations, some soldiers find that they do not like the particular location or they cannot cope with dangers of the counter-insurgency. Absent-without-leave rates are typically about 1%–4% for most Iraqi Army divisions, although deployments to combat sometimes cause absentee spikes of 5%–8%. However, soldiers in units in this final stage of development are less likely to abandon the service. As with any organization, the units with strong, competent leaders tend to have higher present-for-duty rates than those with weak leaders. However, there is currently no judicial punishment system within the Iraqi Army. Therefore, Iraqi Army commanders have little legal leverage to compel their soldiers to combat, and soldiers and police can quit with impunity.

Sectarian Issues

The U.S. Government is committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation and not sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are the deciding factors when selecting recruits, particularly leaders, the ISF are developing so that they generally mirror the demographic make-up of Iraq. Sectarian lines remain drawn, however, along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish soldiers mostly serving in units located in geographic areas familiar to their group. These divisions are even stronger at the battalion level, where

battalion commanders of one particular group tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, has used the normal transitions to continue to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi Army. This continuing process strives to ensure that the Iraqi Army is led by competent leaders who are representative of the national fabric. In the aggregate, Sunni, Kurd, and Shi'a are well and appropriately represented in senior leadership positions. The Sunni and Kurds are slightly over-represented, while the Shi'a are slightly under-represented, though Shi'a commanders still hold a large majority of command positions. The percentage of Sunni leaders at each level remains constant. At the battalion level, the echelon in which the Shi'a have the highest percentage of commands, they are appropriately represented when compared to the demographics of the Iraqi population. The relatively high percentage of Sunni and Kurds in higher-level commands is a result of the requirement for experienced military leaders, of which few were Shi'a. Generally, Shi'a and Kurds were excluded from higher-level positions in the former regime. The Kurds, however, benefited from years of experience in the *Peshmerga*. Nationally recruited Iraqi Army divisions are otherwise representative of the ethno-religious composition of the country. The even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, with the intent that these units would serve in the respective local regions. The composition of these units tends to be representative of the region in which they serve. Over time, replacements from the national recruiting pool will increase the diversity of these divisions.

3. Transition

3.1 Transitioning Security Responsibility

Process for Implementing Provincial Iraqi Control

The transfer of security responsibility from Coalition forces to the Government of Iraq is an objective of the security track outlined in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Such transfers reflect the capability of the Government of Iraq to fulfill its sovereign responsibility in the most fundamental, vital interest of any state—to protect its citizens and safeguard its territory. As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles in most areas. This may allow for future personnel reductions or a delay in previously scheduled deployments. The Coalition's military posture on the ground will remain responsive and flexible. As the security situation evolves, MNF-I will maintain sufficient forces on the ground to help Iraq consolidate and secure its gains on many different fronts. The recent agreement between Prime Minister al-Maliki and President Bush to increase force presence in Baghdad is indicative of this flexibility.

Iraq achieved a historic milestone on July 13, 2006, with the transfer of security responsibility in Muthanna Province from MNF-I to the Provincial Governor and civilian-controlled Iraqi Police Service. Muthanna is the first of Iraq's 18 provinces to be designated for transition to Provincial Iraqi Control, which represents the successful development of Iraq's capability to govern and protect itself as a sovereign and democratic nation.

The joint decision between the Government of Iraq and MNF-I to hand over security responsibility is the result of Muthanna's demonstrated ability to take the lead in man-

aging its own security and governance duties at the provincial level. The transition decision also reflects a joint assessment of the overall threat situation in Muthanna, the capabilities of the IPS and the Iraqi Army, and the provincial leadership's ability to coordinate security. Transition Teams are in place to smooth the transfer process, and multinational forces stand ready to provide assistance if needed.

Dhi Qar Province appears to be ready to assume security independence within the next 45 days, and several other provinces should meet the transition criteria before the end of the year. The Government of Iraq and the MNF-I will continue to transfer security responsibilities in other provinces as prerequisite conditions are met.

In concept, security transition is a four-phased process.

1. **Implement Partnerships**. MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of ISF units, from battalion to ministerial level.
2. **Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)**. Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations.
3. **Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)**. Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and to exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces.
4. **Iraqi Security Self-Reliance**. The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq, and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.


These phases are not strictly sequential. For example, the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin transfer of provincial control. This was the case in Muthanna.

Phase 1 of the security transition concept—implementing partnerships—is already complete. As described above, the second phase, Iraqi Army lead, is well under way in many provinces. The third phase, establishing provincial Iraqi control over security, will be implemented on an area-by-area basis. The Government of Iraq, jointly with military and political leadership of the United States and Coalition partners in Iraq, will assess when conditions permit handing over security responsibility for specific areas from Coalition forces to the Iraqi civil authorities. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) has developed criteria to guide the transfer of security responsibility. Recommendations for transfer include an assessment of conditions in four categories:

1. Threat Assessment
2. ISF Readiness
3. Local Governance Capability

4. MNF-I Ability to Respond Quickly to Major Threats, if Needed

The recommendation to transfer security responsibility is based on the specific situation in any one province or provincial capital in the context of the overall security environment. The appropriate Multi-National Force Division Commander and Provincial Governor, assisted by representatives of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense and U.S. and United Kingdom Embassies, conduct monthly assessments of provinces and of provincial capitals. The JCTSR working group meets monthly to review the assessments and to present recommendations to the JCTSR principals regarding which provinces are ready to be transferred. Once a decision is made, the JCTSR working group will provide oversight of the development of transition directives, develop a public affairs plan, and arrange a post-transfer security agreement between MNF-I forces and provincial governors. Every transfer will ensure an effective and successful handover of security responsibilities. Moreover, the transition and reduced presence of MNF-I forces will be plainly visible to the Iraqi people.



Detainee Operations

Releases


In June 2006, MNF-I, in coordination with the Government of Iraq, conducted a large-scale release of detainees in support of the newly formed national unity government. The release served as a visible symbol of the government's commitment to national unity and reconciliation in the progress toward democratic governance and the rule of law. MNF-I released 2,500 low-risk detainees over a period of three weeks. Coupled with the 500 detainees from the normal Combined Review and Release Board process, MNF-I had a net reduction of more than 2,000 detainees in June. A MNF-I special board reviewed approximately 6,500 records to identify the low-risk detainees. Each file was also reviewed by the MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to consider any additional intelligence reports. Detainees involved in violent acts, IED making/placement, financing insurgent operations, identified as key insurgent leaders, or who have been recaptured were not considered for release.

Transition of Coalition Detention Facilities and Detainees to the Government of Iraq

MNF-I has begun training Iraqi guards for a potential transition of the Coalition detention facilities and detainees. Transitioning detainee operations is a three-phase process.

1. Phase 1 consists of individual and collective training of Iraqi guards and leaders, including training alongside their U.S. counterparts inside the facility.
2. Phase 2 consists of the removal of U.S. guards and establishment of a U.S. transition team to supervise Iraqi Security Forces and to maintain legal custody of detainees.
3. Phase 3 consists of the final removal of all U.S. personnel and turnover of the facilities and legal custody of the detainees to the Government of Iraq.

The criteria for transfer includes the requirement for the Government of Iraq to possess the legal authority to hold security detainees, each facility demonstrating the ability to meet the care and custody standard, and the MOJ



having effective oversight of the program. MNF-I is currently in Phase 1. Significant challenges exist to ultimately meeting these criteria. The Iraqi Corrections System has not demonstrated the capacity to effectively resource and run a major facility, such as Camp Bucca. Additionally, based on the composition of the guard force, serious questions remain as to whether they would be able to maintain the required standards of care and custody. The most significant obstacle remains establishing the legal authority to hold security detainees. There is widespread opposition inside the Sunni political leadership to providing this authority to the Government of Iraq.

3.2 U.S. Force Adjustments

In consultation with the military commanders in Iraq, the Government of Iraq, and Coalition partners, the Secretary of Defense continues to advise the President on the appropriate level of U.S. forces in Iraq and the surrounding theater of operations based on current conditions. These conditions include, but are not limited to, key elements of the MNF-I Campaign Plan, such as the increasing responsibility of the ISF in counter-insurgency operations and ownership of areas of responsibility and progress in the political process.

Arbitrary deadlines or timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces—divorced from conditions in Iraq and the region—would be a serious strategic error, as they would suggest to the terrorists, the Rejectionists, and the various illegal armed groups in Iraq that they can simply wait or stall to win. The absence of a specific timetable does not mean that the Coalition's posture in Iraq is static. On the contrary, the Coalition continually reviews the situation in Iraq and adjusts its posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow.

As security conditions improve and as the ISF becomes more capable of securing their own country, Coalition forces will move out of the cities, reduce the number of bases from which they operate, and conduct fewer visible missions. However, they will remain postured to assist, including supporting the ISF with transition teams. Although the Coalition military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may gather and organize.

The Coalition retains the ability to quickly reinforce the Iraqi Army as required and to provide critical enablers as Iraqis develop their own capabilities. Coalition personnel levels will increase, if necessary, to defeat the enemy or to provide additional security for key events, like the 2005 referendum and elections. But the goal, over time, is to reduce Coalition forces as Iraqis continue to assume more of the security and civilian responsibilities themselves. This process is already under way.

The Government of Iraq has agreed to form a Joint Committee with MNF-I and the U.S. and UK Embassies to develop a conditions-based roadmap for the full transition of security responsibility to the ISF. This roadmap will consist of recommended conditions intended to lead to the eventual and gradual withdrawal of multi-national forces from Iraq.

The Joint Committee for Achieving Iraqi Security Self-Reliance (JCAISSR) will base its roadmap on much of the successful work that has already gone into developing the strategy for transition of security responsibility in Iraq:

Governance

The seating of the new Government of Iraq's, based on its Constitution, sets the conditions

for continuing progress toward Iraqi security self-reliance. Toward this end, the government's program calls for speeding up plans for completing the preparation of the ISF; speeding up the process of transferring security responsibilities and powers to the Iraqi Army, police, and security forces; and cooperation with the multi-national forces in a way that will allow the handover of security responsibilities to the ISF, the completion of the mission, and the exit of the multi-national forces.

Development of the ISF

Efforts to develop the capacity of the ISF have been successful. In November 2005, the Iraqi Army had 4 brigades and 23 battalions in the lead. As of August 7, 2006, the Iraqi Army has 6 Division Headquarters, 25 brigades, and 85 battalions that have assumed responsibility. MOI forces also grew significantly, from approximately 93,000 trained and equipped members in November 2005 to more than 160,000 today.

Provincial Iraqi Control Plan

The Government of Iraq and MNF-I have already developed a conditions-based framework for the transition of security responsibility from multi-national forces to Iraqi leadership. As a result of this work, security responsibility for Muthanna Province transitioned to the provincial governor on July 13, 2006. Security responsibility for as many as nine of Iraq's provinces could transition to Government of Iraq authority by the end of 2006.

The JCAISSR will comprise the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Iraqi National Security Advisor (Chair), the Minister of State for National Security Affairs, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the U.S. Ambassador,

the UK Ambassador, and the Commanding General and Deputy Commanding General, MNF-I. This committee will be supported by a working group of direct subordinates.

Conditions recommended by JCAISSR will, at a minimum, include consideration of the threat situation across Iraq, security force readiness, capacity of key security and supporting ministries, and development of the overall Iraqi national security processes.

MNF-I Basing Construct

MNF-I will efficiently consolidate its footprint in Iraq to reduce its military basing requirements progressively. The MNF-I basing strategy is an integral part of the Campaign Plan. MNF-I uses a conditions-based process to synchronize basing requirements with Coalition force structure and projected command and control structure. Several factors are considered when employing this process, including cost-effective use of resources, maintaining security presence where required by the mission and maintaining only those bases required, transition of operations to the ISF as they continue to assume the lead in security operations, and other factors. Specifically, MNF-I seeks to minimize its presence in major cities while building the flexibility required to support other elements in Iraq, including Coalition partners, PRTs, Transition Teams, Department of State activities, and other supporting units and entities. This process will culminate in the transition through Operational and Strategic Overwatch, which will leverage and maximize support through a minimum number of strategically located FOBs and Convoy Support Centers.

As of August 7, 2006, MNF-I has closed 48 of its 110 FOBs, handing over 31 to ISF, MOD/MOI; and 17 to the Ministry of Finance. Thirteen more FOBs are scheduled for closure and handover by January 2007.

(b)(6)

From: Delong, Mike (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:35 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Can't make it.....

Mike DeLong
Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc.
725 US Highway 301 South
Tampa, FL 33619
(b)(6) direct
cell
813.626.4758 fax
www.shawgrp.com

******Internet Email Confidentiality Footer******

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The Shaw Group Inc.
<http://www.shawgrp.com>

(b)(6)

From: Thomas McInerney (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 5:04 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: OSD CC 6 OCT 06

(b)(6)

WILCO

Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

Voice: (b)(6)
Cell:
Fax:

(b)(6)

From: Glenn Lackey (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:32 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

I'll call in.

Thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 5, 2006

Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **FRIDAY, October 6, 2006, from 11:00-11:30.**

Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director of Accession Policy for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will update you on FY06 recruiting numbers. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, you must agree to **EMBARGO** the information you receive until the start of the press briefing on **TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2006, at 11:15.**

12/3/2007

To join the call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:15 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Simmons - Conference Call

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks, as always, for the note. I will not be able to participate. Delta Airlines FINALLY refunded my ticket this week. They did their best to NOT take responsibility even though they grounded the flights. How pathetic. Look forward to seeing you soon. Take care.
Wayne

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:14 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow


Admiral Jeremiah will not be able to participate.

Thanks –

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

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970

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:03 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6)

What's your new telephone number? I just called the one shown below and a nice lady says you moved to another office.

My request. I used to receive the DOS updates that showed Iraq oil production, economic progress, charts on movement to unity government (political stuff) and the security forces status i.e., the latest numbers. Do you have that information and would you forward same to me?

Thanks.

Bob

--

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/>(b)(6)

----- Original message -----
From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" <(b)(6)>



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Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 5, 2006
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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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(b)(2)

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
972

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:00 PM
To: (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6) please call me tomorrow on my cell and remind me of this call. please call me about 1045 - 1050. thanks.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:51 PM
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



MEMORANDUM

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(b)(6)

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(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

Sorry but I'm teaching tomorrow!

Best

Ken

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

(b)(6) Pls count me out on that one. Sounds like a real snoozer. Thanks. Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)


(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:54 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

I will be on the call.

Jeff

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thu 10/5/2006 12:51 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: Conference call tomorrow



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(b)(6)

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Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:54 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call tomorrow

I'll plan on it. Thanks.

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/>(b)(6)

----- Original message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" (b)(6)



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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

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Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:44 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(2) Or you can walk down and go up with us about 7 minutes out from 1300. (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 12:33 PM
To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

i'm happy to, if you'd like me there. where is it??
 thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 11:24 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6) - Dr. Chu Press Briefing is scheduled to start at 11:15 on Tuesday, Oct. 10 and anticipated to end at 11:45. By the Way, do you want to attend a meeting with Dr. Chu today at 1300 to discuss Recruiting Game plan. They were going to have me brief the analysts, but you are obviously the SME. Just let me know. (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 11:10 AM
To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

do you have the press briefing scheduled?? just wondering when i can tell these guys they can start talking...
 thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:13 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:09 AM

12/3/2007

To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

thanks. i spoke with mr. gilroy. once i receive his bio, i will send the invite out to the analysts and schedule the call for 1100 tomorrow morning. i will provide an agenda and list of participants before the call. also, mr. gilroy will provide a brief that i can electronically send to the analysts tomorrow morning. it will be embargoed until dr. chu begins his press briefing on tuesday.

if you have any questions, please let me know.

thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:25 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 9:35 AM
To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

thanks for requesting this. it always helps for the analysts to have an embargoed brief. then, they can let their networks know prior to the press briefing that they've been made "smart" on the subject matter and they can provide timely commentary. as always, there is no guarantee that they will get air time or that it will interest their networks, but always better to be ahead of the game.

(b)(6) thanks for whatever assistance you can give us to get the ball rolling.

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
 Community Relations and Public Liaison
 (b)(2) The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

12/3/2007

Subject: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6) Minor Edits to Recruiting Communications Plan.

(b)(6) - Does Mr. Carr have time on Friday to brief the military/media analysts on Recruiting/Retention for this year? Preferably late morning and with briefing material provided electronically that morning to PA to distribute.

V/R, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Major, US Marine Corps

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

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(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 11:42 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Afghanistan and Summary of Interviews.

(b)(6) and Dallas-- thanks for the help last night. A lot of inquiries about Afghanistan since Saturday will be fifth anniversary. If you have anything good on this in terms of talking points or can arrange a teleconference it would likely be worthwhile.

In terms of my interviews with respect to trip to Iraq here is a short summary.

-- While we were in country (to include my extra days) I did a daily extended debrief with New York that they would use for the hourly roundup they send out to all affiliates.

-- I did about ten two-way live interviews with affiliates while I was in country. These included New York, LA, San Diego, San Francisco, and Salt Lake to name only a few.

-- Upon my return I did an extended interview for the CBS Weekly Roundup News Program which is an hourlong news program that airs on the weekend. I also did another ten live interviews as well as six or seven with New York which were all driven by the fact that I had recently been in country. This was particularly true because of the release of Woodward's book.

-- I did a television appearance on CBS Morning Show on Saturday, 30 September as well as giving private talks at a couple of sites in New York as well as to a War College and Dickinson College audience here. I have another major talk to give in DC in a week.

BOTTOM LINE: We all know that the situation in Iraq changes rapidly. The security problem today is vastly different than it was six months ago. There is nothing like first hand knowledge and having that my network promotes me to their affiliates for commentary.

Let me know if this fills the bill. Thanks again for all your great work in making this happen!

Best,

Jeff

12/3/2007

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984

(b)(6)

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

985

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To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
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lrc johnson, thanks for whatever assistance you can give us to get the ball rolling.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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 (b)(2) The Pentagon
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Major, US Marine Corps

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

12/3/2007

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986

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

987

(b)(6)

From: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 11:04 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

Thanks. Pentagon channel reporter is fine.

Curt

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:58 AM
To: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

sir,
yes, absolutely. whoever you would like to bring is more than welcome. we will also have the pentagon channel reporter sitting in to get an idea of the material for the interview. ok with you?

i would assume there will be some questions on retention. also, just so you know, some of the analysts just got back from iraq, and many of them have traveled there with us in the past.
thanks

(b)(6)

From: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:56 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

Thanks, (b)(6) I will bring my deputy, Navy Captain (b)(6) OK?
Also, do we expect any questions on retention?

Curt

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:34 AM
To: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

sir, thanks again for your availability and willingness. the call will take place in (b)(2) at 1100 tomorrow.
more to follow,

(b)(6)

From: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:19 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Upton, Stewart T Maj OSD PA

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Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

Attached is my bio. Looking forward to the opportunity.

Curt

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:09 AM

To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA

Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR; (b)(6) OSD PA

Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

thanks. i spoke with mr. gilroy. once i receive his bio, i will send the invite out to the analysts and schedule the call for 1100 tomorrow morning. i will provide an agenda and list of participants before the call. also, mr. gilroy will provide a brief that i can electronically send to the analysts tomorrow morning. it will be embargoed until dr. chu begins his press briefing on tuesday.

if you have any questions, please let me know.

thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA

Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:25 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR

Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

I just tried to call. We need to coordinate with Mr. Gilroy in regard to speaking with Military Analysts tomorrow about the year's recruiting/retention efforts. He has asked to know about the group he will be briefing as well. Best to walk over to e-mail me today. Thanks, (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 9:36 AM

To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R

Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA

Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

thanks for requesting this. it always helps for the analysts to have an embargoed brief. then, they can let their networks know prior to the press briefing that they've been made "smart" on the subject matter and they can provide timely commentary. as always, there is no guarantee that they will get air time or that it will interest their networks, but always better to be ahead of the game.

(b)(6) thanks for whatever assistance you can give us to get the ball rolling.

(b)(6)

)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

989

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6) Minor Edits to Recruiting Communications Plan.

(b)(6) - Does Mr. Carr have time on Friday to brief the military/media analysts on Recruiting/Retention for this year? Preferably late morning and with briefing material provided electronically that morning to PA to distribute.

V/R, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Major, US Marine Corps

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:19 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan
Attachments: BioCurtw-picture.doc

(b)(6)

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Curt

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:09 AM
To: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; Gilroy, Curt CIV OSD PR; (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

(b)(6)

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 (b)(6) CAPT OSD PR
Subject: RE: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

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(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OSD-P&R; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Update: Recruiting Communications Plan

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V/R, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Major, US Marine Corps

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 8:12 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Here you go! Fogleman starts around the middle (this way it's done for the night!)

Defense Analysts Debate Whether Secretary Rumsfeld Should Go

Bob Woodward's new book "State of Denial" presents the struggle between the military and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld over decisions made in the Iraq war. Analysts debate whether Rumsfeld should remain at his post.

RAY SUAREZ: Appearing on three Sunday morning news programs, the president's top communications aide, Dan Bartlett, dismissed renewed calls for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's resignation.

DAN BARTLETT, Top White House Communications Aide: We recognize that he has his critics. We recognize that he's made some very difficult decisions. Some people don't like his bedside manner. But what President Bush looks to in Secretary Rumsfeld is to bring him the type of information he needs to make the right decisions in this war.

RAY SUAREZ: The latest criticism comes following the release of Bob Woodward's third book about the administration at war, called "State of Denial." It depicts disagreements among the president's top advisers about dealing with post-war Iraq and the man running the war, Donald Rumsfeld. The book also suggests top military commanders executing the war in Iraq were repeatedly frustrated with Rumsfeld's leadership at the Pentagon.

The secretary, who was traveling over the weekend, said the president had in recent days reached him by phone to express his continued support.

TONY SNOW, White House Press Secretary: I think what the president simply wanted to do is, given all the press attention and everything that's been going on, to say, "Don, I still have faith in you, and I support you."

RAY SUAREZ: In the book, Woodward writes that former Chief of Staff Andrew Card tried to persuade Mr. Bush to fire Rumsfeld on two separate occasions. "Card outlined his problems with Rumsfeld and how he believed it was time for a change. He said, however, so far his advice on the Rumsfeld situation had been considered and rejected."

Card hasn't denied that he discussed replacing Rumsfeld with the president but said Woodward's book takes the discussion out of context. Just last month, a group of retired generals called for Rumsfeld to step aside at a forum put together by Senate Democrats.

MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE (Ret.), U.S. Army: Our nation's treasure in blood and dollars continues to be squandered under Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership. Losing one American life due to incompetent war-planning and preparation is absolutely unacceptable.

RAY SUAREZ: Rumsfeld has acknowledged he offered his resignation to the president twice, but Mr. Bush refused to accept it.

Rating as a manager

RAY SUAREZ: Well, General Fogleman, he's about to become, Secretary Rumsfeld, the longest serving secretary of defense in history.

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: Yes.

RAY SUAREZ: Would you say, over the five and a half years, that he's been good at that, been good at being secretary of defense, and taking into account what you just heard

Lawrence Korb say?

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: Well, I would disagree with what Larry said, but the fact of the matter is he has been a very strong secretary of defense. That should not surprise anybody.

We had some legislation in late 1980s, Goldwater-Nichols legislation, that was eventually going to drive us to this kind of situation. And we're, I think, seeing that.

If you look at the agenda that he set out on before 9/11, one of the big issues was trying to transform the military. And I can tell you: I was inside that process, and it badly needed transformation, in many, many different ways.

He has, I think, continued to try and do that as he has prosecuted two wars, one in Afghanistan, one in Iraq. I think that he has served the president well. And you hear these issues with senior officers. Senior officers are not used to having their egos bruised.

My experience with Secretary Rumsfeld is he doesn't brook fools. But if you come to the table with a solid position, he's going to listen and he's going to make a decision based on your input.

RAY SUAREZ: What about that?

LAWRENCE KORB: You know, again, I would even disagree. I know he has this reputation as the great manager.

Look at the situation with the Boeing thing, when Boeing tried to get these tankers, you know, to the Air Force to buy them, and they wanted to lease them, as opposed to buying them. When the inspector general, after Senator McCain complained that this was not a good deal for the taxpayer, Rumsfeld said he wasn't even aware of what was going on.

You look at his Quadrennial Defense Review, which is -- you know, he puts out to say which direction that the Pentagon should go in the next four years. That is fiscally irresponsible. He did not make any of the hard choices in that to do the transformation and then stay within the budgetary limits that we're supposed to have.

If you take a look -- when he came in, what they call the number of weapons systems under production was about \$800 billion. It is now \$1.6 trillion. You've had cost overruns in virtually every program there.

So, when you get this idea that he's this great manager, that's not true either. And if you take a look at that -- take Boeing. He's sort of like -- well, he didn't know what was going on. You didn't know this deal that was tearing apart and forced the secretary of the Air Force actually to resign over it, because the relationship between Boeing and the Air Force and what Senator McCain said? So I don't even buy this, that he's this great manager.

Placing the responsibility

RAY SUAREZ: You just mentioned various administrative things he did, tough assignments that he took onto himself. But do those have to sit side-by-side with growing public view that things have gone very badly in Iraq, in ways that this Department of Defense seemed to be unprepared for and unwilling to admit were happening, whether it's the looting of Baghdad, whether it's the growth of an insurgency, and our forces having to fight guerrilla warfare, and so on?

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: Well, first of all, I think that, while he is the secretary of defense and he's ultimately responsible for what occurs here on the one hand, I remember very clearly that President Bush, after 9/11, said we are going to fight this war on terror with all the elements of government, state, commerce, treasury, defense.

I was on the Defense Policy Board during that period of time when it was the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. And I can tell you that there was an effort made to try and engage those other elements of government. And they were AWOL. They were missing in action. Now, there's been lots of reasons given for why they didn't come to the table, but they did not come to the table.

Now, here's a man who's charged with fighting two wars. He has continued to keep the department functioning through two QDRs. He has continued to work the transformation issue. And through all of that, he has kept the confidence of the president of the United States.

RAY SUAREZ: So very quickly, when all these stories emerge of inability to cooperate between government departments, you would lay more of that on the other departments than on Secretary Rumsfeld himself?

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: That was my observation in this thing.

LAWRENCE KORB: Again, I would disagree. If you listen to General Gardner, Jay Gardner, who was the first man Rumsfeld put in charge of, you know, what would happen in reconstructing Iraq, he wanted to bring people from the State Department who had worked on this whole post-Saddam phase there, and Rumsfeld wouldn't let them even put them...

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: I disagree with that, Larry. I mean, I was...

LAWRENCE KORB: Well, that's General Gardner's...

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: Jay Gardner briefed us. He came in and briefed us. And I know of no prohibition...

LAWRENCE KORB: Well, Rumsfeld told him that -- and, in fact, Rumsfeld said this came from higher authority, that he wasn't allowed to bring somebody from the State Department there.

When Ambassador Bremer took over that job there, he sent Secretary Rumsfeld the RAND study that said you'd need 500,000 troops there. According to Ambassador Bremer, to whom they gave, you know, the presidential medal of freedom, Rumsfeld never even responded.

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: That's not true.

LAWRENCE KORB: Well, again...

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: Rumsfeld sent Bremer a note that said, "I have received your request." He sent the request to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs met and, over a period of a couple of weeks, and came back with -- and by this time Bremer had left. It was during his transition period.

And the Joint Chiefs came back and with the conclusion that there were no more -- there were no troops -- no additional troops required, not based on Joint Chief deliberation, but based on going to the guys in the field that were out there.

RAY SUAREZ: Well, on the report card item of whether Donald Rumsfeld works well with others, we'll have to just mark it incomplete and wait for that story to play out. Gentlemen, thank you both.

GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN: OK. Thank you.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 8:12 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Former intern writes about Iraq in Wall Street Journal

(b)(6)

Pete was my intern at the Family Research Council. He's a smart guy - obviously - and his thinking will resonate.

Bob

Wall Street Journal
 October 3, 2006
 Pg. 26

More Troops, Please

By Pete Hegseth

I've heard President Bush repeatedly state he will send more troops to Iraq if the commanders on the ground ask for them. I think, having returned home from Iraq two months ago, that there must be a breakdown in communication somewhere along the line. Maybe units on the ground are painting too rosy a picture for the generals. Perhaps the generals aren't asking because it goes against the "can do" ethos of the Army. Possibly the military is being squeezed by the Pentagon to do more with less. Or maybe the White House doesn't want to admit more troops are needed. In any case, while I do not have the answers nor do I seek to place blame, it is painfully obvious there's a disconnect.

I volunteered to serve in Iraq because I believe in our mission there. I share the president's conviction about the Iraq war -- we can and must win, for the Iraqi people, for the future of our country and for peace-loving people everywhere. But I'm frustrated. America is fighting with a hand tied behind its back. Soldiers have all the equipment we need -- armored humvees, body armor for every body part, superior technology, etc. -- but we simply do not have enough troops in Iraq, and we need them now. After witnessing two national elections during three months in Baghdad, my Army unit moved north to Samarra, where we spent eight months sowing the seeds of progress. While we had success in uprooting the insurgency and building the local government, it wasn't enough. We had just enough troops to control Samarra and secure ourselves, but not enough to bring lasting stability or security. "Not enough" became the story of my year in Iraq.

The future of Samarra and Iraq as a whole, ultimately lies in the hands of her people -- their sympathies are the ultimate prize in this war. No matter how many insurgents we kill, city leaders we meet or policemen we enlist, it is all for naught if we cannot provide security and stability. Tribal sheikhs told us that even within Samarra -- deep in the Sunni triangle -- a vast majority of people just want peace and order and will side with whoever can provide it. Right now Samarrans rightfully question who that will be.

The end goal in Samarra is for Iraqis to do everything for themselves. But their government and security forces are not ready. Insurgents use death threats and murder to assert power over anyone working with the City Council or joining the police force. This atmosphere forces moderate Samarrans to keep their mouths shut, and their silence abets the insurgents who live and fight in Samarra. Despite killing scores of insurgents, we are unable to provide lasting security, and so the Samarran street slips away.

Two things are to blame for our predicament, one a corollary of the other. The first reason is that we did not have enough troops in Samarra. The skill and courage of 150 American soldiers prevented chaos, but

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was never enough to fully secure a city of 120,000 people or maintain the rule of law. The soldiers in the city were preoccupied with defending themselves and conducting night raids, and were therefore largely unable to regularly patrol during the day -- thus giving insurgents reign to move freely and intimidate the local population. A visitor in Samarra on an average day would be hard-pressed to point out a single American humvee traversing local neighborhoods. The same is true for Baghdad.

Our four-vehicle civil affairs patrol was often the only American presence deep inside the city and we were frequently greeted by locals with the question, "Where have you been?" Americans can't of course be omnipresent; but we should at least be there when it matters. When Americans are there, either the insurgents are not or they are on the losing side of a firefight.

Second, because of a lack of troops, American military leaders are forced to make a choice between mission objectives and self-preservation. Many of our leaders are opting to guard supply routes and coagulate on sprawling military bases, rather than consistently moving into dangerous areas and fighting the insurgency. In our case, we had 500 soldiers stationed outside Samarra who made infrequent trips into the city center. There is little reason why most of these troops were not stationed inside Samarra, canvassing every neighborhood with platoon-sized patrol bases and suffocating insurgent operations. Rather than take the risks necessary -- like small patrol bases and frequent foot patrols -- our unit opted to secure itself and its supply routes rather than commit resources inside the city. And while this approach is safer in the short run, it only prolongs mission accomplishment, ultimately endangering more troops. We often speculated our unit would be back next year, driving the same streets with even fewer guys.

In due time, the Iraqi Security Forces will take over Samarra, but they are not ready yet. If the Americans left today, the Iraqis would be co-opted by the insurgents -- who are utterly ruthless, willing to kill family members of policemen or decapitate Iraqi soldiers to preserve disorder. It will take time. Both the Iraqi Army and Samarra Police need to get bloodied a bit and bounce back, proving their strength to the people. They will eventually be ready, but until then, security belongs to us.

I also understand calling for more troops is contrary to conventional thinking inside government and the military. Supporters of the current approach argue sending more troops would further inflame anti-American sentiment, incite more violence and retard independent progress. My experience suggests otherwise. American troops are tolerated, even welcomed when they effectively provide security; but their presence is cursed when it does not accompany progress. Violence persists not because American troops are present, but because our presence is futile. Many local leaders asked us, "How come the most powerful country in the world cannot defeat local criminals and thugs?" They suggested our failure was part of a larger conspiracy to keep the Iraqi people suffering.

I have not lost the optimism that sent me to Iraq. We did make gains. Our 10-man civil affairs team established good relationships with brave Iraqi leaders and sat across from them as equals. I watched city leaders battle insurgents, not only with guns but with newspapers and economic development. By the time we left, the City Council was meeting on its own accord and with increasing legitimacy, forming committees to oversee fuel allocation, new construction and security. Increased home construction was evident and local markets were open.

Even the security situation inside the city improved. Previous summers in Samarra had been extremely violent, but the summer of 2006 was different. Days passed without a significant attack inside the city. Less than 150 Americans, along with Iraqi counterparts, controlled a town of over 120,000 Sunni Arabs through targeted raids and sniper operations. One local insurgent even begged city leaders for amnesty in exchange for good conduct. Our unit killed or captured hundreds of insurgents, knocking the wind out of the local insurgency -- *but never crushing it*.

I believe, as the president noted, that "the safety of America depends on the outcome of the battle in the streets of Baghdad." Why then do we have just enough troops in Iraq not to lose? Most of the people I've spoken with since coming home -- those both for and against the war -- believe we must finish the job in Iraq. Americans understand a defeat in Iraq would have horrible consequences for America and its allies for decades to come. America has the capacity to win and the will to support a winning strategy.

Why then are we pursuing a bare minimum approach?

12/3/2007

First Lt. Hegseth served as an infantry platoon leader and civil-military operations officer in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division.

--

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/>(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Monday, October 02, 2006 5:30 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: 1430 Clip from Wayne Downing, MSNBC

You have received an email transcript from TVEyes.

To read it, click the link below:

<http://mms.tveyes.com/ExpandGuest.asp?ln=140561>

If you do not see a hot link above, copy and paste the text address into your internet browser.

To reply to the person who sent this email, hit the Reply button.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Monday, October 02, 2006 5:28 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Wayne Downing at 1230 9/29

You have received an email transcript from TVEyes.

To read it, click the link below:

<http://mms.tveyes.com/ExpandGuest.asp?ln=140558>

If you do not see a hot link above, copy and paste the text address into your internet browser.

To reply to the person who sent this email, hit the Reply button.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 1:41 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Question

(b)(6) Do we have any figures on how many Muslims have been killed by terrorist organizations (Al-Q, IJ, etc) in the past decade? Also, how many Muslims have we saved? Bosnia, etc.? Thanks. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From:
Sent:
To:

(b)(6)

Friday, September 29, 2006 12:45 PM

(b)(6)

(b)(6) : Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: Simmons - Presidential Speech

I had the pleasure and honor of being present today as President Bush delivered one of his most rousing speeches yet outlining the US led war on terror. His outline was simple and the message was clear. Afghanistan and Pakistan are our allies and have contributed significantly in helping the coalition forces fight Al Quada and other terrorist's. Musharif and Karzi made decisions to assist the US despite daily attempts on their lives. The President's policy of preemptive strikes on terrorist's around the world have allowed the US to remain terror free since 9/11. Despite what the Left would have many believe, there is NO link between terrorist recruitment and the war in Iraq. Remember, we weren't in Iraq 9-11-2001 and recruitment levels were as high as ever by the purveyors of death. As the President thanked all of our men and women of the military who were present from Walter Reed and Bethesda, he reiterated how valuable his policies of NSA wire taps and terrorist interrogations were in our arsenal of weapons against the terrorist's. These policies have proven over and over again to have saved lives of Americans. As I shook hands with the President and expressed my support for his policies, he personally assured me that he would "stay the course." I have heard it said a thousand times but to hear it from him while looking me in the eyes was almost overwhelming. He also shared with me how important it was at this time in our history for those of us who believe in and support his policies to push our message. The terrorist's are united in their efforts to destroy us. I can tell you unequivocally that they will not destroy us on President Bush's watch.
Take care.
Wayne

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 8:49 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Anything on this issue? I have 5pm program

Attachments: oledata.mso; image004.gif; image002.gif; image001.wmz; image002.gif; image003.jpg; image004.gif

Mr. Maginnis:

Probably too late, but here's the latest on the Al-Muhajir audio message.

Global Issues Report

A policy support document for OSD-Policy prepared by the Center for International Issues Research.

28 September 2006

Zarqawi's Successor Releases His Second Speech for Ramadan

On 28 September 2006, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, the successor of the late Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi as the leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq, released his second audio message to mark the beginning of Ramadan, "the month of jihad and martyrdom."^[1] His first audio message, released on 7 September 2006, announced the beginning of a 15-day military campaign in which he called upon every Sunni to kill an individual quota of one American or Shi'a.^[2] This second production, "Come Together on the Same Message," is an attempt to reach out to specific target audiences and win them over to the insurgency. From Muslim religious leaders, he seeks moral support and guidance. He thanks friendly Iraqi tribes for their support, and offers "traitors" a "general amnesty" during Ramadan. Finally, he calls on scientists to apply their expertise to the insurgency and offers them an opportunity to experiment with unconventional warfare, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This release is the most recent component of a wider media campaign by Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), the umbrella organization of militant radical Islamic (MRI) insurgent groups of which Al-Qaida in Iraq is a leading member, to regain publicity and support for the organization by leveraging the occasion of Ramadan after months of relative silence and inactivity. As its title suggests, this message may indicate a shift away from Zarqawi's uncompromising radicalism to a conciliatory stance toward less militant prospective supporters.

The recording begins with a technically sophisticated introduction describing it as a "call" to specific target audiences identified by relevant sound bites from the body of the speech. Muhajir addresses his first segment to Muslim religious leaders and scholars. He expresses great devotion to and respect for them and asks for their moral support and guidance at this critical "crossroads," as the mujahideen have sacrificed their own blood to defend Islam. He cites as evidence the loss of more than 4,000 *Muhajirs*, or foreign fighters, in Iraq and many more *Ansar*, or native Iraqis.^[3] Although the tone of this section is not openly critical, it implies that Muslim scholars have not done enough to support the mujahideen by applying their knowledge to the cause of jihad. It warns them against "sleeping" during this time of urgent need, and asks them not to abandon the mujahideen, as the loyal mujahideen would never abandon them. Part of this segment is devoted to the MRI Sheikh Umar Abd Al-Rahman, the nominal head of the Islamic Group (IG) of Egypt serving time in a U.S. prison as a convicted terrorist. Muhajir offers hope of his release and encourages insurgents in Iraq to capture Westerners to exchange for the captive Sheikh. Additionally, he supports the recent merger of a dissident militant faction of the IG with Al-Qaida and criticizes "defeatists" in the mainstream IG for forsaking their militant ways.^[4]

The speech's second segment addresses Iraqi tribal leaders. Muhajir thanks those who have offered "us" support overtly and covertly, and assures them of divine rewards and victory in Iraq in the foreseeable future. He then scolds those "traitors" who have collaborated with the U.S. military and the Iraqi government, thereby betraying their religion, country, and kin. Nonetheless, he offers them a "general amnesty" during Ramadan to "repent" and join the insurgency. This offer comes with the stipulation that they publicly renounce their "treason" and embrace the insurgency at tribal gatherings.

The speech's third segment addresses those with scientific and technical skills in media, administration, chemistry, and physics, particularly nuclear science and explosives. Muhajir emphasizes that "we are in urgent need" of such skills and encourages such specialists to join the insurgency. He presents the insurgency in Iraq as an excellent opportunity for them to apply and develop their skills. More specifically, he suggests U.S. military bases in Iraq as useful targets on which to conduct experiments in unconventional warfare, including biological weapons and "dirty bombs." He concludes by announcing the beginning of "a great military campaign" in Iraq for Ramadan, one that will bring decisive victory even closer.

The beginning of Ramadan, the fifth anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the convergence of these two dates may have provided some MRI groups with a well-timed opportunity to seize to the limelight. This includes Al-Qaida in Iraq and the MSC, which may be attempting to reassert themselves after months of relative idleness following Zarqawi's June 2006 death. The recent escalation of suicide bombings and other forms of violence throughout Iraq suggests that this campaign is taking place on the ground and through the media. This spike in media activity also includes the central core of Al-Qaida itself, its subsidiary in Saudi Arabia, its claim to have recently acquired Egyptian and Algerian wings, and other MRI groups.^[5]

This message could also indicate a shift in strategy under Zarqawi's successor. Zarqawi's excessive use of violence and staunch ultra-radicalism characterized him and his organization and made them infamous. As even central Al-Qaida leaders suggested in their communications to Zarqawi, such a stance may have been counterproductive because it sullied Al-Qaida's image and alienated potential supporters, thereby interfering

with the organization's global strategy.¹⁶¹ In contrast, the content and tone of Muhajir's message addressed to Iraqis and other Muslims are more conciliatory and inviting, likely in the hopes of rallying specific target audiences to Al-Qaida. Rather than lashing out at mainstream Muslim religious leaders for condemning or failing to support al-Qaida in Iraq, Muhajir requests that they reciprocate the loyalty that the mujahideen have demonstrated and asks rhetorically why Muslim scholars have not offered them moral guidance and support. The call to free Abd Al-Rahman – a commonly cited goal of Usama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri – not only demonstrates devotion to a leading MRI scholar, but also leverages the publicity resulting from the Al-Qaida – IG merger controversy. This shift may also indicate that Muhajir will lead Al-Qaida's Iraqi subsidiary in a direction more consistent with that of its core leadership.

Muhajir's amnesty offer to traitors is not only a conciliatory gesture that makes him look reasonable and magnanimous, but may also have the effect of exaggerating his organization's, as well as his personal, power and importance. In this sense, the offer is reminiscent of Bin Laden's truce offers to Europe and the USG.¹⁷¹ Regardless, the gesture is likely intended to widen his potential support base. His focus on tribal leaders reflects due consideration of the key role of kinship in Iraqi society. More specifically, it may be an attempt to counter recent U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to turn the tribes of Anbar province against Al-Qaida.¹⁸¹ Additionally, the vitriolic anti-Shi'a rhetoric typical of Al-Qaida in Iraq is totally absent in this message. Muhajir simply refers to "traitors" and does not acknowledge the sectarian dimension of the conflict at all. This difference could indicate that the organization is moving away from its controversial and possibly counterproductive sectarianism. Finally, his call for scientists to contribute to the insurgency with their WMD-related expertise is presented as an opportunity for them to experiment and dramatically suggests a major escalation of the insurgency beginning in the Islamic holy month that will ultimately lead to victory.

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 4:29 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Anything on this issue? I have 5pm program

Terror tape says 4,000 foreign fighters killed in Iraq

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- A man identified as the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq said on an audiotape Thursday that more than 4,000 foreign fighters have died battling the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi troops.

"We poured so much of our blood in Iraq," said the tape's speaker, purportedly new al Qaeda in Iraq chief

Abu Hamza al-Muhajer.

CNN was unable to verify the speaker's identity. The tape, at 20 minutes, 31 seconds long, was posted on several Islamic Web sites Thursday.

The speaker urged other Muslims in Iraq to join the fight, saying he was launching a major military campaign.

"We are calling upon you to take your responsibilities because we are on crossroads, so don't fail us," the voice said, especially calling on Iraqi professionals such as chemists, physicists and nuclear experts to help.

Al-Muhajer, also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is an Egyptian Islamic militant believed to be an expert in producing car bombs.

He succeeded Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who died June 7 in a U.S. airstrike north of Baghdad.

The tape's speaker also pushed for the kidnapping of "Christian dogs" who could be exchanged for Omar Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian Muslim cleric imprisoned since 1995 for conspiring to blow up landmarks in New York.

"I remind you of our dear sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, who is lying in an American jail undergoing all kinds of abuses -- psychological and physical abuses. I tell him don't be sad. God will bring good news after the hardship," the speaker said.

"I here announce the beginning of a military campaign to uproot the infidels," he said, as Muslims around the world observe the holy month of Ramadan, which continues through late October.

Ramadan, traditionally a time of peace, fasting, soul purification and charity, was called "a month of jihad and martyrdom" on the tape.

The speaker said Sunni Arab tribal leaders who have supported the U.S.-backed government will be granted "amnesty" if they switch over to the insurgency.

"Because Ramadan is the month of forgiveness, we offer the traitor tribal leaders amnesty, on one condition -- that you announce your repenting openly in front of all your people and get the word to us."

In addition, those who repent must cooperate with the mujahedeen to drive the "occupier" out of Iraq, he said.

Earlier this month, al-Muhajer urged each Iraqi Sunni to kill one of the 140,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq by the start of Ramadan.

Sixty more bodies found in Baghdad

Police found 60 bodies -- all showing signs of torture -- dumped around the Iraqi capital in a 24-hour period ending Thursday morning, pushing the number of bodies discovered so far this week to 122.

Most of the bodies had their hands tied and gunshot wounds to the head, Iraqi emergency police said.

"This has been a tough week," U.S. Maj. Gen. William Caldwell said Wednesday, noting that murders and executions were the largest cause of deaths in Baghdad and attributing them to sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites.

Caldwell also reported a rise in insurgent attacks over the past two weeks, particularly in the capital.

"We are seeing an increase in attacks, as anticipated," he said, blaming "terrorists" and "illegal armed groups" for launching strikes during Ramadan.

In Thursday's violence, at least four Iraqis -- including two police officers -- were killed and 38 wounded when a pair of bombs exploded on Saadoun Street, Baghdad's main thoroughfare, Iraqi emergency police said.

The first bomb exploded on the street, and a second one went off as officials rushed to the scene.

In central Baghdad, at least one police officer died and four civilians were wounded when a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol exploded.

Elsewhere in Baghdad, a car bomb killed two Iraqi soldiers and wounded eight others in Sha'ab, a mixed Sunni-Shiite, middle-class neighborhood, police said. Four civilians also were injured.

Also Thursday, 10 police officers were wounded in four separate bomb attacks in the capital.

Other developments

- British troops and Iraqi security forces have begun a project to reform Basra's police force and the southern city's infrastructure, a British Army spokesman told CNN. UK Royal Military Police teams will be placed in police stations in Basra to weed out officers "unable or unwilling to do their duty," said Maj. Charlie Burbridge. "We have to accept that elements of the police have been infiltrated by elements of armed criminal groups," he added.
- A survey released Wednesday shows most Iraqis think the American presence in their country is doing more harm than good, and 71 percent favor a commitment by U.S.-led forces in Iraq to withdraw in a year. The survey, by the University of Maryland, also indicates that six out of 10 Iraqis favor attacks on U.S. forces. ([Full story](#))
- U.S.-led coalition forces Wednesday killed four suspected terrorists and four civilians in a raid in Baquba, northeast of Baghdad, a military statement said. The military said troops were "targeting a terrorist tied to extremist leaders" of al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala and Salaheddin provinces.

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Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/> (b)(6)

Ⓜ "الهيئة الإعلامية: كلمة صوتية جديدة للشيخ المجاهد أبي حمزة المهاجر حفظه الله" (The Media Department Presents: A New Audio Speech by the Mujahid Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, May God Protect Him)." [Al-omh.net](http://www.al-omh.net) 28 September, 28 September 2006 <<http://www.al-omh.net/vb/showthread.php?t=6731>>.

Ⓜ See Global Issues Report, "Zarqawi's Successor Calls for Killing of Crusaders and Shi'a," 8 September 2006.

Ⓜ His use of the terms *Muhajir* and *Ansar* is a common MRI historical allusion to the early Muslim community under the Prophet Mohammed. The *Muhajirs* (literally, "immigrants,") were those first Muslim converts who fled persecution in their native Mecca with the Prophet to Medina, where they won over and converted many of its tribes, who became known as *Ansar* (literally "supporters"). Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir's pseudonym indicates that he is not Iraqi (as his accent suggests as well). The effect of such allusions in the Iraqi context is to emphasize the common bond between Iraqi and non-Iraqi militants and to draw a parallel between the political and military successes of the early Muslim community and the present and future of the insurgency in Iraq.

Ⓜ See Global Issues Reports, "Alleged Merger between Al-Qaida and the Islamic Group of Egypt Results in Denials and Confusion," 8 August 2006; "Merger of Al-Qaida and Islamic Group of Egypt Debate Continues," 23 August 2006; and "Militant Websites Promote a New Al-Qaida Ideologue," 27 September 2006.

Ⓜ See Global Issues Reports, "Iraqi Insurgent Media Organization Launches New Website," 12 September; "Militant Websites Mark 9/11 Anniversary with Media Campaigns," 13 September; "Syrian Government Uses Embassy Attack to Criticize USG Policy," 15 September 2006; "Al-Qaida Extends Reach in Formal Alliance with Algeria's GSPC," 18 September 2006; and "Militant Arabic Websites Prepare for Ramadan, a 'Month of Jihad,'" 22 September 2006.

Ⓜ "Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qaida High Command." [Ctc.usma.edu](http://ctc.usma.edu) 25 September 2006, 28 September 2006 <<http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf>>; "Zawahiri's Letter to Zarqawi." [Ctc.usma.edu](http://ctc.usma.edu) 11 October 2005, 28 September 2006 <<http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10-05.pdf>>.

Ⓜ "Bin Laden' Offers Europe Truce," [Bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk) 15 April 2004, 28 September 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3627775.stm>; "U.S. Rejects bin Laden Tape's 'Truce' Offer." [Cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com) 20 January 2006, 28 September 2006 <<http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/19/binladen.tape/index.html>>.

Ⓜ Salaheddin, Sinan. "Leader: Iraqi Tribes Fight Insurgency." [Washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com) 18 September 2006, 28 September 2006 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/18/AR2006091800318.html>>.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2006 10:21 PM
To: Bradley John Lt Gen AF/RE (AFRC/CC); Jumper, John Gen AF/CC; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@ (b)(6)
National Book Festival

For any in the D.C. area - I will be at the National Book Festival on the Mall in D.C. this weekend, Saturday, 30 Sept. - I am taking part in a panel at 12:00 noon at the Library of Congress tent, talking about my new book *Bury Us Upside Down*, then signing autographs.

The event is in the Library of Congress Pavilion (tent), at about Ninth St., between Jefferson and Madison drives on the eastern side of the festival (between the Children's pavilion and the book-sales tents). The book can be purchased at the tent right next to the LOC Pavilion - signing table afterwards.

Here is the link for the festival, including a map:

<http://www.loc.gov/bookfest/pavilions.html>

Please pass on - Shep

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2006 7:33 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Talking points on NIE?

(b)(6)

No doubt, the analysts will be asked about the NIE. Now that more details have been released there will be additional opportunities to provide context. Do you have that context and or talking points to help explain?

Thanks.

Bob

--

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

<http://home.comcast.net/> (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2006 5:24 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: General DeLong on CNN's American Morning

DeLong pushes back on myths propagated by the retired generals via CNN.

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2006 5:17 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD-ATL; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) Ms OSD PA
Subject: General DeLong on CNN's American Morning

Joining us now is retired Lieutenant General Mike DeLong.

He was a top commander during the beginning of the Iraq war.

He joins us from Tampa.

General DeLong, good to have you with us.

LT. GEN. MIKE DELONG, FORMER CENTCOM DEPUTY COMMANDER: The same here, Miles.

Thank you.

M. O'BRIEN: Let's offer a lot more of a sampling of what was said yesterday.

This one comes from Major General Paul Eaton.

Let's listen to what he had to say.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

MAJ. GEN. PAUL D. EATON, U.S. ARMY (RET.): Conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short to meet the foreign policy requirements of this nation.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

M. O'BRIEN: General DeLong, we hear this time and again -- the troops are stretched thin, not enough boots on the ground.

What do you say to that?

DELONG: Well, I mean, you've got Abizaid, who was one of the co- deputies during Iraq with me under General Franks. You've got the other leaders over there -- again, General Abizaid has probably asked for a few more right now. But when we fought the war, we fought the war with the exact amount of people that we needed.

M. O'BRIEN: No, we're talking...

DELONG: Some things happened...

M. O'BRIEN: But we're talking about after the war now.

DELONG: I understand.

M. O'BRIEN: Yes.

DELONG: But I'm leading there.

M. O'BRIEN: OK.

DELONG: But -- but as we -- as -- after the war right now, Abizaid is the guy running it over there and he says he's got the number of people. There's 18 provinces in there right now. About 14 or 15 are as nice a place as any place in the world. Unfortunately, the one province that's really giving us problems is Baghdad and we're -- the U.S. is putting more troops in, along with our coalition partners.

And some things have happened that weren't planned. There is -- there was a decent plan for war end. It just hasn't gone according to plan.

M. O'BRIEN: All right. But looking at the new plan and the new set of goals, it seems as if -- and you hear a lot of generals inside and outside the military saying publicly and privately that many more troops will be needed. As a matter of fact, many Republicans on Capitol Hill would go along with that.

How many more troops do you think are needed?

DELONG: Well, I find it interesting that you've got people who are saying things that aren't accountable. You've got John Abizaid, you've got the secretary of defense -- and, by the way, the secretary of defense serves as -- at the pleasure of the president of the United States.

Abizaid thinks he has enough people over there right now given that we've built up about 250,000 Iraqi police and soldiers right now. And the U.S. coalition, working with the Iraqis, appears to be working.

Is it going to take some time?

Sure it is. But some things have happened over there with the -- between the two sects in the Shia that are not getting along, Al-Sadr and the other group not getting along with the Sunnis. Things are happening that are not helpful.

M. O'BRIEN: Let's talk about another bone of contention, this also from Major General John Batiste, retired.

Let's listen to what he had to say.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BATISTE: In 2003 and early 2004, collect up huge numbers of Iraqis and put them in Abu Ghraib. But the way we treated them, the way we abused them turned them against the effort in Iraq forever.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

M. O'BRIEN: He's essentially saying that Abu Ghraib and the treatment of the prisoners there was an irrevocable mistake.

DELONG: Well, I -- from what I know, Major General John Batiste -- by the way, he's U.S. Army -- was -- was not there. He didn't go there.

Were there some things done?

In war, historically, back to the beginning of time, if you don't have small unit leadership and other leadership and during wartime and some sort of your POW (ph) or prisons, you're going to have problems. That's just -- that's life.

It should not have happened. I'll give you that.

M. O'BRIEN: But the allegation from General Batiste is that, really, from the top on down, the message was given to go -- to treat these prisoners harshly. That message filtered down to Abu Ghraib and allowed that circumstance to occur and forever changed the moral high ground. It took the U.S. off the moral high ground for good.

DELONG: That's baloney. It didn't happen.

M. O'BRIEN: All right.

Let's go on to one final point of contention that was brought up. This one comes from Colonel Thomas Hammes.

Let's listen to him.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COL. THOMAS X. HAMMES, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.): We did not ask our soldiers to invade France in 1944 with the inferior equipment they had in 1941. The failure to provide our best equipment is a serious moral failure on the part of our leadership.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

M. O'BRIEN: Let's talk about that. This talk -- this is armoring Humvees and all of the other issues.

Is the Army properly equipped now?

We've been hearing that over time, in the three years since the invasion especially, that they need a lot more men to stay supplied and keep this effort up.

What do you say?

DELONG: According to what I've read -- of course, I've been out three years -- but from what I've read right now, they have the up- armored Humvees. They have the amount of body armor that they need. In fact, probably about 700,000 sets is the latest that I've read. They have enough.

What's happening with our -- with a learning enemy, as their IEDs -- these unexploded -- or explosive devices -- are now more powerful and even those things are detrimental to armored Humvees, even tanks.

M. O'BRIEN: But is the Army being forced to operate on a shoestring, which puts soldiers in harm's way?

DELONG: Not to my knowledge, no.

I don't -- there's no commander in any of the military that knowingly sends Guard, Reserve, active duty troop out not properly equipped.

M. O'BRIEN: All right, sir, thank you for your time.

Retired Lieutenant General Mike DeLong.

Thanks for being with us this morning.

DELONG: Thanks, Miles.

Full transcript: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0609/26/lm.03.html>

(b)(6)

Secretary Rumsfeld's Speechwriting Group

Department of Defense

(b)(2) (phone)
(b)(2) (fax)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2006 2:13 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: CNN

CNN: Anderson Cooper 360 - 09/25/06 23:05:53:

COOPER: Well, as that was playing out, Senate Democrats were holding hearings, at which three top former commanders in Iraq slammed the administration's conduct to the war and called on Secretary Rumsfeld to resign.

We spoke with one of them, Retired General Paul Eaton earlier tonight, along with Retired Lt. Colonel Bob Maginnis.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

COOPER: General Eaton, the White House is saying now that Islamic fundamentalists have hated us for years, and Iraq hasn't fueled the global jihadist movement. You were there. Do you think the threat of terrorism has gotten worse?

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL EATON, U.S. ARMY (RET.): Well, Anderson, I think the stage was set for where we are right now by a failure on the part of the administration, specifically Secretary Rumsfeld, to plan adequately for what we predicted would be a pretty tough phase four.

COOPER: When you talk about phase four, you're talking about what?

EATON: Phase four was the reconstruction phase for Iraq and always destined to be a little bit more problematic for us.

COOPER: Lieutenant Colonel Maginnis, if all of the U.S. intelligence agencies are saying that Iraq has made matters worse, how can the president continue to say the exact opposite?

LT. COLONEL ROBERT MAGINNIS, U.S. ARM (RET.): Well, intelligence is an art and not a science, Anderson. Recognize that there were mistakes made early on, but the fact is on the ground, we can't change what has happened. What we can change is what hopefully is going to happen in the future. They have a plan in place, a strategy that was published in November of '05. It outlines the security, the economic, as well as the political.

COOPER: Do you believe, though, that this has made the war on terror more difficult, that it's emboldened the global jihadist movement?

MAGINNIS: Well, in a global way, it is a different composition. I go back to what Osama bin Laden said. He said that Iraq is the epicenter of the global war on terror and Zawahiri, his deputy, said basically it is the arena of the jihad. And what that means to me, Anderson, is that it's like bees on beehives. They just congregate there. They are getting some training. We're killing a lot of them. And they're inspiring a lot of others through their Internet access recruiting systems.

But I think it was inevitable what we are seeing, the jihad movement. It is just a matter that we are able to kill them over there and not here.

COOPER: General Eaton, do you agree with that? And it is essentially echoing what John McCain said today, which was, look, if it wasn't in Iraq, it would have been in Afghanistan. EATON: Anderson, that's a reasonable comment, and I can't disagree with that. What I do disagree with is this administration and this secretary have not moved out in a Manhattan project approach to solving the security problems as well as a full frontal approach on the economic and diplomatic arenas to solve the problem that we have in Iraq right now.

COOPER: You were basically the guy in charge of standing up the Iraqi security forces. First started with the Army, then they gave you the border, then they gave you the police, as those clearly weren't working out with other folks. How is that going? I mean, is there progress there? Is there -- I mean, are they on the way to standing up?

EATON: Anderson, they are. General Dempsey is doing a superb job, as did General Patrias before him. We've got the right men in place doing superb work. They are undermanned right now and they are not getting the equipment that they need.

COOPER: General, you testified today that Secretary Rumsfeld has proven himself incompetent, strategically, operationally and tactically. You basically saying he's tried to fight this war on the cheap. Do you think he's still doing that? EATON: This war -- and we go back to the decision to grossly under man the phase four. The lack

of security and the problems that we established immediately after the takedown of Baghdad have created the environment that we are in right now.

There has been a failure on the part of the administration and on the part of the secretary of defense to properly man and properly equip the forces destined to stand up to the Iraqi security forces. We are still not pursuing this as a Manhattan project. The Iraqi security forces are arguably the second most important security forces on this planet and you would not know that looking at how we have proceeded with their main train equip programs. COOPER: Obviously, the first most important security forces in your opinion would be U.S. forces. Is that correct?

EATON: Absolutely. And we are not doing well there either with this administration.

COOPER: General Eaton, appreciate your perspective. Lt. Colonel Maginnis, as well. Thank you.

(b)(6)

Media Analyst, OSD/PARA

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

Phone: (b)(2)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2006 12:28 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Simmons

Hi (b)(6)

Hope you're doing well. Would love to back hand some of these low lifes that criticize the SECDEF. Never hurts to have supporters reassure him of his value and leadership. Look forward to seeing you soon.

Take care.

Wayne

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6)
Sent: Tue, 26 Sep 2006 11:54 AM
Subject: RE: Simmons

hi. understand your frustration and appreciate your note of support. the secretary is traveling right now... i have thought recently about how long it's been since we had you all in. i'll see what we can do, but it may not be for a little while. hope you're well,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 7:16 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Simmons

I am disgusted at what I saw on the news(?) tonight. I would strongly suggest that you arrange a meeting with SECDEF asap. Those in attendance should be those like me who, without question, SUPPORT his leadership for President Bush and America. Thanks.

Wayne

Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [valley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 9:57 PM
To: 'Gordon Cucullu'; WSSInter@(b)(6); brian.kilmeade@(b)(6); brian.wilson@(b)(6); bruce@(b)(6); donovan.grannum@(b)(6); Elizabeth.Rhodes@(b)(6); nate.fredman@(b)(6); gavin.gibbons@(b)(6); Hannity@(b)(6); mikejerrick@(b)(6); kim.bell-simensky@(b)(6); lauren.clabby@(b)(6); Mary.Ragsdale@(b)(6); michael.skrzenski@(b)(6); rob.monaco@(b)(6); rsmith@(b)(6); Tara.New@(b)(6); Tom@(b)(6); Bill.cowan@(b)(6); PAULVALLELY@(b)(6); tmcinerney@(b)(6); JedBabbins@(b)(6); DHunt12348@(b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA;@(b)(6); nashct@(b)(6); gresham.striegel@(b)(6); (b)(6); CIV, OASD-PA; ShepDonald@(b)(6); sean.mcgrane@(b)(6); Andrew.Napolitano@(b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); m1@(b)(6); ginni.thomas@(b)(6); Peter.Brookes@(b)(6)

Subject: RE: HUGO CHAVEZ and Assassination

More to add to the 'Bleeding the Dragon' Project that I will expose to some degree next week on Fox.....

 Osprey Media
 Paul E Valley
 Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
 valley@(b)(6)
 tel: 406 249 1091
 fax: 406 837 0996
 www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----
From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:gordon@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 5:59 PM
To: WSSInter@(b)(6); brian.kilmeade@(b)(6); brian.wilson@(b)(6); bruce@(b)(6); donovan.grannum@(b)(6); Elizabeth.Rhodes@(b)(6); nate.fredman@(b)(6); gavin.gibbons@(b)(6); Hannity@(b)(6); mikejerrick@(b)(6); kim.bell-simensky@(b)(6); lauren.clabby@(b)(6); Mary.Ragsdale@(b)(6); michael.skrzenski@(b)(6); rob.monaco@(b)(6); rsmith@(b)(6); Tara.New@(b)(6); Tom@(b)(6); Bill.cowan@(b)(6); PAULVALLELY@(b)(6); tmcinerney@(b)(6); JedBabbins@(b)(6); DHunt12348@ (b)(6); dallas.lawrence@(b)(6); timmerman.road@(b)(6); nashct@(b)(6); gresham.striegel@(b)(6); (b)(6); ShepDonald@(b)(6); sean.mcgrane@(b)(6); Andrew.Napolitano@(b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); ginni.thomas@(b)(6); Peter.Brookes@(b)(6)

Subject: Re: HUGO CHAVEZ and Assassination

Wayne, you're right on target. I hope you weren't too terrified when Alan Colmes tried to attack you. He's pretty scary.

Seriously I've been writing about Chavez and the ties to N Korea/Iran for more than a year. The stuff is coming out all over the place now. The N Koreans have an office only a few blocks distant from Miraflores palace and we know they're not in Caracas to sell kim chee and dried squid. The Iranians aren't trying to expand their pistachio markets.

Chavez in on a buying spree: MiG 29s, 100,000 sets of AK-47s and an entire production facility, other armaments. Can intermediate and long-range missiles (such as the Nodong and Taepodong class) be far behind?

The Iranians are eager to usher in the 12th Iman by bringing on the apocalypse. Yes,

it sounds goofy but so did the 'final solution to the Jewish problem.' As Wayne alludes, this really is closer to WWII than anything we've faced previously.

Picture a megalomaniacal Chavez with missiles topped with dirty bombs or fissionable material. That's where all this is leading to.

And we're debating assassinating this a\$\$hole?

Gordon Cucullu

----- Original Message -----

From: WSSInter@(b)(6)

To: brian.kilmeade@(b)(6); brian.wilson@(b)(6); bruce@(b)(6);
donovan.grannum@(b)(6); Elizabeth.Rhodes@(b)(6); nate.fredman@(b)(6);
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; tmcinerney@(b)(6); JedBabbin@(b)(6); gordon@(b)(6); DHunt12348
(b)(6); dallas.lawrence@(b)(6); timmerman.road@(b)(6); nashct@(b)(6);
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(b)(6); ginni.thomas@(b)(6); Peter.Brookes@(b)(6)

Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 5:59 PM

Subject: HUGO CHAVEZ and Assassination

Were it not such a serious charge I would find it amusing that terrorist, Hugo Chavez has now accused President George Bush of ordering his assassination. Right..... the President of the United States has, as a matter of professional courtesy, notified the Venezuelan terrorist that he intends to kill him. I am quite certain that the NY Times has also been notified by the President. Pat Robertson may have had it right last year when he said that the demise of the South American Nazi, Hitler clone and best friend of FARC, Cuba et. al. might be the best solution for our hemisphere. When I was asked by Alan Colmes on Hannity and Colmes if I supported Pat Robertson's position I replied, "If a stray bullet from a hunter in Kentucky should find it's way between this guy's (Chavez's) eyes, no American should lose any sleep" I was summarily attacked by Alan and the Left. http://cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=venezuela_53
<http://cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=venezuela_53>

Yet, here we are almost a year later and Chavez has grown stronger economically and militarily and succeeded in cultivating friendships with China, Russia, Iran, Syria and North Korea. He has called for the destruction of the US economy and threatened the US with decreasing oil imports. Many of my colleagues are convinced that Chavez was part of the FARC plot to assassinate President Bush when he traveled to Columbia <http://dailyinklings.wordpress.com/2004/11/> Does this mean we should assassinate Chavez? I have to believe in retrospect that if we had the opportunity to "assassinate" Hitler in 1937, we would have and many, many millions of lives would have been saved. Remember, NO ONE believed that Hitler could over run Europe in 1937. Like Yogi Berra said, "it's deja vu all over again."

Take care.

Wayne

12333 states very clearly that:

As it is part of an executive order, the President may modify or rescind the assassination ban in E.O.

<<http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/11/27/122623.shtml>>

12333, Section 2.11, by executive order. Except in specific circumstances, an executive order

revoking a previous order would have to be published in the Federal Register under 44 U.S.C.

§ 1505(a) if it is deemed to be an order of general applicability. However, under 44 U.S.C.

§ 1505(c):

In the event of an attack or threatened attack upon the continental United

States and a

determination by the President that as a result of an attack or threatened
attack-

(1) publication of the Federal Register or filing of documents with the Office
of the

Federal Register is impracticable, or

(2) under existing conditions publication in the Federal Register would not
serve to give appropriate

notice to the public of the contents of documents, the President may, without
regard to any other

provision of law, suspend all or part of the requirements of law or regulation
for filing with the Office

or publication in the Federal Register of documents or classes of documents.

Such a suspension would remain in effect until revoked by the President or by
concurrent

resolution of Congress.

(b)(6)

From: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret) (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 7:30 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: DoD Responses

Which one of these tells the retired GO's to kiss his #&%\$@)????

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 5:14 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: DoD Responses

Gentlemen,

Please find attached a few representative news items highlighting Secretary Rumsfeld's and Gen. Meyers' response to the retired generals critiques, as well as excerpts from the April 11th and April 18th Press Briefings. The press has largely used comments from these two briefings as the basis of their reports, particularly for the Secretary's response. In addition, I've attached a fact sheet on responses to repeated false claims.

We hope you find these useful.

Have a great week,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Thomas McInerney (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 8:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: DoD Responses

(b)(6)

Good work.

We will use it. I am trying to get Fox on it now but they are mesmerized about Clinton's blowup with Chris Wallace yesterday.

Thanks

Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

Voice (b)(6)
Cell:
Fax:

Gentlemen,

Please find attached a few representative news items highlighting Secretary Rumsfeld's and Gen. Meyers' response to the retired generals critiques, as well as excerpts from the April 11th and April 18th Press Briefings. The press has largely used comments from these two briefings as the basis of their reports, particularly for the Secretary's response. In addition, I've attached a fact sheet on responses to repeated false claims.

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 5:04 PM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Subject: RE: Retired Generals

Thanks,

Please send it out to the analysts.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 5:02 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Subject: Re: Retired Generals

First find out if mark already sent this out to the surrogates. If he didn't. You can do it.

Thx for checking
Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
CC: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Mon Sep 25 16:55:38 2006
Subject: RE: Retired Generals

hi. this is really good stuff. i've had some questions from analysts on this. if ok with you i'll shoot it out with the dod response to false claims??
thanks

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:51 PM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Retired Generals

Evan did a good job of isolating some quotes out of the press and two press briefings where SECDEF talked about some of the retired generals complaints. These also might be helpful to Tara for her analysts.

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 12:44 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Free Republic traffic information

We have pulled a few representative news items highlighting Secretary Rumsfeld's and Gen. Meyers' response to the "retired generals" critiques. Additionally, please find attached excerpts of the April 11th and 18th Press Briefings - the press has largely used comments from these two briefings as the basis of their reports, particularly for the Secretary's response.

I hope this helps in putting together the talking points. If you need anything else, let us know.

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 10:02 AM
To: (b)(6), CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Free Republic traffic information

Thanks (b)(6) Good stuff. Also can you help us with researching for comments Secretary Rumsfeld or General Meyers (Former Joint Chiefs of Staff) have said about the retired generals who are criticizing the war effort?

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
email: roxie.merritt(b)(6)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 8:39 AM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Subject: Free Republic traffic information

I have pasted below the ranking information via Technorati (Technorati is the premier blog search engine - they claim that they are "currently tracking 55 million blogs").

According to Technorati, blogs with over one hundred links are considered to have "a lot of authority." Additionally, the Free Republic's numbers have probably increased over time since the ranking information was last updated 116 days.

Free Republic

* Rank: 22,628 (190 links from 115 blogs)
<<http://www.technorati.com/search/www.freerepublic.com%2Fhome.htm>>
* <<http://www.technorati.com/faves/?add=http://www.freerepublic.com/home.htm>>
URL: <http://www.freerepublic.com/home.htm>
* Updated: 116 days ago

(b)(6)

Media Analyst, OSD/PARA

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

Phone: (b)(2)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:51 PM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Retired Generals
Attachments: SecDef Press Briefing April 18.doc; SecDef Press Briefing April 11.doc; SecDef and Retired Generals.doc

Evan did a good job of isolating some quotes out of the press and two press briefings where SECDEF talked about some of the retired generals complaints. These also might be helpful to Tara for her analysts.

Roxie T. Merritt

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)

U.S. Department of Defense

601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)

Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007

Phone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

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Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 12:44 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
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From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 10:02 AM
To: (b)(6), CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Free Republic traffic information

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Roxie T. Merritt

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)

U.S. Department of Defense

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1028

601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

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Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 8:39 AM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
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Free Republic

- λ Rank: 22,628 (190 links from 115 blogs)
- λ URL: <http://www.freerepublic.com/home.htm>
- λ **Updated: 116 days ago**

(b)(6)

Media Analyst, OSD/PARA
The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Phone: (b)(2)
Email: (b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1029

DONALD H. RUMSFELD HOLDS A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING - NEWS BRIEFING

4587 words

18 April 2006

Political Transcripts by CQ Transcriptions

English

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING

APRIL 18, 2006

SPEAKERS: DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL PETER PACE (USMC), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

[*] RUMSFELD: Good afternoon, folks.

One of the interesting things about this city is that there are so many distractions that people sometimes lose track of how fortunate we are to be a part of what may very well be the most innovative and successful society in world history.

In a relatively short amount of time on this planet, our republic has found its way through a whale of a lot of tough challenges.

I was reminded this week by General Buzz Moseley, the chief of staff of the Air Force, that it was 64 years ago today that Jimmy Doolittle led the against-all-odds raid on Tokyo during the early days of World War II.

After Pearl Harbor, of course, the United States faced difficulties and a long string of defeats. We needed to show the Japanese empire that they, too, were vulnerable.

Colonel Doolittle hoped to score a psychological victory for the American people, and he did. The living survivors of that raid are gathering this week, and I extend my warm appreciation to them for their bravery and their service to our country.

...QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, among the criticisms that have been made of you by several retired generals in recent days is that you've been dismissive and even contemptuous of the advice offered by senior military officers.

They've also said that, on a strategic level, they've faulted you for some failures in connection with the Iraq war, including failing to gain sufficient international support for the initial invasion, for example, on the northern front and for post-combat operations and stability operations.

Do you see validity in any of those criticisms? And is it appropriate for these to be aired publicly by retired generals?

RUMSFELD: Well, you know, I've been hearing about all of this, and I kind of would prefer to let a little time walk over it.

There are important issues that are involved. There's no question about that. Change is difficult. It also happens to be urgently necessary. Transforming this department is important.

I think that because of the importance of these matters that are being discussed, I'd like to reflect on them a bit. And I'm a little reluctant to start taking each piece of what people talk about -- or the individuals involved -- and I just am not inclined to be instantaneously judgmental about them.

Coming into work today, I did think about something that happened 30 years ago, I think close to this month. I was secretary of defense. And to my office about 7 o'clock at night came a decision where I was told that the Army was recommending an M-1 battle tank that had a 120-millimeter cannon, as I recall, instead of the 105 Howitzer that the Army traditionally had.

And the Army was in favor of the 105 and in favor of a diesel engine. And the other approach would have been to standardize with our NATO allies at 120 millimeters and also to move away from the diesel engine to a turbine engine.

I decided I wanted to take some time to think about it, and ultimately announced that I thought that the turbine engine and the 120-millimeter cannon was preferable to the 105 and the diesel engine.

RUMSFELD: Well, you would have thought the world had ended. The sky fell. Can you imagine? Can you imagine making that decision and breaking tradition for decades in this country? Can you imagine overturning what the service had proposed for a main battle tank?

Well, it went on and on in the press, and it was a fire storm, and there were congressional hearings and people saying how amazingly irresponsible it was. And it calmed down eventually. The tank has done a great job and served our country very well these intervening decades.

And I mention it because the people involved were good people, and there were differences of views, and somebody needed to make a decision. And the person who is appointed by the president, who is elected by the people and then confirmed by the Senate as secretary of defense has to make those kinds of decisions.

And when you make a decision, you make a choice, somebody is not going to like it.

It's perfectly possible to come into this department and preside and not make choices, in which case people are not unhappy, until about five years later when they find you haven't done anything and the country isn't prepared.

Now, let me just take a minute and tell you what's going on in this last five years.

We have agreed with the Russians on dramatic reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons -- sizable reductions.

We have a new unified command plan for the Northern Command and the Strategic Command.

We have made changes in the defense logistics system.

We have provided reforms in NATO to create a NATO Response Force and to reduce substantially the number of headquarters that existed.

We have fashioned a senior-level review group where, for the first time, we really bring the military and the civilians, the services as well as the combatant commanders, into the decision-making process on all major issues in this department -- a different way of functioning.

The special operations forces have been dramatically increased and given new authorities. The Marines are now involved.

Every one of those changes that I just described has met resistance. It's taken years to get the Marines involved in the special forces. And people like things the way they are. And so, when you make a change like that, somebody is not going to like it.

We've had the largest base-closing effort I think in history. We've done two quadrennial defense reviews. We've adjusted our global posture around the world, bringing forces home from Europe and from Korea.

We have gone out to the combatant commanders who have the responsibility for war plans and had them revise and update their contingency plans, and shortened the process so that they wouldn't be on the shelf and be stale and be unusable and irrelevant.

We have passed a National Security Personnel System so that we can begin to get a grip on how we manage the Department of Defense and the civilian population, the workforce, which is so important. And it's tied up in the courts, and it'll take time. It's been three years I think that we've been struggling with it so far. And that's hard for people, that change. The idea of paying for performance is stunning for some people.

We've canceled weapons systems, just like we canceled the -- disagreed with the tank three years ago. The artillery piece, the so-called Crusader, was canceled, and it caused a major uproar. You may remember that. People didn't like it. Other pieces of equipment have been terminated.

The Army is going through what is a major modernization. It's moving from a division-oriented force to a modular brigade combat team force. When it's completed, it will be an enormous accomplishment.

RUMSFELD: And our Army will be vastly better than it was five to six years ago.

And that's hard. That's hard for the people in the Army to do. It's hard for people who are oriented one way to suddenly have to be oriented a different way.

If you think about the movement, we've gone from -- the military -- from service-centric war-fighting to deconfliction war-fighting to interoperability and now toward interdependence.

That's a hard thing to do, for services to recognize that they don't have to have all of the capabilities, but they have to work sufficiently with the others so that we truly get a leveraged

capability and the taxpayers get better bang for their buck and the United States military becomes vastly more capable.

The idea of bringing a retired person out of retirement to serve as chief of staff for the Army was stunning and a lot of people didn't like it. The fact that he was a special forces officer, a joint officer added to the attitudes.

The idea of taking a Marine and making him supreme allied commander and another Marine in the Strategic Command, let alone a Marine as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the first time in history -- imagine what a stunning thing to do.

I look back on those decisions, and I'm proud of them. They caused a lot of ruffles, let there be no doubt. I mean, how many years ago -- it wasn't too many years ago that the Marines weren't even members of the Joint Chiefs, let alone the chairman.

PACE: The mid-'70s, yes, sir.

RUMSFELD: Mid-'70s.

QUESTION: Well, you got a good one there.

RUMSFELD: So far.

(LAUGHTER)

Just a minute. Just a minute. I was asked a question, and I'm going to take all the time I want.

(LAUGHTER) Now, all of this is to say that, at the same time, we had a war in Afghanistan, we've got a war in Iraq, and we've got the global war on terror going on.

Now, that's hard for people. That's difficult. With all of those moving parts, with all of those challenges to try to get from the 20th century, the industrial age, into the information age, to the 21st century, from conventional warfare into a regular and asymmetrical warfare is a difficult thing to do.

RUMSFELD: And, by golly, one ought not to be surprised that there are people who are uncomfortable about it and complaining about it.

It's also true that I have a sense of urgency. I get up every morning and worry about protecting the American people and seeing if we are doing everything humanly possible to see that we do the things that will make them safe.

And that means you have to look out six months and imagine that there was another 9/11 of equal proportion or twice or three times the proportion and ask yourself, what ought we to be doing today to avoid that from happening six months from now?

And that's what we're doing. And we're working hard at it.

I think that...

(CROSSTALK)

(LAUGHTER)

RUMSFELD: I think that it's important to put all of what is going on in context and recognize that people who are often talking about what's taking place inside here do not know what is taking place inside here.

I don't mean to say -- they knew when they were there, certainly. But I think it is important that we recognize that there is a lot of change going on. It's challenging for people; it's difficult for people. And we have to, I think, be reasonably tolerant with respect to things that get said.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there's one thing you may want to comment on. I know you do not like to quote The Washington Post, one of your favorite newspapers, but there was an issue this morning I think you may want to touch on, if you haven't seen it, the lead editorial.

And that is that it might be a bad precedent to have a secretary of defense, a civilian -- given the fact that you have civilian leadership (inaudible) because of criticism by military officers, active duty or retired.

And another brief point, have you considered perhaps or have you talked to the president in this firestorm where you are, as clearly the center of the controversy over Iraq, have you considered resigning to ease his burden and maybe to assist GOP people running for election or re-election in November?

RUMSFELD: With respect to the first, you asked if I'd like to comment on it.

I don't think so. I think I'd like to let the experts and historians talk about that question of civilian-military relationships, leave it to them.

And the president knows, as I know, that there are no indispensable men. "Graveyards of the world are filled with indispensable people," quote/unquote.

No. He knows that I serve at his pleasure, and that's that.

PACE: Let me say something, if I could, about the process. In fact, it's really important that our fellow citizens understand that the process of making decisions and all of the things that the secretary just talked about, as far as issues, all were handled basically in the same fundamental way, which was a great deal of dialogue amongst the people wearing uniforms and those wearing civilian clothes.

A normal day for me -- a minimum of 30 minutes a day. Today is much more of an example: three to four hours per day. Sometimes as many as six, seven or eight hours per day, the chairman and the vice chairman are with the secretary of defense, listening to all of the information that is being provided to him, giving our best military advice.

We are reaching out, either formally through a war plan staffing process or informally just through a discussion process to the combatant commanders and asking their opinions about whatever the issue of the day is.

And if it's important, the combatant commanders have either gotten on a video teleconference or they've come to this city and sat down with the secretary, and they've come (ph) in through the tank and been with the chiefs.

And the chiefs, individually, are with the secretary at least once a week, if not more often, in the meetings that he holds.

And then the additional meetings that have been formed during the course of the last several years, where all of the senior civilian leaders in the department and all of the senior military leaders in the department get together, not for an hour, but for two or three days at a time. It used to be the combatant commanders would come to town twice a year for two days. Now they come to town three times a year for three days to sit down for quality time, three whole days, with the senior leadership of the department, just discussing various issues.

PACE: There are multiple opportunities for all of us, whatever opinions we have, to put them on the table. And all the opinions are put on the table.

But at the end of the day, after we've given our best military advice, somebody has to make a decision. And when a decision's made by the secretary of defense, unless it's illegal or immoral, we go on about doing what we've been told to do.

RUMSFELD: Don't even suggest that.

(LAUGHTER)

Illegal or immoral.

PACE: But those are the reasons why you would expect somebody to -- after having had the proper opportunity to speak their mind -- I mean, it's important for the American people to understand how this dialogue takes place, that they understand that decisions are not made in a vacuum and that all of those of us who you trust with the lives of your sons and daughters -- you trust us -- that we are going to speak our minds as we should to the leadership so that they can make decisions based on as much knowledge as possible.

So we all have the same facts that lead us to different opinions potentially, that lead us to a dialogue that gets to the right solution.

QUESTION: The outpouring of criticism of you suggests that there's a great deal of dissatisfaction within the office with your leadership. So how can you lead the department effectively if that's the case? And what are you doing personally to address the concerns that they may have?

RUMSFELD: I don't know that that's the case. We've got, what, 6,000, 7,000 retired admirals and generals. Anyone who thinks that they're going to be unanimous on anything -- look at the

votes in the House of Representatives. It's 51-49, 55-45. Same thing in the Senate. Look at our country when we vote.

There are always differences of opinion. That's a healthy thing in this country. We ought to respect it and get about our business.

But if it paralyzes people because someone doesn't agree with them, my goodness gracious, we wouldn't be able to do anything.

PACE: It would be unfair to leave that statement the way it is. It is not my experience that that's true.

General Hagee, commandant of the Marine Corps, just came back from I think it was a week in Iraq. He got exactly zero questions about the leadership in the department.

Last week, while all this was going on back here, guess what they're focused on out there? They're focused on their mission, getting the job done.

The sergeant major, my sergeant major, Sergeant Major Gainey just got back from the Gulf region himself, and he received no questions like that, even though did he a lot of probing.

The fact of the matter is that the folks who are out doing this nation's business are appreciative of the leadership that's being provided and understand the missions they have and the value of what they're doing.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, during the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal...

RUMSFELD: Let's switch over here.

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: ... you twice offered your resignation to President Bush, which he rejected, even though there was no evidence that the activities there worked its way up the chain of command, certainly to the Pentagon.

Yet here there are questions about decisions in which you were directly involved regarding the war in Iraq, and you said you don't even consider resignation.

Why in one case and not the other?

RUMSFELD: Oh, just call it idiosyncratic.

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how much of this do you think is simply about your management style?

In this Wall Street Journal opinion piece that was written yesterday by a number of retired generals, it was said that some feel that you have been unfair, arrogant and autocratic. And this was from your supporters...

(LAUGHTER)

... who were supporting you in this opinion piece.

How much do you think this is about your management style and...

RUMSFELD: No idea.

QUESTION: Well, quick follow-up. To the charge that you're arrogant and autocratic...

RUMSFELD: I've said I have no idea.

QUESTION: Are you arrogant and autocratic?

(LAUGHTER)

RUMSFELD: You know me.

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: Could I change the subject for a minute?

RUMSFELD: It depends on where you want to go.

(LAUGHTER)

Print Media: "Retired Generals"

Secretary's Response

The Two-Star Rebel -- For Gen. Batiste, a tour in Iraq turned a loyal soldier into Rumsfeld's most unexpected critic – May 13

(Wall Street Journal)...Greg Jaffe

...Mr. Rumsfeld has suggested that the criticism of him by the retired generals is a byproduct of the sweeping reforms he brought to the Pentagon and the Bush administration's bold efforts to win the global war on terror by spreading freedom in the Middle East. *"There's a lot of change going on; it's challenging for people, it's difficult for people,"* he told reporters recently.

Rumsfeld says his changes caused complaints – April 19

(Philadelphia Inquirer)...Robert Burns, AP

Vowing not to bow to calls for his ouster from several retired generals, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that their grievances are a natural fallout from his push for dramatic changes in the military. He also discounted any suggestion that the generals' complaints reflect widespread dissent in the officer corps. At a Pentagon news conference, Rumsfeld said it was not surprising that his decisions have roused some discord. *"When you make a decision, you make a choice; somebody is not going to like it,"* he said. *"It's perfectly possible to come into this department and preside and not make choices, in which case people are not unhappy until about five years later, when they find you haven't done anything and the country isn't prepared."*

...In the news conference, Rumsfeld cited several examples of tough choices he has made that have angered some inside the Pentagon. He mentioned a reorganization of the Army's combat units that has been under way since the Iraq war began. *"By golly, one ought not to be surprised that there are people who are uncomfortable about it and complaining about it,"* he said. *"It's also true that I have a sense of urgency. I get up every morning and worry about protecting the American people and seeing if we are doing everything humanly possible to see that we do the things that will make them safe."*

...When Rumsfeld was asked about the charges that he has been dismissive of advice offered by military officers, and that he made strategic missteps in the Iraq war, he told reporters he wanted more time to think about it. *"I've been hearing about all of this, and I kind of would prefer to let a little time walk over it,"* he said. *"There are important issues that are involved."*

Growing ranks of ex-generals bash Rumsfeld – April 14

(Chicago Tribune)...Peter Spiegel and Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times.

Criticism of political leaders by retired generals is nothing new, and Rumsfeld dismissed many of the criticisms this week as just the latest in that tradition. *"It's always been the case, and I see nothing really very new or surprising about it,"* he said at a Pentagon news conference. *'Search for scapegoats'*

Anti-Rumsfeld chorus growing – April 14

(Centre Daily Times)...Tom Raum, AP

Rumsfeld himself answered *"no"* when asked this week whether the march of retired generals was hurting his ability to do his job. *"There's nothing wrong with people having opinions,"* he said.

Bush voices strong support for Rumsfeld – April 14

(NBC News and news services)

In an interview aired Friday on Al-Arabiya television, Rumsfeld said he intends to serve the president at his pleasure. *"The fact that two or three or four retired people have different views, I respect their views,"* Rumsfeld said. *"But obviously if, out of thousands and thousands of admirals and generals, if every time two or three people disagreed we changed the secretary of defense of the United States, it would be like a merry-go-round."*

Gen. Meyers' Response

Generals at War Over Rumsfeld – April 19

(Dallas Morning News)

Supporters

Retired Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001-05: *"One of the things about Secretary Rumsfeld and working for him is, you have tremendous access and you can present your arguments, but in our system, when it's all said and done, in our system the civilian control of the military means the civilians make the decision."*

CNN: Anderson Cooper 360 – April 19

And the White House has dispatched its own army of generals to fight back. The Pentagon even released talking points to help defend Secretary Rumsfeld.

GEN. PETER PACE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS: He does his homework. He works week weekends, he works nights.

GEN. RICHARD MYERS, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.): *It's inappropriate because it's not the military that judges our civilian bosses.*

PBS: The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer – April 18

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman: *It's inappropriate, because it's not the military that judges our civilian bosses. That would be a -- we'd be in a horrible state in this country, in my opinion, if the military was left to judge the civilian bosses. Because when you judge Secretary Rumsfeld, you're also judging the commander in chief, because that's the chain of command. And that's just not appropriate.*

Generals rally to defend Rumsfeld – April 18

(AFP)

On Sunday, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Richard Myers**, told ABC television that military officials -- even in retirement -- should keep criticisms to themselves.

"It's inappropriate, because it's not the military that judges our civilian bosses," said Mr Myers, who was senior US military adviser until six months ago.

"There are professional standards that you have when you are in uniform that carry on when you retire."

New Ammo in Debate on Future of Rummy – April 17

(New York Daily News)...Derek Rose

Richard Myers, the Air Force general who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2001 through last year, said Rumsfeld allowed *"tremendous access"* for military brass to present their arguments about war strategy.

"We gave him our best military advice and I think that's what we're obligated to do," Myers said on "This Week" on ABC. *"If we don't do that, we should be shot."*

In Defense of Rumsfeld Ex-Joint Chiefs Head Myers Says Secretary Has Given Military Commanders Leeway to Give Views, Tactics – April 17

(Newsday)...Bloomberg News

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Gen. Richard Myers, said yesterday that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld didn't stifle dissent among military commanders, as he sought to counter public criticism of the Pentagon chief from six former officers.

Calls by the six retired generals for Rumsfeld's resignation because of his handling of the conflict in Iraq are *"inappropriate"* and harmful to the military, Myers, who served as the nation's top military leader from October 2001 until last September, said on ABC's "This Week." *"We'd be in a horrible state in this country, in my opinion, if the military was left to judge civilian bosses."*

ABC News: Good Morning America – April 16

(OC) Well, not only is the secretary and the president sort of rejecting your call for resignation, but they're also reaching out to other former generals for support, with this memo, and also the secretary calling for a meeting on Tuesday, with them. Here's former chairman of the joint chiefs, Richard Myers.
RICHARD MYERS (US ARMY (RET))

I don't think it's our place in the military, either in uniform or when you retire, to make those judgments. That's not the military's role. Now, they certainly can. I mean, it's their right to do that. I just think it's inappropriate to do that.

NBC News: Nightly News – April 16

DANIELS: The former chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, today, defended the secretary and his own role in the lead-up to war.

General RICHARD MYERS (Retired, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff): *We gave him our best military advice. And—and I think—and that's what we're obligated to do. If we don't do that, we should be shot.*

CNN: Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer – April 16

On ABC's "This Week," the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General Richard Myers, defended embattled defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

RICHARD MYERS, FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: *One of the things about Secretary Rumsfeld, in working for him, is you have tremendous access and you can present your arguments. But in our system, when it's all said and done, in our system, the civilian control of the military means that civilians make the decisions.*

The commander in chief makes the decision; the secretary of defense makes the decisions; and we live by those decisions.

U.S. retired generals debate over Rumsfeld – April 16

(Reuters)

-- Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers on Fox News:

"I don't think it's our place in the military either in uniform or when you retire to make those judgments. That's not the military's role. ... What (criticism) I'm hearing now, I never heard as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

ABC News: This Week – April 16

(OC) If generals like that, retired generals like that think that we're off course; don't they have not only a right but a responsibility to speak out?

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

They do, and under our – under our system, they speak out when they're - when they have the opportunity to speak to the Secretary or anybody in the chain of command. So, General Batiste, who by the way, I have a lot of respect for, and I have not - by the way, George, I have not criticized them directly. I've criticized...

(OC) But why is it inappropriate?

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

It's inappropriate because it's not the military that judges our civilian bosses. That would be - we'd be in a horrible state in this country in my opinion if the military was left to judge the civilian bosses. Because when you judge Secretary Rumsfeld, you're also judging the commander in chief because that's the chain of command, and I don't – and that's just not appropriate...

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

Where he talked about his access to the Secretary and the fact the Secretary took his advice. And then you have to believe everybody in the chain of command is intimidated. Well, I don't believe that.

GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS (ABC NEWS)

(OC) So, General Newbold is not right when he writes that...

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

I don't believe - I don't believe that is correct at all. No. We have the - one of the things about Secretary Rumsfeld in working for him is you have tremendous access. And you can present - you can present your arguments. But in our system, when it's all said and done in our system, the civilian control of the military means the civilians make the decision. The commander in chief makes the decision, the Secretary of Defense makes the decision. And, and we live by those decisions.

(OC) General Newbold also writes that he is speaking out with the encouragement of some still in positions of military.

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

We'll never know. People are either gonna speak out or not. If they're not - if there are people in position that have not spoken out, shame on them.

GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS (ABC NEWS)

(OC) So they should speak out. But wouldn't they lose their job?

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (FORMER CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

No, no. And that's - you know, you hear that, you know, in the military culture, the senior military officers are not in it for promotion. They're in it to serve. It's a privilege to serve. They're not in it for promotion. I don't - if they are, they're quickly weeded out because in our culture, in the military culture when we make general officer, the first note you get from the secretary of your service or the chief of your service is, 'hey, congratulations, you made general officer.' Second thing they say, 'it's not good to want a particular job. We'll tell you what jobs - they're all important. We'll tell you what jobs.' And, third, 'you're going to have this job and you're promoted for this job.' If there's not a job that follows on, then you're gonna be asked to retire. So that's the culture that we're in.

Bush declares 'full support' for Rumsfeld - April 14

(AFP)

However, retired General Richard Myers, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rushed to Rumsfeld's defense.

"My whole perception of this is it's bad for the military, and for military relations, and it's very bad for the country, potentially, because what we are hearing and what we are seeing is not the role the military play in our society," Myers said in an interview with CNN, broadcast Friday

Fox News: Special Report with Brit Hume - April 14

ANGLE: What do you make of this sudden flurry of criticism about Secretary Rumsfeld. There have been a few complaints along the way, but suddenly there is an outpouring of criticism.

MYERS: Frankly I don't understand it. And furthermore I think it's really bad for the military. I think it's bad for civil military relations and I think it's potentially bad for the country because the role of the military is not to judge or criticize our civilian bosses. I mean this country is built around civilian control of the military. And I think this could undermine that if we are not careful.

ANGLE: You are afraid that this will sound like the generals are saying we know better. The civilians should shut up and let us do what we want to do.

MYERS: Yes. It's just not the role of the military. You know, my role as the chairman, when I was on active duty, the role of the senior military people that advise the secretary is to provide your best possible military advice, unfettered by political concerns or anything besides your best military advice and you do that and you try to do it the best you can...

ANGLE: How then would you explain the comments of some of the generals including General Batiste who said that Secretary Rumsfeld is abusive, arrogant, and didn't build a strong team?

MYERS: Well, you know, I don't know. I don't know, I haven't talked to General Batiste about this. I have a lot of respect for John Batiste. He was somebody I thought had great potential in the armed forces and he did lead a division and he did lead that division in Iraq. And we owe him a great deal of credit for that and for the sacrifice that he and his family made in his leadership. So I don't know where he is

coming from. I have not had a chance to talk to him. But, in terms of a team, I think from what I have seen, the team of senior military, at least when I was on active duty around Secretary Rumsfeld, the combatant commanders, the nine combatant commanders who report directly in the chain of command to the secretary to our commander in chief. The advisors off to the side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of which the chairman is the principal military advisor, I thought we had a really strong team. Now, you know, you don't have to like the style of your boss. I think we have all had bosses where we say well, gee, I wish he were -- had a different style. And it's -- but that's irrelevant. It doesn't matter what the style is. And I certainly wouldn't ever call Secretary Rumsfeld abusive. That's just ludicrous...

ANGLE: And I'm sure you've experienced that on many an occasion. Was there a -- in your meeting you with other generals and Secretary Rumsfeld, was there a free flow of discussion. Did people feel free to express their views.

MYERS: Absolutely. In fact, one of the things I think people misperceive Secretary Rumsfeld in at least one way and I don't think people understand how collaborative he is when we are working tough issues and trying to come to how we feel about this. Most of the meetings he comes to he does not have a preconceived notion of what the answer is. He is very collaborative, I think almost to a fault. I have said well, boss, there is the answer right there. Let's just go this way and he'll say, General Myers, just a minute, we have to consider this, this, and this. So he has this tremendous intellectual energy that allows him to look at these problems probably in more depth than most people have the patience or the energy to do. So no, he is very collaborative and he gets a lot of advice from a lot of people and he listens to that advice...

ANGLE: Now, the people who have spoken out sound like they were crossed somewhere, that they feel to listen to them, feel betrayed somehow by the secretary of Defense. Did he reject their advice? Do you know of anything in particular that would prompt this?

MYERS: You know, I don't know. I do not know. I have not talked to these individuals. Some of them have long standing, have been long-standing critics at least one of them, of the current efforts on the war on terrorism of the administration in general and the secretary in particular. But others I just don't know.

CNN: The Situation Room – April 14

Today, former Joint Chiefs chairman Richard Myers, who worked directly with Donald Rumsfeld until 2005, spoke with CNN's Barbara Starr.

GEN. RICHARD MYERS, FMR. CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: *I think one of the things we have to understand, or at least my whole perception of this, is that it's bad for the military. It's bad for civil military relations. And it's potentially very bad for the country, because what we're hearing and what we're seeing is not the role the military plays in our society under our laws -- for that matter, under our Constitution.*

CNN: Anderson Cooper 360 – April 14

STARR: General Myers has little patience for those who criticize Rumsfeld's well-known abrasive style.

MYERS: *This is not a job for somebody that is -- that is not -- doesn't have courage and toughness. On the -- on the other hand, I don't -- that does not intimidate me. I mean, that's -- our job is to provide the best military advice. Shame on us, if we don't do that. It would be -- it would be an absolute crime, in my view. I should be shot if I didn't provide my best advice.*

DONALD H. RUMSFELD HOLDS DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING - NEWS BRIEFING

5614 words

11 April 2006

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English

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING

APRIL 11, 2006

SPEAKERS: DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL PETER PACE (USMC), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

...QUESTION: Let me go back to the Ivan Scott classic two-part question...

(LAUGHTER)

One part is, was the plan -- the criticism, of course -- was the plan perhaps valid or the criticism valid in that the amount of forces attributed to the invasion or attack were too light?

And, two, did the plan cover what now seems to be an almost blindside of the level of the terrorist or insurgent violence?

And the other part -- and maybe you (inaudible) answer this, Mr. Secretary -- pardon me, sir -- there have been four generals...

RUMSFELD: We get all kinds of help up here.

QUESTION: There's four generals in one month who have called for your head, so to speak. Now that you are the -- or have become the catalyst of criticism of the war, do you think perhaps you're hurting the cause by staying on?

PACE: Should I start?

RUMSFELD: Sure. Why don't you start with the second part?

(LAUGHTER)

PACE: The logic for the size of the force that went in was very solid. And, among other things, it included the believe that Saddam probably believed that we would take six months to build up our forces again, array 500,000 troops on the other side of the border, bomb him for 45 days, and then come in.

PACE: What turned out was the reverse. We went in with a lighter force of about 150,000. We did not precede it with a long bombing campaign. We got to Baghdad much faster than anybody thought we ever would.

And as a result of that, Pete Pace believes that we had much less destruction and much less loss of life to get that job done.

So from that standpoint, I was very comfortable with the prewar planning. I am comfortable with the way it was executed. And I would go back, given the same facts and figures, and reach the same conclusion; as did all the Joint Chiefs in agreement with Tom Franks' plan.

As far as Pete Pace is concerned, this country is exceptionally well served by the man standing on my left. Nobody works harder than he does to take care of the PFCs and the lance corporals and lieutenants and the captains. He does his homework. He works weekends. He works nights.

People can question my judgment or his judgment, but they should never question the dedication, the patriotism and the work ethic of Secretary Rumsfeld.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I actually pursue this just one more step? I wonder what do you think...

RUMSFELD: Don't you want to tell us which one should answer this thing?

QUESTION: No, sir, that'll be up to you.

RUMSFELD: OK.

QUESTION: It's a shame, because it makes it so much easier if he would.

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: To what do you attribute the fact that these retired generals are now coming out with this criticism of you? And does it affect your ability to do your job? Is there any danger that you will lose public confidence because of it?

RUMSFELD: I don't know how many generals there have been in the last five years that have served in the United States armed services: hundreds and hundreds and hundreds. And there are several who have opinions, and there's nothing wrong with people having opinions.

And I think one ought to expect that when you're involved in something that's controversial as certainly this war is, one ought to expect that. It's historic. It's always been the case. And I see nothing really very new or surprising about it.

QUESTION: Does it affect your ability to do your job?

RUMSFELD: No.

...QUESTION: ... General Pace, in his opening statement, was responding, as he mentioned a moment ago, to Lieutenant General Newbold's essay in Time magazine. And in calling for you to step down, Mr. Secretary, in referring to the civilian leadership, he said, "The commitment of our

forces to this fight was done with the casualness and swagger that are special province of those who had never had to execute these missions or bury the results."

Do you take that personally? Does that sting? I mean, what is your reaction to a statement like that?

RUMSFELD: Well, first of all, I haven't read it.

Second, he never raised an issue publicly or privately when he was here that I know of.

Do you know of any?

PACE: No.

And make sure you understand, my opening comment was not directed at General Newbold. My opening comment was directed at several articles that have been out here. I used his timeline as an example in answering Barbara's question.

QUESTION: You did mention General Newbold's name. And in response you were saying, sir, that General Newbold never raised any objections...

RUMSFELD: Not to my knowledge, no.

QUESTION: ... or concerns about the war plan?

PACE: Nor to mine. Nor to mine. RUMSFELD: No, he just didn't.

Plenty of people did, and I did. Lots of people did, and talked about it. But we had discussions in the department, we had discussions in the National Security Council, we had discussions with the president. And they were extensive discussions. An awful lot of people around were not shy about giving their views.

So it's not something that concerns me, because I think that -- I guess he was working on the Joint Staff. But in terms of why he would come up with this now, I just can't speak to that, I'm sorry.

PACE: It'd be unfair for me to leave you with the idea that he never said anything critical.

As the director for operations on the Joint Staff he certainly had the responsibility, as we all do, as we sit around a table, to discuss.

PACE: And I'm sure during those discussions he did.

What I'm trying to point out is that no later than 30 September of 2002, he no longer had that responsibility. He no longer was on active duty. The plan evolved for six more months before it was executed. And, therefore, there's a knowledge base there from which extrapolating to what happened in those six months really should not be done.

RUMSFELD: Thank you folks.

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:34 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: DoD responses

Attachments: DoD Response to False Claims.doc



DoD Response to
False Claims.d...

(b)(6) /Dallas,

Did you get copies of these products for your analysts?

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal
Communications) U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: [redacted]
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA [mailto:Allison.Barber@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:22 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Subject: Fw: DoD responses

-----Original Message-----

From: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Mon Sep 25 16:06:21 2006
Subject: RE: DoD responses

one revision to the myths piece

attached

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:05 PM
To: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
Subject: Re: DoD responses

Great. Thanks. We will push it out to internal and to the website.

Thx
Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
To: Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
CC: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Sent: Mon Sep 25 15:43:11 2006
Subject: DoD responses

<<Six-Year Accomplishment List.doc>> <<DoD Response to False Claims.doc>>

Attached please find two products that Dorrance would like sent out today.

The first is a list of false claims about the Department and SecDef with responses.

The second is a list of some of the accomplishments of DoD since 2001.

Please review it. Unless you see a glaring error, this has been okayed for distribution.

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
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To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: DoD responses

Attachments: DoD Response to False Claims.doc



DoD Response to
False Claims.d...

(b)(6)

Dallas,

Did you get copies of these products for your analysts?

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal
Communications) U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax:
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

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Subject: Fw: DoD responses

-----Original Message-----

From: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Mon Sep 25 16:06:21 2006
Subject: RE: DoD responses

one revision to the myths piece

attached

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 4:05 PM
To: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
Subject: Re: DoD responses

Great. Thanks. We will push it out to internal and to the website.

Thx
Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Latimer, Matthew SES OSD PA
To: Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
CC: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Sent: Mon Sep 25 15:43:11 2006
Subject: DoD responses

<<Six-Year Accomplishment List.doc>> <<DoD Response to False Claims.doc>>

Attached please find two products that Dorrance would like sent out today.

The first is a list of false claims about the Department and SecDef with responses.

The second is a list of some of the accomplishments of DoD since 2001.

Please review it. Unless you see a glaring error, this has been okayed for distribution.

DoD RESPONSE TO FALSE CLAIMS

1. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld fired or "forced out" Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki before his term was up.

REALITY: General Shinseki was appointed to a four-year term as Chief of Staff of the Army and served his full term. Serving longer would have been extraordinary -- the only two men to serve as Army Chief of Staff for more than four years in the entire 103-year history of the position were Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Gen. George Marshall. When General Shinseki made his oft-cited statement about troop levels in February 2003, it was already well-known that his term was ending six months later.

2. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld and civilian Defense Department leaders "ignored the advice of the uniformed military and went into battle in Iraq with too few troops."

REALITY: Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the civilian leadership at the Department of Defense has relied on commanders on the ground -- those who lead and see daily operations firsthand -- to determine troop levels. In the planning phase of the Iraq war, General Franks decided to launch a campaign that emphasized speed rather than mass. This was designed to prevent many of the possible negative consequences of invasion that were widely predicted at the time, such as:

- Saddam Hussein's deliberate burning of oil fields.
- Large-scale refugee flows.
- Food or medical humanitarian crises.
- Destabilization of neighboring countries because of a protracted war.

On July 9, 2003, General Franks stated in Senate testimony:

We have about 145,000 troops in there right now . . . There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you, in the presence of [Secretary Rumsfeld], that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say 'yes.' I mean, we have talked about this on a number of occasions. And when the tactical commanders on the ground determine that they need to raise force levels, then those forces in fact will be provided.

The President and Secretary regularly asked Gen. John Abizaid, the theater commander, if he had all the resources necessary to achieve the mission in Iraq, and, if not, what more he needed to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that what they need is more intelligence and *Iraqi* forces, not U.S. forces. Reliance on the advice and counsel of experts continues today.

Recently, based on commanders' recommendations, approximately 3,800 additional troops were sent to Baghdad in Operation Forward Together.

3. FALSE CLAIM: Iraq is "not the center of the war on terror."

REALITY: Extremists have stated unequivocally that Iraq is the most important front in their war against civilization.

Osama bin Laden said, "The epicenter of these wars is Baghdad, the seat of the Caliphate rule."

Ayman al-Zawahri said, "The arena of jihad in Iraq is now the most important arena of jihad in this age."

Extremists are directing their resources and energies to Iraq, where they believe they will be able to force a Coalition withdrawal. According to seized al-Qaeda documents, Iraq *is* the lynchpin of their strategy.

In the vacuum of power created by a Coalition retreat in Iraq, the extremists hope to establish an Islamic state from which they can topple neighboring governments, attack Israel, and restore the historical Caliphate.

4. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld and civilian Defense Department leaders "skewed, selected and exaggerated weapons of mass destruction."

REALITY: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) looked closely into whether policy officials pressured intelligence analysts, and its unanimous report, published on July 9, 2004, states:

The Committee was not presented with any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies on Iraq's WMD programs, not a single analyst answered "yes."

The charge that the Pentagon "politicized" intelligence is even more implausible since every intelligence agency in the world that monitored Iraq's WMD programs came to the same conclusions. This includes France, Germany, and Russia -- all nations that opposed the war.

This is what members of Congress said about Iraq and WMD in the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom began (not to mention what President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and members of his national security team said in the late 1990s):

- “We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.”
-- Sen. Carl Levin (D., MI), Sept. 19, 2002.
- “We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.”
-- Sen. Ted Kennedy (D., MA), Sept. 27, 2002.
- “I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force -- if necessary -- to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security.”
-- Sen. John F. Kerry (D., MA), Oct. 9, 2002.
- “[Saddam] has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant UN resolution that has demanded that he disarm and destroy his chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity. This he has refused to do.”
-- Rep. Henry Waxman (D., CA), Oct. 10, 2002.

5. FALSE CLAIM: The Administration and the Department of Defense have “no plan” for success in Iraq.

REALITY: Some may disagree with President Bush’s strategy in Iraq, but he has outlined a detailed plan on numerous occasions. It is further explained in the 35-page “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” published in November 2005.

This plan entails progress along three tracks:

- **Political:** Aiding in the development of a political process and the formation of a strong national government.
- **Security:** Strengthening Iraq’s security by training Iraqis and giving them the lead in securing their own country.
- **Economic:** Providing reconstruction assistance to give Iraqis hope for a brighter future.

This plan has been instituted and has achieved a number of successes. Iraqis have held three national elections, which led to the creation of a constitution and the formation of a

national unity government. A quarter-million Iraqis have been trained and equipped. They are now participating in nearly 90 percent of all combat operations, one-third of which are conducted solely by Iraqis. The gross domestic product of Iraq has more than doubled since 2003.

6. FALSE CLAIM: "The Secretary of Defense forbade his staff to develop a plan for post-war Iraq and threatened to fire anyone who raised the issue."

REALITY:

- The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002 and included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. Government: the Secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council.
- A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations.
- In January 2003, after these weeks and months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was stood up to plan for and facilitate the administration of the country once the Hussein regime was disarmed and dispatched.

7. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld has "painted a rosy picture in Iraq" and claimed the "war would be short."

REALITY: Secretary Rumsfeld has been consistently realistic about the challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the War on Terror. Consider the following quotes:

- "It will take a sustained effort to root [the terrorists] out. . . . The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as al-Qaeda, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers." (3/23/2004)
- "I don't think there's ever been a war that was popular. I think that if you think about it, in the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam War -- they're tough, they're hard, and people die. . . . Is it going to be easy between now and when they take over full responsibility for their country? No, it won't be easy -- it will be tough." (6/26/2005)
- "I'm realistic. I'm not going to suggest it's easy. It's hard. It's very difficult. The biggest concern I have is that these people are undoubtedly starved by 35 years of political repression and economic repression." (10/10/2003)
- "It's bound to be tough. It's a tough part of the world. This isn't an easy business. It's not smooth sledding. It never has been. There's never been a country that's

gone from a dictatorship to a democracy on a featherbed. It just doesn't work that way." (2/1/2005)

8. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld described the insurgency in Iraq as "just a few dead-enders."

REALITY: Secretary Rumsfeld first used the term "dead-ender" in November 2001, specifically referring to Mullah Omar and al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists who would never surrender and would only stop fighting once they were dead. In the context of Iraq, the Secretary used the term to describe remnants of the former regime who -- harboring delusions of returning to power and privilege -- were fighting the Coalition and terrorizing other Iraqis along with foreign Jihadists and thousands of criminals released from jail prior to the war.

The Secretary never used the adjective "few" to describe "dead-enders" in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Nor did the Secretary imply that the enemy was less lethal by using the term "dead-enders." Quite to the contrary, because these "dead-enders" would not join Afghan or Iraqi democratic processes or submit to the rule of law, as Secretary Rumsfeld explained, these individuals were even *more* deadly. The suicide tactics of insurgents in Iraq and of al-Qaeda and Taliban holdouts in Afghanistan have proven this to be the case.

9. FALSE CLAIM: Among the biggest strategic mistakes were the decisions to "demobilize the standing Iraqi Army" and to "purg[e] all Baath Party officials from the Iraqi Government."

REALITY: Disbanding the Iraqi army and the so-called "purge" of Baath party members had little effect on the insurgency. As one CPA official pointed out, "By the time Coalition forces reached Baghdad, Hussein's army had ceased to exist. . . . All Iraqi soldiers who survived had, in the Pentagon's jargon, 'self-demobilized.'" The army consisted almost entirely of Shi'a conscripts, who probably would not have heeded calls by their Sunni officers to return to duty. If the Iraqi Army was maintained, it would have thus been made up almost entirely of officers who were seen by most Iraqis as responsible for the repression and torture of the Iraqi public.

Only top officials of the Baath party and those involved in elite security units such as the Fedayeen Saddam were prohibited from government employment. This policy affected 30,000 of 1.5 million Baath party members -- about 2 percent.

These criticisms ignore the far worse scenario of how Iraq's Shi'i and Kurdish communities -- some 80 percent of the population -- might have reacted had these two policies not been adopted.

10. FALSE CLAIM: The Iraqi Security Forces “will not stand and fight and defend their own country as long as they believe the American soldiers will do the job. The best military in the world is there to protect them at no expense.”

REALITY: The Brookings Institute calculates that 5,332 Iraqi Police and Army personnel have been killed since June 2003. The suggestion that those deaths -- and the thousands of casualties also sustained by the Iraqi Security Forces -- are “no expense” is wrong. Having gone from zero in 2003 to over 277,600 trained and equipped today, the Iraqi Security Forces are now assuming the lead in provinces across Iraq. They are standing. They are fighting. They are defending. Ninety percent of all operations are conducted with Iraqi assistance or leadership. On September 7, 2006, operational control was handed over to the Iraqi military. The men and women of the Iraqi army, navy, air force and police are defending their country with heroic courage in the face of brutal terrorist attacks -- at great risk to their personal security, as well as that of their families.

11. FALSE CLAIM: Secretary Rumsfeld “compared the critics of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy to those who appeased the Nazis.”

REALITY: In his speech to the American Legion on August 29, Secretary Rumsfeld did not once mention critics of the Iraq war -- much less did he compare those critics to appeasers of Hitler. This misunderstanding about Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks stems from several initial media reports, particularly from the *Associated Press*, that wrongly claimed that he made those comparisons. As an August 30 *New York Times* article correctly noted, “[Rumsfeld] did not directly compare current critics of the war in Iraq to those who sought to appease Hitler.”

Secretary Rumsfeld recounted the unfortunate history of the 1930s because he believes that success in the current war requires a clear understanding of the lessons and mistakes of the past. The Secretary believes that dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing on American imperfections -- rather than on the nature of the enemy -- can undermine our nation’s ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremism.

12. FALSE CLAIM: “The Secretary of Defense failed to ensure that US troops had adequate protective gear.”

REALITY:

- Secretary Rumsfeld and civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon have made it a priority to ensure that our troops have what they need. They have adjusted as the enemy has evolved.
- From March 2003 to November 2004, the military produced in excess of 400,000 sets of body armor -- from 1,200 sets a month to over 25,000 a month.

- MG Stephen Speakes, Director, Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, said this earlier this year:

“We have gone from about 75,000 sets [of body armor] that were available and distributed in the Army at the time we crossed the line of departure in Kuwait, to now over 700,000 sets. This amount is enough for all the forces operating in the Area of Operations plus the majority of the operating force of the Army.”

- In addition, the Army had increased the production of up-armored Humvees to 450 per month by that time, nearly a 30-fold increase from the previous summer, when the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices first emerged in Iraq.

Office of Public Affairs,
The Pentagon

Revised: September 25, 2006

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 2:32 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Any unofficial response to the retired officer hearing today?

(b)(6)

I have a number of radio programs this afternoon. One of the topics is the NIE and the other being addressed is today's hearing featuring the three retired officers critical of the Iraq planning. Any help?

Thanks.

Bob

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

[\(b\)\(6\)](http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6))

(b)(6)

From: Gordon Cucullu (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Trips and such

That makes sense, (b)(6) I think Paul may be tapped to go. I'd certainly like to put my oar in the water for a trip to Israel, Afghanistan, or the Sand Box, if you can arrange one. I think I'll be back in GTMO next month for what I hope is a final research visit prior to final drafting.

With the transfer of KSM and crew to GTMO that has to be a new chapter.

Thanks for thinking about me, Gordon

On Fri, 22 Sep 2006 15:43:20 -0400, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote

> sir,
> i was just going back through emails and realized i never answered
> your question about the israel trip. i understand there is one, but it
> is not being organized by dod. i've only heard about it second hand. i
> believe aipac in dc is the sponsor. (if it were up to me, i'd invite
> you!) :) thanks (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:(b)(6)]
> Sent: Sunday, September 10, 2006 7:30 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Subject: RE: Army Field Manual for Detention Operations

> No sweat. I don't think I'd read the entire thing anyway. If you see a
> stray wandering around that needs a home...keep me in mind.

> New subject: Paul asked if I was going on an Israel trip? Is there one
> in the offing? And can I participate? I'd certainly like to. (if
> answer is 'no' I'll be disappointed but won't take it too personally!)

> Hang in there, Gordon

> On Sat, 9 Sep 2006 13:58:09 -0400, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA wrote

> > sir,
> > i checked on the hard copy. it's over almost 400 pages, so i don't
> > think the army has any plans to produce a bunch of copies. i've
> > asked our pao to check if they do and if they will have an extra
> > copy. it does not appear likely. i'm sorry about that. if i hear
> > anything different i will let you know.

> > thanks -- have a great weekend!

> > (b)(6)

> > From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:(b)(6)]
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 5:42 PM
> > To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> > Subject: Re: Army Field Manual for Detention Operations

> > I'd like a hard copy but if that proves difficult or
> > uncomfortable
> > let me know and I'll see if I can print it off, thanks, Gordon

> > PS if it doesn't work on the hard copy part, no sweat, just let

> me
> > know
> >

----- Original Message -----

> > From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> > <mailto:(b)(6)>
> > To: Gordon Cucullu <mailto:(b)(6)>
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 4:19 PM
> > Subject: RE: Army Field Manual for Detention Operations

> > sir, do you mean can we send you a hard copy in the
> mail, or do you
> > mean an electronic file of the full manual? the electronic version
> > can

> > be found on the army website. if you are
> > asking for a hard copy, i will see what i can do for you.

> > thanks

> > (b)(6)

> > From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:(b)(6)]
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 2:00 PM
> > To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> > Subject: Re: Army Field Manual for Detention Operations

> > (b)(6) thanks for having me join the conference
> call. Is it possible
> > for me to get a hard copy of the new FM? Thanks, Gordon

----- Original Message -----

> > From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> > <mailto:(b)(6)>
> > To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> > <mailto:(b)(6)>
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006
> > 12:12 PM
> > Subject: Army Field Manual for Detention
> Operations

> > Gentlemen,
> > Please find attached the released DoD
> Directive regarding the
> > Detainee program, as well as a one-page summary of the Army Field
> > Manual.

> > We hope you find this useful.
> > Have a great day,

> > (b)(6)

> > (b)(6)
> > OSD Public Affairs
> > Community Relations and Public Liaison
> > (b)(2) The Pentagon
> > Washington, D.C. 20301
> > (b)(2)

> > Read Gordon's column - The Right Approach - weekly and sign up for a
> free e-subscription. Review a section of his hot new book on North
> Korea, Separated at Birth: How North Korea became the Evil Twin. For
> all this and more log on the web site www.colonelgordon.com.

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: MNSTC-I Slides
Attachments: Defense analysts (19 SEP 06).ppt; IMGP1123.JPG; IMGP1124.JPG; IMGP1128.JPG

Gentlemen,

Please find attached the slides LTG Dempsey used during our meeting with him. Please let me know if you have any follow up questions. I have also attached a few pictures from our trip (as well as pasted the one below). Enjoy. I will be sending more photos shortly.

Thanks to you all for making it a great trip! We appreciate each of you and look forward to future opportunities. In the meantime, if you could please send us any information on interviews you conduct and/or articles/pieces that you write as a result of our trip. It is always helpful for us as we put together our after action report and look at the potential for future travel. In addition, if you know in advance that you will be conducting an interview, etc. we would be glad to know in advance so that we can watch/listen/read it.

We hope you are all well.


Best,

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES


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NY TIMES

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Iraqi Security Forces Update

18 September
2006

1



Future of the Iraqi Security Force



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Transition



Developing Full Operational Capability

Increasing Self-Reliance



30K Replenishment of the Iraqi Army

REPLENISHMENT FORCE 5-week training cycle

	Oct 06	Nov 06	Dec 06	Jan 07	Feb 07	Mar 07	Apr 07	May 07	Jun 07	Jul 07	Aug 07
RTC Habbaniyah— 1st & 7th DIV	1 Oct - 24 Nov	25 Nov - 19 Jan	20 Jan - 16 Mar	17 Mar - 12 May	13 May - 8 Jul						
1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers						
RTC Hammam Al Ail— 2nd & 3rd DIV	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers					
750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers					
RTC K-1— 2nd & 3rd DIV	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers					
1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers					
ITB X 2 Kirkush (KMTB)— 4th & 5th DIV	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers						
1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers							
ITB Numaniyah— 6th & 8th DIV	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers							
1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers								
RTC Tallil— 10th DIV	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers							
750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers								
RTC Taji— 9th DIV	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	360 Soldiers								
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


Recruiting Goals		
Habbaniyah	1st DIV	3390
	7th DIV	5720
Hammam Al Ail, K-1	2nd DIV	2350
	3rd DIV	4050
Kirkush (KMTB)	4th DIV	1350
	5th DIV	4320
Numaniyah	6th DIV	3460
	8th DIV	1650
Tallil	10th DIV	1850
Taji	9th DIV	1860
Total		30000




Issues

- **Challenge:**
 - } Finding the Balance
- **Vulnerabilities:**
 - } Fiscal Responsibility
 - o Culture of mistrust + culture of corruption = financial paralysis
 - o Must encourage FMS agreement
 - } Senior Military & Civilian Leadership
 - o Lack of depth
 - o Must "build a bench"
 - } Intra-Ministry Dependencies
 - o Ministries of Oil, Health, & Communications must support ISF
 - o Ministries of Defense and Interior must cooperate
- **Issues:**
 - } Long-term financial commitment for modernization
 - } USG determination of technology transfers





Iraqi Security Forces Update



18 September
2006

1




Future of the Iraqi Security Force



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

As part of the U.S. military's counterterrorism strategy, the U.S. Army is training and equipping Iraqi security forces to help stabilize Iraq and prevent the resurgence of terrorism.

Transition



Build - Enhance - Develop

Developing
Full
Operational
Capability


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


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Issues

- **Challenge:**
 - } **Finding the Balance**



- **Vulnerabilities:**
 - } **Fiscal Responsibility**
 - o Culture of mistrust + culture of corruption = financial paralysis
 - o Must encourage FMS agreement
 - } **Senior Military & Civilian Leadership**
 - o Lack of depth
 - o Must “build a bench”
 - } **Intra-Ministry Dependencies**
 - o Ministries of Oil, Health, & Communications must support ISF
 - o Ministries of Defense and Interior must cooperate

- **Issues:**
 - } **Long-term financial commitment for modernization**
 - } **USG determination of technology transfers**







(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 11:31 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: TP's for recruiting protests in NY.
Attachments: Gay Enlistment_Sit-ins.doc; Proposed Homosexual Policy TP's 2006.doc

hi sir,
here is the background and talking points on the current situation. i am assuming that this will be the topic they want to discuss with you.
hope it helps... let me know if you need anything else.
welcome back!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 11:17 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: TP's for recruiting protests in NY.

(b)(6)

Please see the approved talking points regarding the department's homosexual policy.

thanks,

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1075



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
4TH MARINE CORPS DISTRICT
BLDG 54, SUITE 3, BOX 806
NEW CUMBERLAND, PENNSYLVANIA 17070-0806

IN REPLY REFER TO:
1230
PAO
3 Dec 07

From: Public Affairs Officer, 4th Marine Corps District
To: All Hands, 4th Marine Corps District

Subj: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR GAY ACTIVISM AND SIT-INS AT
4TH DISTRICT RECRUITING STATIONS AND SUBSTATIONS

1. Situation. Right To Serve (ROS), a national gay rights campaign focused on protesting the exclusion of gay individuals from military service. The ROS organizers are planning coordinated attempts to enlist and sit-ins at various military recruiting facilities across the nation this fall. Several venues in 4th MCD's AO are targeted. Additionally, ROS is attempting to involve as much media as possible at each event. From a newsworthiness standpoint, when the military is pitted against the gay population, the event will make news. Accordingly, our media engagement must be coordinated and consistent.

The Web address for Right To Serve, with tentative event schedule, is: <http://www.soulforce.org/righttoserve>.

United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 37, Sec. 654, "Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces," Nov. 30, 1993, the relevant Title 10 language can be found at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse usc&docid=Cite:+10USC654>.

2. Mission. Disseminate Public Affairs Guidance to all hands, specifically addressing: Military policy on service eligibility of openly gay applicants

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. Produce 4th MCD specific Public Affairs Guidance for impending gay activism events/sit-ins at District RSs/RSSs. Disseminate to all hands and utilize while engaging the media and community leaders.

b. Concept of Ops

(1) Tasks. District PA - Produce PAG for gay recruiting activism, conduct training for District Staff, disseminate to RS MPAs and encourage use of PAG at upcoming all-hands training.

(2) Coordinating Instructions

(a) RS MPAs: ensure widest dissemination and use of PAG.

(b) ALCON: utilize Communication Objectives and Q & As during preparation and execution of media engagement.

Communication Objectives:

- (1) The Marine Corps supports and defends the constitutional right of all United States citizens to free speech and peaceful assembly.
- (2) The Marine Corps does not make policy, however, it is law-bound to abide by, follow and execute any and all applicable policies established by Congress and the U.S. legislative body.

Questions and Answers:

Q1. What is the current policy on the enlistment of homosexuals?

A1. *United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 37, Sec. 654, "Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces," Nov. 30, 1993, governs qualifications for enlistment in the armed forces. Under this provision, the Marine Corps does not and will not ask a service member about his or her sexual orientation, nor are service members required to tell anyone in uniform their sexual orientation. Further, the Marine Corps is bound, both ethically and by law, to prohibit harassment and take appropriate punitive actions against those found guilty of harassment of any kind.*

Q2. What is the purpose of this policy?

A2. *Good order and discipline and unit cohesiveness are critical components combat ready and combat effective military units. Under Title 10, Sub. A, Pt. II, Ch. 37., Sec. 654, Congress found that "...the presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."*

Q3. Why would the presence of openly homosexual individuals impact the unit cohesion and readiness of military units?

A3. The finding is the result of research and surveying by Congress. As such, that question is one for Congress—the policy makers—not the individual Marine or Marine recruiter.

Q4. Do you feel that openly gay Marines would be detrimental to morale and unit cohesiveness?

A4. My opinion has no bearing on policy, nor is it beneficial to my mission to publicly discuss my personal opinions on policies of any kind. What is beneficial for everyone—Marine and civilians alike—is that I strive to be the best Marine I can be, and I continue to recruit highly qualified individuals to earn the Eagle, Globe and Anchor and serve our nation as United States Marines.

Q5. What are your procedures for an applicant who self-admits he or she is a homosexual?

A5. We tell them they don't qualify for enlistment under the current policy and politely terminate the application process. We ensure we are polite and professional at all times because as U.S. Marines, we treat all individuals with the professionalism and courtesy they deserve.

Q6. How do you feel about this policy?

A6. As a United States Marine, I follow and enforce policies as directed by the Congress and the Department of Defense. I am proud to give my service for the good of our country.

Q7. But what is your personal opinion?

A7. My mission is to recruit qualified and motivated men and women for service in America's elite fighting force—the Marine Corps. Congress and our lawmakers determine baseline standards for qualification. Thus, as a professional, my personal opinions are not relevant and have no bearing on my mission.

Q8. Have you had any openly gay applicants come into your station since the change in the policy?

A8. Answer based on your local experience.

Q9. Can you refer me to that/those individual(s)?

A9. Out of respect of the individual's privacy, the Marine Corps will not provide personal/contact information for any prospective applicants. Applicants who wish to speak with the media are certainly welcome to do so on their own behalf.

Q10. What was your reaction to the applicant?

A10. I treated him/her exactly as I would any other unqualified applicant—I informed him/her that he/she is not eligible for enlistment and thanked them for their time.

Q11. There was a group of (name of organization) protesting the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy outside your station. How do you feel about that?

A11. They are exercising their 1st Amendment right, which is one of the freedoms that we as Marines defend.

Q12. How do you feel about this?

A12. It is great to see people expressing their opinions in a nation where they can safely do so, and I am honored to help in providing that opportunity. Also, I am happy to know that other Americans are as passionate about something as I am about being a Marine. I would encourage everyone to remember that the Marine Corps does not make policy; we merely adhere to it. Accordingly, the Corps is not in a position to change policy. Change can only be affected at the Congressional level.

Q13. How do you think openly gay Marines would fit into the Marine Corps?

A13. I don't know. What I do know is that Congress and policy makers have concluded that open homosexuality is incompatible with military culture.

Q14. Do you think the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy will change?

A14. I don't know. As a democracy, we elect our representatives to uphold or change policy according to the voice of the constituents. Policy change rests in the hands of our country's voters.

Q15. Do you think the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy should be changed?

A15. I believe that voters will elect representatives who will continue to keep our nation's best interests at heart. Whether the policy changes or remains, I will continue to faithfully serve this country as a United States Marine.

Q16. Recently, several openly gay individuals in specialty assignments like linguistics and nursing have been discharged from the services. As a recruiter, do you have to make up for those losses? Wouldn't it make sense to retain these individuals?

A16. The Marine Corps plans for a certain amount of attrition within its ranks. That said, the Corps is always looking to recruit highly qualified individuals for service in the Marine Corps. With respect to sexual orientation, Congress alone defines "qualified."

4. Administration and Logistics

a. If feasible, all media interview requests should be referred to RS or District Public Affairs Marines prior to response.

b. All media interviews should be reported to District PA.

c. Interviewees will utilize the provided Communication Objectives and Questions & Answers in preparation for and execution of media engagement. Under no circumstances should Marines being interviewed render their personal opinions.

5. Command and Signal

a. Signal. PAG is effective immediately; updates will be forwarded as needed.

b. Command. POC for more information is 1st Lt. (b)(6) 4th MCD PAO at (b)(2)

(b)(6)

Proposed Talking Points on DoD policy on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy
as well as Gay's in the Military.

Protestors to the Homosexual policy

*The Department of Defense supports and defends the constitutional right of all United States citizens to free speech and peaceful assembly.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

*The department of defense must ensure that the standards for enlistment and appointment of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set forth by Congress.

*The Department of Defense policy on homosexual conduct in the military implements a Federal law that addresses the "Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces," which can be found at Section 654 of Title 10, United States Code.

*Under this policy, a person who has stated that they are a homosexual or bisexual can not be allowed entry into the military services based upon the applicable laws and regulations governing sexual conduct by members of the armed forces.

Gays in the military

*We expect all service members to be treated with dignity and respect ... ALL the time.

*We conduct extensive, recurring training to eliminate harassment of all types.

*Leaders at all levels are expected to take preventative and corrective action against hostility to any of our service personnel.

*Behavior not meeting this standard -- and harassment of ANY type -- is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 10:28 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: FW: Pentagon Channel Highlights

sir,
thanks for the note. glad to hear that you at least got compensated. i'm amazed sometimes at what the airlines can get away with... i'm still disappointed that you couldn't join us! i know you would have gotten a lot from the agenda they put together for us. but, there will be a next time and i hope you can join us then...
chat soon,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 10:20 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: FW: Pentagon Channel Highlights

Welcome home. I hope the trip was great for you. I steamed all weekend and kept track of your time by the hour. The ticket company agreed to refund my \$\$\$ since Delta said that even though they were the cause of the failed trip, they were NOT responsible for the ticket refund. Once again, I was livid. Anyway, I look forward to seeing you soon. Take care.
Wayne

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1082

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 8:20 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: SLIDES

Attachments: slide1.jpg; slide 8.jpg; slide 7.jpg; slide 6.jpg; slide 5.jpg; slide 4.jpg; slide3.jpg; slide2.jpg



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slide2.jpg (177 KB)

Gentlemen,

Please find attached the slides General James L. Jones, SACEUR and EUCOM Commander used to brief the media yesterday. Also, i've included below the statistics on the reconstruction progress ISAF is making in southern Afghanistan that Gen Jones mentioned. We hope you find this helpful.

Have a great day,

(b)(6)

Stats:

- * \$650,000 has been allocated in the Zhari district and \$1,200,000 in Panjwai. Furthermore, USAID has allocated \$500,000 for reconstruction projects in the area and COMISAF is supporting with available funds, where possible.
- * Task Force Grizzly providing \$100K for water supply -- Region Command South executing 100 Metric tons of food stockpiles in Kandahar
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POLICING

*The Alliance is
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3 Continents*

KFOR

ISAF

NATO HQS:
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SKOPJE
SARAJEVO

ACTIVE
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NTM-I

DARFUR

NRF
SRF
ORF

Long Term Reconstruction & Development Activities

There are 126 Projects within Kandahar province which have no location data attached

Zhari

UNICEF Projects
 Education - \$3,600
 Health - \$52,000

WFP Projects
 Total - 1,700 metric tonnes food aid

MRRD Projects Ongoing \$297,000
 Complete \$35,000

Transport - Ongoing \$157,000
 Agriculture - Ongoing \$2,000
 Water & Sanitation - Ongoing \$138,000
 Complete \$35,000

Maywand

Agricultural Education & Training.

Paniva'i

UNICEF Projects
 Education - \$3,000
 Health - \$50,000

WFP Projects
 Total - 2,000 metric tonnes food aid

MRRD Projects Ongoing \$400,500
 Complete \$350,500

Education - Complete \$1,500
 Agriculture - Complete \$50,000
 Transport - Complete \$10,000
 Water & Sanitation - Complete \$269,000
 Ongoing \$400,500

PRT Projects
 Office Furniture for Government Building - Ongoing, \$16,000
 Construction of 2km of Road - Ongoing, \$33,000

Agricultural Education & Training.
 Expand access to Basic Standard Health Package.

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Legend

CERP Project

Education

Transport

Ring Road


Taliban Strongholds



Operation MEDUSA



- Currently 23+ operations ongoing in ISAF
- 10+ of these operations are in Regional Command South



Operation MEDUSA


TASK: Defeat insurgents in the vicinity of Pashmul & Panjwayi

PURPOSE: Set conditions for Kandahar reconstruction and development activities (21 Aug- mid Sep 06)

Development Spending in Afghanistan: May-Sep 06

Total Spending = \$324,100,000
No. of Projects = 238

RC West
Total Spend \$216,000,000
No. of projects = 12
Sectors:
 Agriculture
 Education
 Governance
 Security
 Transport
Remarks:
 Approx 95% of Spend due to Herat - Deteram Ring Road.




RC North
Total Spend \$3,800,000
No. of projects = 130
Sectors:
 Agriculture
 Commerce & Industry
 Education
 Health
 Security
 Transport
 Water & Sanitation
Remarks:
 \$189M Silkworm Factory TBC MeS)

RC Capital
Total Spend \$2,100,000
No. of projects = 41
Sectors:
 Capacity Building
 Community Development
 Education
 Governance
 Transport
Remarks:
 Status Uncertain, some projects Still ongoing

RC South
Total Spend \$68,000,000
No. of projects = 65
Sectors:
 Agriculture
 Capacity Building
 Commerce & Industry
 Community Development
 Education
 Energy
 Environment
 Governance
 Health
 Security
 Transport
 Water & Sanitation
Remarks:
 \$62M Kandahar - Gereshk Ring Road.
 Over \$100M ongoing (Ring Road & Kajaki Dam)



Post Medusa Immediate Actions



Battle Clearance & IDP Returns - Winterisation Preparation

Long Term R&D


Short Term - Collateral Damage

- Identify unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination and initiating clearance - Regional Command (South) lead, HQ ISAF support
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- Miscellaneous health and education initiatives

ISAF Expansion



REGION SOUTH - STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE
TOTAL = \$604,181,000

AS AT 14 Sep 06

PLANNED
 Kajaki Power Plant \$26,330,000
 (Operation & Maintenance)
 Currently Suspended due to
 Security

PLANNED
 Kajaki Transmission Lines
 & Substation,
 Kajaki Dam Road
 Total = \$101M

ONGOING
 Saudi Arabia Section, \$61M

ONGOING
 India, \$84M

ONGOING
 USAID, \$30M
 Aug 06

ONGOING SUSPENDED
 Japan, \$62M
 Dec 06

COMPLETE
 Kuwait, \$25M

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PLANNED
 USAID, \$30M
 TBD

PLANNED
 USAID, \$30M
 2008


COMPLETE
 USAID, \$87M


ONGOING
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 TBD

Kandahar District Routes
 Daman, Maywand, Zhari,
 Township District Centre Routes.
 Total = \$3,851,000

Legend

- District Centres
- Province Centres
- ⊙ Power Plants
- ⊕ Kajaki Power Plant
- Power Lines
- Complete
- - - Ongoing
- ⋯ Planned





Operation MEDUSA - Geographical Overview

Op Medusa Area of Operations

Shah Wali Kot

Tarin Kowt Road

Arghandab

Arghandab River

Daman

Highway 1

Kandahar

Kandahar Airfield

Highway 4

Zhari

Pashmul Pocket

Panjwayi

CONFIDENTIAL / REL

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 6:56 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: SLIDES

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It was a pleasure meeting you yesterday.

Best,

(b)(6)

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Commander (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
European Command Liaison Office
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20318-0520

(b)(2)

Cell: (b)(2) (NEW)

U.S. European Command <<http://www.eucom.mil/>> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<<http://www.nato.int/shape/index.htm>>

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Legend

CERP Project

△ Education

▲ Transport

— Ring Road


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
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
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
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
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(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 12:04 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Military analysts in Iraq
Attachments: Military Analysts in Iraq.doc

Here you go. Would you mind sending out a note to the four that came, thanking them for taking the time and asking tyhem to pleas let us know, in advance if possible, of any and all media they are doing. Let them know it is for a report we will give casey. Dave has some info from mccasuland. thanks

Dallas B. Lawrence
 Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
 United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 11:24 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: Military analysts in Iraq

Dear Mr. Lawrence,

Attached are two clips and transcripts from Gen. Wayne Downing on MSNBC and Col. Jeff McCausland on CBS Radio reporting from Iraq. Gen. Downing discussed the new security measures in Baghdad that may be implemented to stop sectarian violence. Col. McCausland discussed the effect the Pope's recent comments have had in Iraq.

As of this morning, there have been no reports from John Garrett or Bing West. We will continue monitoring for coverage. Please let us know if you need anything else.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1102

Military Analysts in Iraq

General Wayne Downing

MSNBC: MSNBC News Live 13:54:32 – September 19

Anchor: U.S. and Iraqi forces are implementing dramatic new measures in Baghdad as they try to stop sectarian violence from degenerating into civil war. MSNBC military analyst retired General Wayne Downing was recently in Iraq. He was meeting with senior U.S. and Iraqi officials. And while he was there, he sat down with NBC's Mike Betcher.

Mike Betcher: General, you've been here four days. You've seen what's going on right now. Are we winning, the United States? Is the United States losing? Or is that even the right question to ask?

Gen. Wayne Downing: Tremendous progress on the military front. The Iraqi army has stood up. The units I saw are doing very very well. But, the provision of services to the people just has not occurred. Primarily because of security type things. But the other thing is we still have these sectarian political issues that have not been solved.

Betcher: Did the military officials you spoke here, top generals, did they say they think a political process will work here to make that happen?

Gen. Downing: I talked to not only American generals, I talk to British generals, I talked to Iraqi generals, I talked to colonels, I talked to people throughout the chain of command. They're doing what they can do. All of them also expect the politicians to do what they have to do.

These political parties, these Sunni and Shia parties, they have got to come together and they've got to solve some fundamental differences that we papered over when we did that constitution, and they've got to come to grips with that.

Betcher: I'm told by senior military officials here that since Zarqawi was killed, they've been able to kick the heck out of the insurgency. That the problem is not so much that, but the sectarian violence. And we've had 200 people killed in the last five days.

Gen. Downing: It is sectarian violence. It is the death squad. The Sunni death squads, the Shia death squads, it's the Mahdi Army, and this is what they have to get after now.

Betcher: They're talking about this new plan to build a ring around Baghdad.

Gen. Downing: It will be several rings, which are primarily checkpoints, barb wire fences, a couple of ditches which will channel people so they can't easily get in and out of the city without going through some kind of a physical check point. It is a technique that's not going to go on forever but it will support the overall effort to diffuse Baghdad.

Anchor: That was Mike talking to retired General Wayne Downing in Iraq.

Colonel Jeff McCausland

WCBS-NY (Radio): News 16:31:12 – September 18

Col. Jeff McCausland (Taped): Just when you thought things in Iraq couldn't get any more difficult, along comes the Pope who makes some comments about Islam which makes things more difficult here in Iraq. About 2 percent of the population of Iraq is Christians and following the Pope's comments, there have been demonstrations in Basra, Karbala, as well as here in Baghdad.

The governor today made an official statement calling on all Iraqis not to attack Christians in response to the Pope's comments. Having said that, one of the militia groups, that is the one headed by [inaudible], have reportedly told his people to attack Christians.

(b)(6)

From: Scott Stanley (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 11:15 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV. OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Analyst Call

Attachments: (b)(6) 156.doc



(b)(6) 156.doc
(33 KB)

(b)(6)

Today's list of Participants...

If there are any questions please call (b)(2)
Scott Stanley

Host's Name:

(b)(6)

Conference Title:

Military Analyst

Participant Information

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. C (b)(6) | **** |
| 2. John Molino | Former Department Secretary of Defense |
| 3. Gen. Ron Fogelman | Durango Herald |
| 4. Lieutenant Commander Joe Carpenter | Department of Defense |
| 5. Robert Timberg | US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine |
| 6. Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney | Fox News |
| 7. Chuck Nash | Fox News |
| 8. Don Shepherd | Department of Defense |
| 9. General Perry Smith | CBS Radio |
| 10. Paul Vallely | Fox News |
| 11. Major General (Retired) Mike Nardotti | Patton Boggs |
| 12. William Nash | Council on Foreign Relations |
| 13. Jed Babbin | American Spectator |
| 14. Rick Francona | NBC |
| 15. John Warden | Venturiast |
| 16. General William Kernan | CBS |
| 17. Peter Brooks | Heritage Foundation |
| 18. Steve Greer | Fox News |
| 19. (b)(6) | Pentagon Public Affairs |

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 8:06 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: israel

(b)(6) a group of eight of us (military media analysts) are taking a trip to Israel Oct 22-28.....sponsored by aipac in dc

Fox News Channel
Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"

(b)(6)

tel: 406 249 1091
fax: 406 837 0996
www.ospreymedia.us

Add me to your address book... Want a signature like this?

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1106

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 4:14 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Gen Jones & Retired Military Analysts (0800, 20 Sep?)

Attachments: RSVP.doc

As it stands right now we have 20 military analysts that have accepted the invitation to participate in the call. The RSVP list is attached for your review.

(b)(6)



RSVP.doc (48 KB)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 10:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA
Subject: Gen Jones & Retired Military Analysts (0800, 20 Sep?)

(b)(6)

Gen Jones (EUCOM/SACEUR) is very interested in participating in a 25-30 minute teleconference with the retired military analysts to provide an overview of the challenges facing NATO in Afghanistan to include the force generation issue and the Taliban on Wed, 20 Sep. This would be prior to his 1000 press brief on NATO's mission Afghanistan in the Briefing Room.

0800 would be the only time on his schedule for this call although we might be able to slide it to about 0745 if that would work better.

Please let me know the feasibility of this event. If it is feasible, let me know what I can provide you to move forward with this opportunity.

v/r

CDR (b)(6)

Commander (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer
European Command Liaison Office
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20318-0520

(b)(2)

Cell: (b)(2) (NEW)

U.S. European Command <<http://www.eucom.mil/>>

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe <<http://www.nato.int/shape/index.htm>>

-----Original Message-----

From: Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]

Cc: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Subject: FW: Military Analysts

(b)(6)

Can you help with Dallas and (b)(6) out?

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 9:30 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Subject: FW: Military Analysts

Good morning Dallas,

(b)(6) from Gen James Jones's, the EUCOM commander, staff is interested in a military analysts call tomorrow for the general to discuss the progress/challenges in Afghanistan. This would be prior to a Wednesday press brief he's doing.

Is 0800 doable?

I've info'd Cappy so y'all can work directly.

Thanks,
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Sent: Sunday, September 17, 2006 9:06 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Subject: Military Analysts

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First, would this be a possibility for him this Wed? Secondly, if this is feasible, is it possible to get a list of the people OSD has on their call list to present to Gen Jones when he asks who he would possibly be speaking with?

Thanks for the help.

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld



Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

8:00-8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired) MSNBC
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG) American Spectator
Cmdr. Peter Brookes	(USN, Reserve) Heritage Foundation
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired) Fox News
General Ronald Fogelman	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired) MSNBC
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
General Jack Keane	(USA, Retired) ABC
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Glenn Lackey	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired) CNN
Major General Perry Smith	(USAF, Retired)
Captain Robert Timberg	(USMC, Retired) U.S. Naval Institute
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel John Warden	(USAF, Retired)

Declining:

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong	(USMC, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Major F. Andy Messing Jr.	(USAR, Retired) Fox News
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Captain Martin L. Strong	(USN, Retired)
General Larry D. Welch	(USAF, Retired)

Unconfirmed RETIRED MILITARY

Admiral Dennis C. Blair	(USN, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired) Heritage Foundation
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired) Heritage Foundation
General Wayne A. Downing	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired) CNN
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez	(USN, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired)
Major General Burton R. Moore	(USAF, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton	USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood	(USMC, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons	(USN, CIA, Retired) Fox News
Mr. Bing West	(USMC, ASD, Retired) Atlantic Monthly, National Review
General Charles E. Wilhelm	(USMC, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 7:55 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference Call - Wednesday 9-20

Attachments: Invite.doc; GEN Jones bio.doc

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: September 19, 2006

Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Official**

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **WEDNESDAY, September 20, 2006, from 8:00 – 8:30 a.m.**

The topic of the conference call will be an overview of the challenges facing NATO in Afghanistan including the force generation issue and the Taliban.

General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)/Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) will brief you. (His biography is attached for your review.) This call will be On-the-Record.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call him at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.



Invite.doc (40 KB) GEN Jones bio.doc (39 KB)



MEMORANDUM

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Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: September 19, 2006

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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call him at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

General James L. Jones
Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR)
Commander, United States
European Command
(EUCOM)



General Jones is the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of the United States European Command (CDR USEUCOM). From the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium, General Jones leads Allied Command Europe (ACE), comprising NATO's military forces in Europe. The mission of ACE is to preserve the peace, security, and territorial integrity of the NATO member nations in Europe.

As CDR USEUCOM, General Jones commands five U.S. components: U.S. Army, Europe; U.S. Navy, Europe; U.S. Air Forces in Europe, U.S. Marine Forces, Europe and Special Operations Command, Europe. The European Command's mission is to support and achieve U.S. interests and objectives throughout 91 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and portions of the Middle East. The command performs a variety of functions including planning for and conducting contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuations and humanitarian relief operations; providing combat-ready forces to both Allied Command Europe and other U.S. unified commands; and conducting intelligence activities and security assistance.

General Jones spent his formative years in France, returning to the United States to attend the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, from which he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in 1966. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps in January 1967. Upon completion of The Basic School, Quantico, Va., in October 1967, he was ordered to the Republic of Vietnam, where he served as a Platoon and Company Commander with Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. While overseas, he was promoted to First Lieutenant in June 1968.

Returning to the United States in December 1968, General Jones was assigned to Camp Pendleton, Calif., where he served as a Company Commander until May 1970. He then received orders to Marine Barracks, Washington, DC, for duties as a Company Commander, serving in this assignment until July 1973. He was promoted to Captain in December 1970. From July 1973 until June 1974, he was a student at the Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Va. In November 1974, he received orders to report to the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa, where he served as the Company Commander of Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, until December 1975.

From January 1976 to August 1979, General Jones served in the Officer Assignments Section at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. During this assignment, he was promoted to Major in July 1977. Remaining in Washington, his next assignment was as the

Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the United States Senate, where he served until July 1984. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1982.


He was selected to attend the National War College in Washington, DC. Following graduation in June 1985, he was assigned to command the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Calif., from July 1985 to July 1987.

In August 1987, General Jones returned to Headquarters Marine Corps, where he served as Senior Aide to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was promoted to Colonel in April 1988, and became the Military Secretary to the Commandant in February 1989. During August 1990, General Jones was assigned as the Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit at Camp Lejeune, N.C. During his tour with the 24th MEU, he participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Turkey. He was advanced to Brigadier General on April 23, 1992. General Jones was assigned to duties as Deputy Director, J-3, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, on July 15, 1992. During this tour of duty, he was reassigned as Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise, for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Returning to the United States, he was advanced to the rank of Major General in July 1994, and was assigned as Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, Marine Forces Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, NC. General Jones next served as Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, during 1996, then as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. He was advanced to Lieutenant General on July 18, 1996.

His next assignment was as the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to General on June 30, 1999, and became the 32nd Commandant of the United States Marine Corps on July 1, 1999. General Jones assumed duties as the Commander of U.S. European Command on 16 January 2003 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on 17 January 2003.


General Jones' personal decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", and the Combat Action Ribbon.



Iraqi Security Forces Update

18 September 2006

Future of the Iraqi Security Force



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Transition

2006-2007-2008
Build - Enhance - Develop

Developing Full Operational Capability

Increasing Self-Reliance

30K Replenishment of the Iraqi Army



Oct 06
Nov 06
Dec 06
Jan 07
Feb 07
Mar 07
Apr 07
May 07
Jun 07
Jul 07
Aug 07

REPLENISHMENT FORCE
5-week training cycle



1 Oct - 24 Nov	25 Nov - 19 Jan	20 Jan - 16 Mar	17 Mar - 12 May	13 May - 8 Jul
1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers	1850 Soldiers
750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers
1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	
1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers	1500 Soldiers		
750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers		
750 Soldiers	750 Soldiers	360 Soldiers		

RTC Habbaniyah—
1st & 7th DIV

RTC Hammam Al Alii—
2nd & 3rd DIV

RTC K-1—
2nd & 3rd DIV

ITB X 2 Kirkush (KMTB)—
4th & 5th DIV

ITB Numaniyah—
6th & 8th DIV


RTC Tallil—
10th DIV

RTC Taji—
9th DIV

Recruiting Goals	
Habbaniyah	3390
Hammam Al Alii, K-1	5720
Kirkush (KMTB)	2350
Numaniyah	4050
Tallil	1350
Taji	4320
Total	30000



Issues



- **Issues:**
 - } **Long-term financial commitment for modernization**
 - } **USG determination of technology transfers**

(b)(6)

From: Garrett, John (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 11:58 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Thank you

For a truly great trip. It would not have been the same without your preparation and continuous monitoring to enhance the schedule and to make it a pleasant experience that allows us to focus on and think about the tough and confusing issues at play.

You and Dallas make it look easy -- but we all know how hard it is to get the results you do.

Thanks again. John.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

DISCLAIMER:

This e-mail message contains confidential, privileged information intended solely for the addressee. Please do not read, copy, or disseminate it unless you are the addressee. If you have received it in error, please call us (collect) at (202) 457-6000 and ask to speak with the message sender. Also, we would appreciate your forwarding the message back to us and deleting it from your system. Thank you.

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 10:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA
Subject: Gen Jones & Retired Military Analysts (0800, 20 Sep?)
Attachments: GEN Jones bio.doc



GEN Jones bio.doc
(39 KB)

(b)(6)

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Please let me know the feasibility of this event. If it is feasible, let me know what I can provide you to move forward with this opportunity.

v/r

CDR (b)(6)

Commander (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer
European Command Liaison Office
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20318-0520

(b)(2)

Cell: (b)(2)

(NEW)

U.S. European Command <<http://www.eucom.mil/>> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<<http://www.nato.int/shape/index.htm>>

-----Original Message-----

From: Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Subject: FW: Military Analysts

(b)(6)

Can you help with Dallas and (b)(6) out?

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 9:30 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
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Subject: FW: Military Analysts

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(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

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General James L. Jones
Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR)
Commander, United States
European Command
(EUCOM)



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Returning to the United States in December 1968, General Jones was assigned to Camp Pendleton, Calif., where he served as a Company Commander until May 1970. He then received orders to Marine Barracks, Washington, DC, for duties as a Company Commander, serving in this assignment until July 1973. He was promoted to Captain in December 1970. From July 1973 until June 1974, he was a student at the Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Va. In November 1974, he received orders to report to the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa, where he served as the Company Commander of Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, until December 1975.

From January 1976 to August 1979, General Jones served in the Officer Assignments Section at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. During this assignment, he was promoted to Major in July 1977. Remaining in Washington, his next assignment was as the

Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the United States Senate, where he served until July 1984. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1982.

He was selected to attend the National War College in Washington, DC. Following graduation in June 1985, he was assigned to command the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Calif., from July 1985 to July 1987.

In August 1987, General Jones returned to Headquarters Marine Corps, where he served as Senior Aide to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was promoted to Colonel in April 1988, and became the Military Secretary to the Commandant in February 1989. During August 1990, General Jones was assigned as the Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit at Camp Lejeune, N.C. During his tour with the 24th MEU, he participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Turkey. He was advanced to Brigadier General on April 23, 1992. General Jones was assigned to duties as Deputy Director, J-3, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, on July 15, 1992. During this tour of duty, he was reassigned as Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise, for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Returning to the United States, he was advanced to the rank of Major General in July 1994, and was assigned as Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, Marine Forces Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, NC. General Jones next served as Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, during 1996, then as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. He was advanced to Lieutenant General on July 18, 1996.

His next assignment was as the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to General on June 30, 1999, and became the 32nd Commandant of the United States Marine Corps on July 1, 1999. General Jones assumed duties as the Commander of U.S. European Command on 16 January 2003 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on 17 January 2003.

General Jones' personal decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", and the Combat Action Ribbon.

(b)(6)

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 9:29 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV. OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts

Good morning (b)(6)

(b)(6) from Gen James Jones's, the EUCOM commander, staff is interested in a military analysts call tomorrow for the general to discuss the progress/challenges in Afghanistan. This would be prior to a Wednesday press brief he's doing.

Is 0800 doable?

I've info'd Cappy so y'all can work directly.

Thanks,
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR, JCS DOM
Sent: Sunday, September 17, 2006 9:06 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Subject: Military Analysts

(b)(6) Todd,

I'd like to present the opportunity for Gen Jones to speak with the stable of military analysts Wed morning before he goes on the podium to discuss Afghanistan as I think this would be a good opportunity to help align the message.

First, would this be a possibility for him this Wed? Secondly, if this is feasible, is it possible to get a list of the people OSD has on their call list to present to Gen Jones when he asks who he would possibly be speaking with?

Thanks for the help.

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

(b)(6)

From: Garrett, John (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 1:07 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: URGENT call from (b)(6) - OSB Public Affairs Pentagon

Ok sorry to bother you -- if you need to know my clearance was TS/SCI.

Look forward to seeing you -- Bing and I just boarded Emirates 859 from Dubai to 'uwait City.

Thanks again. John.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: Garrett, John
CC: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Fri Sep 15 13:00:32 2006
Subject: Re: URGENT call from (b)(6) -- OSB Public Affairs Pentagon

Sir, not to worry. I think it's a classic game of telephone. You will not be excluded from anything on the trip. They just needed to know at what level they could speak. Sorry for the confusion!

See you soon,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Garrett, John
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Sep 15 12:43:22 2006
Subject: Fw: URGENT call from (b)(6) - OSB Public Affairs Pentagon

Coping you

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Garrett, John
To: 'dallas.lawrence'(b)(6)
Sent: Fri Sep 15 12:33:59 2006
Subject: Fw: URGENT call from (b)(6) -- OSB Public Affairs Pentagon

Hi Dallas,

Pls see below -- could this be? I am in Dubai now, waiting for transist on to Kuwait City. Re clearance, I do not still have one but nor did I for the other two trips nor the Pentagon briefings. The below message is the first I have heard on any different requirement. Thanks Dallas.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: Garrett, John
Sent: Fri Sep 15 09:08:17 2006
Subject: URGENT call from (b)(6) -- OSB Public Affairs Pentagon

He needs to know your status of your current security clearance. Without knowing the

status, you will not be able to physically attend the meetings that are scheduled for you. You will have to sit outside of the meetings. He has placed over a dozen phone calls stressing the urgency. His number at the Pentagon is (b)(2) The urgency is mainly because the people who are arranging the meetings are 8 hours ahead of us here in DC & will need this information before their close-of-business. Let me know what I need to do.

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 3:08 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR MNF-I SCJS VOB Deputy Director
Subject: [U] RE: Simmons

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Arggghh!!! Be safe, (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 10:44 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) LCDR MNF-I SCJS VOB Deputy Director
Subject: Fw: Simmons

Hey guys, just had one drop. Am in london checking on the others to make sure their flights took off!! Ugh.
See you soon -- I hope!!

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Sep 15 00:36:30 2006
Subject: Simmons

Dallas (b)(6)

Delta Airlines grounded its planes in Baltimore and JFK causing a 4 1/2 hour delay of my flight #6006 at 7:00 p.m. Consequently, missed Emirates connection at 11:00 p.m. from JFK to Dubai and Kuwait. No flights allowing me to arrive before Saturday 16 Sept at 4:00 p.m., only prudent to cancel. Very pissed off and disappointed. Have a safe trip.

Wayne

Check out the new AOL <<http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/1615326657x4311227241x4298082137/aol?redir=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eaol%2Ecom%2Fnewaol>> . Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 12:37 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] INFO: Baghdad_Photo.ppt
Attachments: Baghdad_Photo.ppt

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) no map that's unclas – but here's a photo you may consider. Unless you're paying for the ink cartridge (it's a nice photo, tho). (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 12:25 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] UNCLAS Itinerary
Attachments: Analysts v7.doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6) here's the unclas itin. Stripped pretty bare, but that's how it has to be. Bad news on the Iraqi general bios – still working that; will have to give those to you upon arrival. Anything else? (b)(6)

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 7:22 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: RE: [U] MORE: Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraq

hi. these are all great. thanks.
 any headway with an unclass itinerary?? and i think the only other thing i need is the iraqi bios! hooooooweee.
 thanks!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 9:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] MORE: Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraq

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) this is a slide depicting the timeline for Iraqis taking charge of Iraq. First two slides are helpful, but think they'll salivate over the third. (b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)
 MNF-4 Strategic Effects, Communications Division
 (b)(2)
 Stay informed! <http://mnf-iraq.com/>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply.

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Version 7 DRAFT As of 2000 local 14 Sep 06

**ITINERARY FOR
DEFENSE ANALYSTS**

OFFICIAL PARTY (7):	SUPPORT PARTY (7):
HON Bing West (National Review & Atlantic Monthly) Former Asst Secretary of Defense	Brig Gen Wright, MNF-I STRATEFF Comms Div Director
GEN (r) Wayne Downing (MSNBC)	Lt Col (b)(6), MNF-I STRATEFF Comms Div Plans
COL (r) John Garrett (FOX News)	MAJ (b)(6) Aide-de-camp
Dr. (COL) Jeff McCausland (CBS)	
Mr Wayne Simmons (FOX News)	
Mr Lawrence (OASD-PA) GS-15	
(b)(6) (OASD-PA) GS-11	JVB (4)

Purpose:

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs invited civilian military analysts and national veterans organization leaders to the Iraq AOR to show them, first-hand, current Multinational Force-Iraq operations and to file reports on the same. These retired senior officials provide MNF-I a unique capability to accurately communicate with global audiences regarding current operations, as well as showcase the progress MNF-I is making in Iraq. As former U.S. Government or Department of Defense employees, DVs have first-hand experience with military doctrine and operations. They are educated, informed and ready to engage the national and international media on current issues to help deliver themes and messages, and counter enemy propaganda. The group should see the degree to which Coalition Forces and Iraqi leaders are working together. Engaging with these DVs will help the global audience understand the current situation on the ground and the progress being made in Iraq, which will increase public trust and support for the MNF-I effort. OASD-PA hosted a similar outreach trip to Iraq in the days leading up to the October 2005 elections with full support from MNF-I.

Day One

DVs arrive Kuwait City (commercially) / RON

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)
IRAQNA (b)(2)
JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA: (b)(2)
STRATEFF AO: Lt Col (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) MCI (b)(2)

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Day Two

DVs depart KCIA

DVs arrive

JVB Hotel in-processing

IGFC JOC tour / mission overview

MNC-I Ops / Intel

Lunch / Executive time

MND-Baghdad tour

Executive time

Dinner with GEN Casey

RON

Day Three

Breakfast

MND-North tour

Working lunch w/CF

International Zone office calls

US Ambassador Speckhard

Prime Minister Maliki

Tour of Combat Support Hospital

Social with LTG Chiarelli

ERU-Emergency Response Unit demonstration (or operation walk-through)

RON

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)
IRAQNA (b)(2)
JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA (b)(2)
STRATEFF AO: Lt Col (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) MCI (b)(2)

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Day Four

JVB out-processing

Breakfast with BG Pittard, MITT / NPTT reps

International Zone office calls
MG Peterson, CPATT
LTG Dempsey, MNSTC-I

Battlefield awareness tour of MNF-West
Working lunch w/ CF

Departure for Kuwait

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)
IRAQNA (b)(2)
JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA (b)(2)
STRATEFF AO: Lt Col (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) MCI (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Bing West (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Attachments: bing rec letter.doc; ATT1946977.txt



bing rec letter.doc (32 KB) ATT1946977.txt (284 B)

Here is letter re: my work for Atlantic Monthly while in Iraq.



Literary Agents

September 13, 2006

To Whom It May Concern:

As a literary agent at Sanford J. Greenburger Associates, Inc., I am representing Bing West, who is currently on assignment from *The Atlantic Monthly* for two articles about Iraq, as well as conducting research for a future book about how the insurgency was fought there. I hope to negotiate a deal for this book in the near future, either with his current publisher, Bantam Books, with whom he has published both **NO TRUE GLORY** (2005) and **THE MARCH UP** (2004), or perhaps with another publisher.

Please feel free to contact me at 212-206-5612 or dmandel@sjga.com if I may be of further assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Dan Mandel

55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 telephone: (212) 206-5600 facsimile: (212) 463-8718

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 10:09 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: INFO: [U] Brig Gen Wright Bio
Attachments: Wright, Thomas B. (updated).doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6) Brig Gen Wright will be along with the DVs for most of the trip (minus Mosul). Are these helping? Goal was to get you something packaged – but such is life over here. –(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF COMM DIV
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 6:07 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF
Cc: (b)(6) SFC MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: [U] Brig Gen Wright Bio

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Ma'am,

Brig Gen Wright's bio is attached.

V/R

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Major, Armor
Executive Officer
Chief, Communications Division, Strategic Effects
DSN (b)(2)

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

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BIOGRAPHY



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS B. WRIGHT

Selected for promotion to major general.

Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Wright is Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Communications, Multi-National Force – Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq.

As a graduate of the Florida State University Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, the general entered active duty in 1977. He has commanded a fighter test and evaluation squadron, an air operations group, a fighter wing and a reconnaissance wing. His previous staff tours include aide to the Tactical Air Command commander; Division Chief at Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command; Vice Director of Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency; and Director of Intelligence at Air Combat Command.



General Wright has also commanded the 39th Air and Space Expeditionary Wing at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. During his command, the wing enforced U.N. sanctions in Operation Northern Watch and participated in combat operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. The general is a command pilot with more than 3,100 flying hours, including more than 430 combat hours.

EDUCATION

1975 Bachelor of Science degree in biological science, Florida State University, Tallahassee

1977 Master of Science degree in biological science, Florida State University, Tallahassee

1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1985 U.S. Air Force F-15 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.

1989 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1996 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

1996 Master of Science degree in national defense strategy, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

1985 U.S. Air Force F-15 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
1989 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1996 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1996 Master of Science degree in national defense strategy, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. April 1977 - August 1977, student, weapons controller training, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
2. September 1977 - May 1979, weapons director, 25th Air Division, McChord AFB, Wash.
3. June 1979 - June 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
4. July 1980 - September 1980, student, fighter lead-in training, 416th Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, Holloman AFB, N.M.
5. October 1980 - February 1981, F-15 qualification training, 461st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Luke AFB, Ariz.
6. March 1981 - February 1984, F-15 aircraft commander, instructor pilot, 8th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Holloman AFB, N.M.
7. March 1984 - May 1984, student, F-15 Replacement Training Unit Instructor Course, 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Luke AFB, Ariz.
8. June 1984 - March 1985, F-15 initial cadre instructor pilot, 1st Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
9. April 1985 - August 1985, student, F-15 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
10. September 1985 - April 1987, squadron weapons and tactics officer, 1st Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, air-to-air academic instructor, 325th Tactical Training Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
11. May 1987 - May 1988, F-15 flight commander, 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Keflavik Air Station, Iceland
12. June 1988 - June 1989, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
13. July 1989 - November 1989, Chief, F-15 Air Support Branch, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va.
14. December 1989 - April 1992, aide to Tactical Air Command Commander, Headquarters TAC, Langley AFB, Va.
15. May 1992 - June 1992, student, F-15 recurrence training, 95th Fighter Training Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
16. July 1992 - July 1993, assistant operations officer and 1992 William Tell project officer, 58th Fighter Squadron, and Chief of Standards and Evaluations, 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, Fla. (December 1992 - March 1993, operations officer, 58th Fighter Squadron, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)
17. August 1993 - November 1993, Chief of Safety, U.S. Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB, Fla.
18. December 1993 - July 1995, Commander, 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.
19. August 1995 - June 1996, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
20. July 1996 - July 1998, Chief, Aerospace Control Division, Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
21. August 1998 - May 2000, Commander, 611th Air Operations Group, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
22. June 2000 - December 2001, Commander, 39th Wing and 39th Air and Space Expeditionary Wing, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
23. January 2002 - March 2003, Vice Director, Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency,

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

24. March 2003 - August 2004, Commander, 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale AFB, Calif.

25. September 2004 - January 2006, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.

26. February 2006 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Communications, Multi-National Force - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 3,100, including more than 430 combat hours

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, F-15A/B/C/D, U-2 and RQ-4A

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Aerial Achievement Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star

Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

1977 Distinguished graduate, weapons controller school, Tyndall AFB, Fla.

1978 Weapons Controller of the Year, Air Defense Command

1980 Distinguished graduate, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.

1981 Distinguished graduate, Top Gun, top academic award, F-15 qualification training, Luke AFB, Ariz.

1986 F-15 Instructor Pilot of the Year, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant April 8, 1977

First Lieutenant June 4, 1978

Captain April 4, 1980

Major Sept. 1, 1987

Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 1992

Colonel Oct. 1, 1996

Brigadier General Aug. 1, 2003

(Current as of February 2006)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 10:01 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] Bios on Dempsey, Pittard, Peterson
Attachments: Dempsey, Martin E..doc; Pittard, Dana J. H..doc; Peterson, Joseph F..doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) these definitely are not pretty – but they serve the purpose. (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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United States Army



Lieutenant General MARTIN E. DEMPSEY

Commander
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO
Training Mission-Iraq
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
APO AE 09348
since: September 2005

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
 United States Army Command and General Staff College
 National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy – BS – No Major
 Duke University – MA – English
 United States Army Command and General Staff College – MMAS – Military Arts and Sciences
 National Defense University – MS – National Security and Strategic Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) French

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	5 Jun 74
1LT	5 Jun 76
CPT	8 Aug 78
MAJ	1 Sep 85
LTC	1 Apr 91
COL	1 Sep 95
BG	1 Aug 01
MG	1 Sep 04
LTG	8 Sep 05

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FROM TO

ASSIGNMENT

Jan 75	May 76	Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
May 76	Sep 77	Support Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 77	Jun 78	S-1 (Personnel), 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 78	Jan 79	Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Apr 79	Jan 80	Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jan 80	Oct 80	Commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Oct 80	Jun 81	S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jun 81	Jul 82	Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Aug 82	May 84	Student, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

Lieutenant General MARTIN E. DEMPSEY

Jun 84 Jul 87 Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of English, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

Aug 87 Jun 88 Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jul 88 Sep 89 Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany

Sep 89 May 91 S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia

Jul 91 Jun 93 Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany

Jul 93 Jun 95 Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, United States Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia

Aug 95 Jun 96 Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC

Jul 96 Jul 98 Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado

Jul 98 Oct 99 Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Oct 99 Aug 01 Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Sep 01 Jun 03 Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, Saudi Arabia

Jun 03 Oct 04 Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

Oct 04 Jul 05 Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jul 98-Oct 99	Colonel
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Oct 99-Aug 01	Colonel/Brigadier General
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Aug 05-Present	Lieutenant General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Army Commendation Medal

Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Combat Action Badge

Parachutist Badge

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

As of 6 Jun 06

- 2 -



United States Army

Major General JOSEPH F. PETERSON

**Commanding General
Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
APO AE 09316
since: October 2005**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Santa Clara University - BS - Economics
Chaminade University - MBA - Comptrollership

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	3 Nov 72
1LT	3 Nov 74
CPT	3 Nov 76
MAJ	1 May 84
LTC	1 Apr 90
COL	1 Jul 95
BG	1 Sep 99
MG	1 Jan 03

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
May 73	Nov 74	Battalion Motor Officer, later Scout Platoon Leader, 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
Nov 74	May 77	Executive Officer, B Company, later S-3 Air, later Commander, Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 77th Armor, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
May 77	Mar 78	Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Mar 78	May 79	Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea

Major General JOSEPH F. PETERSON

May 79	Sep 80	Student, Chaminade University, Honolulu, Hawaii
Sep 80	Jul 82	Resource Review Officer, Office of The Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jul 82	Jul 83	Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jul 83	Jul 84	Action Officer, Plans, Programs and Budget Analysis for the Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate, J-6, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jul 84	Jun 85	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 85	Dec 86	Deputy Inspector General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Dec 86	Jul 87	S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 87	Apr 88	Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Apr 88	Apr 89	S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Apr 89	May 91	Aide-de-Camp to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, later Staff Officer, Arms Control Branch, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium
Jun 91	Jul 93	Commander, 2d Battalion, 35th Armor, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jul 93	Jun 94	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jun 94	May 96	G-3 (Operations) and Director for Plans, Training and Mobilization, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jun 96	Apr 98	Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, Kansas
Apr 98	Jul 99	Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Jul 99	Jul 01	Assistant Division Commander (Support), later Commanding General, later Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia
Jul 01	Aug 03	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Aug 03	Oct 05	Vice Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Action Officer, Plans, Programs and Budget Analysis for the Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate J-6, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC (No Joint Credit)	Jul 83 - Jul 84	Captain/Major
Aide-de-Camp to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe later Staff Officer, Arms Control Branch, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium	Apr 89 - May 91	Major/Lieutenant Colonel
Vice Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Aug 03 - Oct 05	Major General
Commanding General, Civilian Police Assistance Training Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Oct 05 - Present	Major General

Major General JOSEPH F. PETERSON

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Joint Service Achievement Medal

Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 3 December 2007



United States Army



Brigadier General DANA J. H. PITTARD

Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
APO AE 09316
since: July 2006

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Armor Officer Basic Course
Infantry Officer Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
School of Advanced Military Studies
Senior Service College Fellowship - Harvard University

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Army Military Academy – BS – History
United States Army Command and General Staff College – MMAS – Advanced Military Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

<u>PROMOTIONS</u>	<u>DATES OF APPOINTMENT</u>
2LT	27 May 81
1LT	27 Nov 82
CPT	1 Dec 84
MAJ	1 May 93
LTC	1 Aug 97
COL	1 Jun 02
BG	Frocked

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Apr 82	Feb 83	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, B Company, 2d Battalion, 63d Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, Kansas
Feb 83	Jul 84	Scout Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, later Adjutant, 3d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, Kansas
Aug 84	Apr 85	Equal Admissions Outreach Officer, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
May 85	Oct 85	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Oct 85	Jun 88	Squadron S-4 (Logistics), later Commander, E Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, Germany
Jun 88	Mar 90	Commander, F Company, 40th Armor, United States Army Berlin Brigade, Germany
Mar 90	Jul 91	Commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army Germany and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia
Oct 91	Jun 92	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jun 92	May 94	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 94	Sep 95	Chief of Plans and Exercises, G-3, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas

Brigadier General DANA J. H. PITTARD

Sep 95 Nov 96 S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, later S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas

Nov 96 Jan 99 Military Aide to the President of the United States, The White House, Washington, DC

Jun 99 Jun 01 Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, later Commander, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington

Jun 01 Jun 02 Senior Service College Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Jul 02 Feb 04 Commander, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commander for Maneuver, Multi-National Brigade (East), KFOR, OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN, Kosovo

Feb 04 Jul 05 Commander, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

Jul 05 Jun 06 Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Combat Action Badge
Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Presidential Service Identification Badge

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 9:52 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: [U] MORE: Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraq
Attachments: ITCI Near Term Timeline.ppt

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Picky!! (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 5:51 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: RE: [U] MORE: Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraq

oops! no attachment. :)
(hate it when i do that! :))

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 9:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] MORE: Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraq

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) this is a slide depicting the timeline for Iraqis taking charge of Iraq. First two slides are helpful, but think they'll salivate over the third. (b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)
MNFI Strategic Effects, Communications Division

(b)(6)

Stay informed! <http://mnf-iraq.com/>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraqis Significant Near Term (60 Days) Event List

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF):

- Iraqi Ministry of Defense/Iraqi Joint HQs assumes Operational Control of Iraqi Ground Forces (IGFC) (8th Iraqi Army Division), Iraqi AF, and Iraqi Navy on 7 Sep 06 in a ceremony hosted by PM Maliki.
- 4th IA Division scheduled for assumption into IGFC in mid-Sep 06. Marks second IA Div. now under operational control of IGFC (20% of IA Divs now fully operationally controlled by Iraqi Chain of Command).
- 6th IA Div. scheduled for OPCON by IGFC approx 1 Nov 06. (50% of all IA Divs now operationally controlled by Iraqi Chain of Command and IGFC).

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC):

- In September (exact date is classified until 48 hours out), the Iraqis will take charge of the Dhi Qar Province. The Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) transfer indicates that the Provincial Leadership is ready to assume responsibility for providing Iraqi Army and Police security for the province. This marks the second of 18 provinces to be completely under Iraqi control.
- In July, Muthanna was the first province to achieve governance and security independence under the plan and several more provinces are likely to follow Muthanna before the end of the year.
- It is expected that approx. 50% of the Iraqi Provinces will be under PIC by the beginning of 2007.

Field Operating Base Turnover (FOB):

- Near the end of Sep 06, CF are expected to turn Forward Operating Duke over to Iraqi Armed Forces. This marks the 50th of 110 FOBs to be fully transferred to the Government of Iraq.
- Later in Nov 06, two additional FOBs will be transferred to the GOI marking the 50% level for transfer of all FOBs.

Key Definitions List:

IAF (Iraqi Armed Forces): includes the major components of the Joint HQ; including Iraqi Ground Forces, Iraqi Naval Forces, and Iraqi Air Force

NP: (National Police): includes the division HQs, brigade HQs and combat battalions

ITL (In The Lead): A unit "In The Lead" is capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or Coalition support

ITF (In The Fight): A unit fighting "Side-by-Side" is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units

PIC (Provincial Iraqi Control): is the civil counterpart to the Coalition's strategy for transferring security authority. Assumption of provincial security responsibility is not timeline driven, but will occur when the necessary conditions are set for the appropriate Iraqi civil authorities to take Provincial Iraqi Control.

- The Ministerial Committee for National Security (MNCS), chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister, has approval authority on when a Province is prepared to accept the security responsibility based on the following conditions: Threat level, Iraqi Security Forces capacity and capability, Governance, MNF-I Force level of support needed


FOB: Forward Operating Base turnover is a process by which Coalition Forces turn responsibility of a specific secured location under their control over to the Iraqi Security Forces and Government of Iraq. It is not time driven but conditions based similar to PIC.

Iraqis Taking Charge of Iraqis Master Event List

As of 12/3/2007 15:22

SEP 06	OCT 06	NOV 06	DEC 06	JAN 07	FEB 07	MAR 07	APR 07
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IAF




BDEs



BNS




NP



Key:

- Media Event
- Opportunity
- Benchmark

PIC



Based on forecasted PIC estimates

FOBs



Bdr Fts

Final Border Fort Completed Iran Border (approx. Oct-Nov) FOB Olson approx. Nov 06

POC: STRAT EFF COM DIV - 239-8764

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 9:41 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] More Bios
Attachments: General George W. Casey.doc; Biography-ChiarelliPeterW_2006-01.doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) GEN Case and LTG Chiarelli. (b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)
MNFI Strategic Effects, Communications Division
(b)(2)
Stay informed! <http://mnf-iraq.com/>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

**General George W. Casey, Jr.
Commanding General
Multi-National Force - Iraq**



General Casey became the Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq, July 2004. <!-- [endif]-->

General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt and the United States. He has commanded at every level from platoon to Division. His most recent assignment was as the 30th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

His principal staff assignments have been as a: Congressional Liaison Officer; Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff; Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, J5; Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command; Director, J5, Joint Staff; and Director of the Joint Staff. He has also served as a United Nations Military Observer in Cairo, Egypt, with the UN Truce Supervision Organization.

General Casey: commanded a mechanized infantry battalion - 1st Battalion 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; commanded a mechanized infantry brigade - 3rd "Grey Wolf" Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Casey assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq on July 1, 2004.

General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

U.S. Decorations and Badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge


(Updated 30 August 2006)



United States Army

Lieutenant General PETER W. CHIARELLI

**Commander
Multi-National Corps-Iraq
APO AE 09342
since January 2006**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Armor Officer Basic Course
Infantry Officer Advanced Course
United States Naval Command and Staff College
National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Seattle University - BS - Political Science
University of Washington - MPA - International Relations and Economics
United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategic Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	21 Sep 72
1LT	21 Sep 74
CPT	21 Sep 76
MAJ	1 Mar 84
LTC	1 Mar 90
COL	1 Jun 95
BG	1 Sep 99
MG	1 Jan 03
LTG	22 Nov 05

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Mar 73	Jun 75	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron (Air), 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jun 75	Dec 77	S-2 (Intelligence), later Commander, A Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jan 78	Jul 78	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Lieutenant General PETER W. CHIARELLI

Aug 78	Jun 80	Student, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
Jun 80	Jun 84	Instructor, later Assistant Professor, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
Jul 84	Jun 85	Student, United States Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, Rhode Island
Jun 85	Oct 87	S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 33d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Oct 87	Jun 89	S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 89	Jun 90	Assistant Operations Officer, G-3 (Operations), I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jun 90	Aug 92	Commander, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
Aug 92	Jun 93	Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
Jun 93	May 95	G-3 (Operations), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
May 95	Apr 96	Deputy G-3 (Operations) and Director for Plans, Training and Mobilization, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas
May 96	Jul 98	Commander, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington
Aug 98	Jul 00	Executive Assistant, later Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium
Aug 00	Aug 01	Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, Texas
Aug 01	Jul 03	Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army, Washington, DC
Mar 04	Feb 05	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Mar 05	Nov 05	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Jan 06		Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Executive Assistant, later Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium	Aug 98 - Jul 00	Brigadier General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 3 December 2007

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 9:20 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] Baghdad Bios
Attachments: 4ID Bios.doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) here are the 4ID bios. We'll spend some time with them on Day Two (first day here). Still hunting. --(b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)
MNFI Strategic Effects, Communications Division
(b)(2)
Stay informed! <http://mnf-iraq.com/>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

Major General James D. Thurman Commanding General, 4ID



Major General James D. Thurman is a native of Marietta, Oklahoma. He received a Bachelor of Arts in History from East Central University and a Master of Arts in Management from Webster University. MG Thurman received a Regular Army Commission from the United States Army as a Second Lieutenant in 1975.

Major General Thurman began his career in the 4th Infantry Division serving as Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Motor Officer for 6th Battalion, 32d Armor. MG Thurman has commanded at all levels from Company to Brigade. After attending the Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, he commanded the Aero-Scout Platoon and later became the Operations Officer, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From 1981-1982, he attended the Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Upon completion, MG Thurman attended the AH-64 Aviator Qualification Course, United States Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. MG Thurman then served as Executive Officer, 3rd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas. During 1989-1991, Major General Thurman served as Executive Officer for 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Cavalry Division and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia. MG Thurman's previous assignments also include Commander of 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; Commander, 2d Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia; Commander, Operations Group, United States Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Regional Command South, Italy; Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, California; Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army; and Chief, Operations, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Camp Doha, Kuwait.

Major General Thurman departed Kuwait to become the Director, Army Aviation Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army in Washington, D.C., where he remained until his arrival at Ft. Hood.

Major General Thurman's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (one oak leaf cluster), the Legion of Merit (two oak leaf clusters), the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious

Service Medal (five oak leaf clusters), the Army Commendation Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal (three oak leaf clusters).

Brigadier General David D. Halverson Assistant Division Commander (Support), 4ID



BG David D. Halverson was born in Virginia, Minnesota on 13 August 1957. He was awarded a Bachelor of Science Degree from the United States Military Academy and commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery in 1979.

BG Halverson has held a variety of troop and staff positions, both in the United States and overseas. In 1979, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He served as a Battalion Reconnaissance Survey Officer, Battery Fire Direction and Executive Officer and Battalion

Adjutant. In 1983, BG Halverson was assigned to the 6th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, 8th Infantry Division in the Federal Republic of Germany. He served as Battalion Adjutant and Commander of Battery A until his departure in February 1987. He attended graduate school and was awarded a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in June 1989. In 1990, he assumed duties as the Senior Military Analyst in the Joint Wargaming Division of the United States Southern Command in Panama. BG Halverson reported to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii in 1991 where he served as the Assistant Operations Officer for the Division Artillery, Operations Officer and Executive Officer for the 2nd Battalion 11th Field Artillery of the 25th Infantry Division (L). He served as Special Assistant to the Commanding General, United States Army Pacific at Fort Shafter, Hawaii from November 1993 until June 1994. In June 94, BG Halverson returned to Fort Hood, where he served as Chief, Review and Methodology Division, Test and Experimentation Command, prior to commanding the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division. After the War College, he served as the CINC Team Chief in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation Directorate. In June 1999, he assumed command of the forward-deployed 2d Division Artillery, 2d Infantry Division at Camp Stanley, Korea. In June of 2001, BG Halverson became the CENTCOM J3, Chief of Plans and planned, coordinated and executed war plans for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In August 2003, he assumed duties as the Deputy Assistant Commandant, US

Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He then returned to central Texas to command the U.S. Army Operational Test Command from June 2004 until January 2005. He is currently serving as the Assistant Division Commander (Support) for the 4th Infantry Division.

His military schooling includes the Field Artillery Basic and Advanced Courses, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army War College, and the British Higher Command and Staff College.

BG Halverson's awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion Of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Joint Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal, Joint Unit Medal, Korean Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Staff Badge, and the Parachutist Badge.

BG Halverson is married to the former Karen Malloy of Belmont, California. They have three daughters, Lindsey, Anna, and Ellen.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 8:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) Col MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI IZ CSO
Subject: INFO: [U] JHQ Info Sheet
Attachments: JHQ Info Sheet.doc

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6) I'm still anxiously awaiting the bio / itinerary info from Corps PA. They're knocking heads around to make it happen – but in the meantime, I'm looking for applicable info you can fill the read-ahead file with. Here's a start – a fact sheet on the new Iraqi Joint Headquarters. Your call – toss if you don't need. –(b)(6)

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12/3/2007

JHQ/IGFC Fact Sheet

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki: *"These are historical moments in our country's history. We now have command of our military and we have faced the challenge of terrorism. This is only one step on a road we know will be a difficult journey, but we are a country that is capable of handling our own issues including our military affairs."* (AP)

GEN George Casey: *"From now on, there will be Iraqi military operations under the leadership of Iraqi Army. We will remain hand in hand with these forces to protect Iraqi people from all threats. This step has come after we made assessment of the performance of the Iraqi Army and its loyalty to achieve Iraq's unity and protect its security and stability."* (Al Hurra)

Iraqi Joint Headquarters/Iraqi Ground Forces Command:

- **As of 7 Sep 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense/Iraqi Joint Headquarters assumed operational control (OPCON) of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy.**
 - Operational Control or OPCON, is defined as "the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate units involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."
- **As of 7 Sep, operational control of a significant portion of Iraqi military forces transferred to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, while the Coalition Forces continue to support the IJHQ and its subordinate forces in operations and the gradual transition of operational control of the remaining Iraqi Army Divisions to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command.**
 - Assumption of operational control by IJHQ is a significant milestone in the new Iraqi Armed Forces. Since the Coalition Forces began assisting the Government of Iraq in the development of its military in 2003, in accordance with the authorities granted under UN Security Council Resolutions and Coalition Provisional Authorities orders, MNF-I has had the primary responsibility for operational control of each of the branches of the Iraqi armed forces.
- **The IGFC is the operational fighting HQ for the Iraqi Army and is the equivalent to a US Corps-level command center.**
 - The IGFC is based in the Camp Victory complex, to the eastern side of Baghdad. The central element of the IGFC is the Joint Operations Center (JOC), a theater-style operations center, in which all the elements of a modern headquarters staff.

- The IGFC's mission is to exercise command and control of assigned Iraqi Army forces and, upon assuming Operational Control (OPCON) of Iraqi Army formations, to plan and direct operations to defeat the insurgency and preserve Iraq as a sovereign democratic nation.
- The transition of operational control of Iraqi Divisions to the IGFC HQ demonstrates the increased capability of the Iraqi Army to assume control of security tasks.
- The transition will be gradual, with one Iraqi Army Division transitioning in early September and a second by the end of the month. The Iraqi Chain of Command working with the Coalition Forces, will develop a conditions-based transition sequence that will see the operational control of almost all Iraqi Army divisions to the IGFC by the end of 2006.

Iraqi Military Forces:

Iraqi Army (IA)

- Six Iraqi Army division HQs, 26 brigades and 88 battalions have assumed the lead in their areas (increase of five divisions, 22 brigades, and 65 battalions since Nov 05).
- Six Iraqi Army divisions, approx. 30 brigades and approx. 90 Iraq Army battalions are projected to have assumed the lead by the end of Sep 06.
- An additional 3 brigades and 6 battalions (total of 33 brigades and 96 battalions) are projected to assume the lead for operations in their assigned area by the end of October.
- By the end of October, it is projected that approx 2/3 of the Iraqi Army will be in the lead.
- Iraqi divisions that are in the lead in their own areas of responsibility (AOR) are capable of coordinating, planning, and executing security operations independent of Coalition forces.
 - The transition of AORs to Iraqi Army lead is the result of the increased capacity of Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Government.
- Recent performance by the Iraqi Army against the enemy in Baghdad and Diyala provinces is very positive.
- In addition to providing security, Iraqi Army units often engage with humanitarian and other local civic actions; provide security for many essential service construction projects and Iraqi soldiers physically help repair local schools and actively engage in projects to improve local area appearance and pride.

Iraqi Air Force (IqAF)

- The primary role of today's Iraqi Air Force is to detect and prevent the incursion of hostile elements across national borders and assist other security forces with surveillance and transportation capabilities to support the Counter Insurgency Mission.
- The IqAF has personnel and aircraft at four locations within Iraq: New Al-Muthana, Taji, Basrah, and Kirkuk.
- It consists of a variety of fixed wing and rotary wing airframes with multiple capabilities.
 - **2nd Squadron** – located at Taji Air Base. Consists of 16 UH-1H helicopters which are undergoing modifications in the United States to upgrade them from a Huey I to a Huey II configuration. Upgrades for all 16 aircraft are expected to be complete by May 2007 with the first Huey IIs returning to Iraq in January 2007. Currently the Iraqi Air Force helicopter pilots are being kept proficient by flying the Bell 206. The 2^d Squadron's mission, once the UH-1H helicopters are delivered, is medical evacuation.
 - **3rd Squadron** – located at Kirkuk Air Base. It consists of 2 CH-2000 SAMA aircraft with the mission to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
 - **4th Squadron** – located at Taji Air Base. Consists of 10 MI-17 helicopters with another 24 MI-17s being delivered later this year and early 2007. The mission of 4th Squadron is battlefield mobility – moving troops and equipment from one area to another quickly, and cargo transport.
 - **12th Squadron** – located at Taji Air Base. Consists of five Bell 200 Jetranger helicopters. The 12th Squadron's mission is to train Iraqi Air Force helicopter pilots.
 - **23rd Squadron** – located at Al Muthana Air Base in Baghdad. This is where the Iraqi Air Force's three C-130E aircraft are stationed. These aircraft are heavily engaged in the ongoing operations of the Iraqi Security Forces and conduct heavy lift of cargo and troop transport.
 - **70th Squadron** – headquartered at Basra Air Base. The squadron is made up of two SB7L-360 Seeker aircraft and four CH 2000 SAMA aircraft. These two platforms fly surveillance missions daily and are equipped with infrared cameras and advanced radio communications systems.

Iraqi Air Force Facts

- Currently the Iraqi AF boasts a force of more than 750 airmen and officers.
- Since March 2006 the Iraqi Air Force has:
 - Flown more than 450 sorties and more than 650 hours
 - Moved more than 6,000 troops and passengers

- Moved more than 460 tons of cargo
- Flown more than 200 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions

Iraqi Navy (IqN)

- The Iraqi Navy defends Iraq's territorial waters, to include its vital oil terminals along the coast of the Northern Arabian Gulf against both external and internal security threats.
- Along with patrol craft, the Navy includes a Marine Battalion trained for defense of the oil platforms, boarding actions, search and seizures at sea and defense of naval installations.
- Sailors and Marines attend a tailored naval version of the standard eight-week Iraqi military basic training courses, then move on to advanced training. This training includes sea training for the patrol boat crews and battle tactics for the Marines.
- Today, the Navy includes five 27-meter long Predator-class patrol boats and ten fast assault boats. The Iraqi Navy and Marines also use the smaller craft to control the approaches to the Iraqi ports, defend the oil platforms and prevent foreign-fighter infiltration.
- Both squadrons have seen tactical successes in combating smuggling and piracy as well as conducting a couple of successful rescues at sea for injured mariners. Incidents of piracy have continuously declined since the Iraqi Navy began 24/7 presence operations.

Iraqi Navy Facts

- Currently the Iraqi Navy boasts a force of more than 1,130 sailors and marines.
- ***The Iraqi Navy operates two squadrons:***
 - Patrol Boat Squadron w/ 5 Predator Class patrol craft (27m)
 - Assault Boat Squadron w/24 fast assault boats (FABs)
- **Missions of the Iraqi Navy**
 - Maritime security operations and sector patrols
 - Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS)
 - Oil platform security operations on the Kwar Al Amaya Oil Terminal and the Al Basrah Oil Terminal
 - Base security operations at Um Qasr
 - Maintenance diving
 - Presence patrols along the Shait al Arab River and the Kwar Abd Allah to the port of Umm Qasr

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 6:31 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) Col MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) LCDR MNF-I SCJS VOB Deputy
Director; (b)(6) (b)(6) CNTR CPATT; (b)(6)
CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] UPDATE: LTG Dempsey and MG Peterson

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(b)(6) change on the itinerary with the Defense Analysts that affects you – I'll send you details on the SIPR, but suffice to say that the **DVs will meet with MG Peterson here on Day Three** (instead of at Victory) for about an hour, **followed by 30 minutes with LTG Dempsey**. Also, you saw the **IGFC dog-and-pony show was approved for Day One**... One final muscle movement we're working that affects MNSTC-I – **Camp Dublin on Day Two** (after social with LTG Chiarelli). We continue to work that, but expect it to be a go. Thanks for the assist! --(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 4:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: trip points of contact

Gentlemen,
I wanted to also pass along some points of contact in Kuwait in case something comes up with your flight or if there are any other issues you run into.

The Kuwait JVB poc's are:
Major (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell)
Master Sgt (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell)
Major (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell) or (b)(2) (office)

Also, both Dallas and I have international capabilities on our blackberries, so we can be reached once we are on the ground.
Dallas (b)(2)

(b)(6)

If all else fails and you need to reach someone, please call (b)(6) the Deputy Director, at (b)(2)

Safe travels and see you on the other side,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 11:07 AM
To: 'McCausland, Jeffrey'
Subject: RE: travel orders

oh good. glad to hear. all set otherwise?? also, you know the sheraton where we're staying, right? the one downtown. (someone said there's another one and i wasn't aware, so wanted to mention it and make sure you get the right place!)

does your cell phone work over there? mine should. (b)(2)

also, will you have access to email at all? just in case?

should you need anything before we get there, the in-country poc's are:

Major (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell)
Master Sgt (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell)
Major (b)(6) (b)(2) (cell) or (b)(2) (office)

safe travels,
see you soon,

(b)(6)

From: McCausland, Jeffrey [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 10:52 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: travel orders

I got them.

Jeff

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tue 9/12/2006 5:53 PM
To: McCausland, Jeffrey
Subject: travel orders

hi there. here is a scanned copy of your travel orders so that you'll have them with you when you depart. looking forward to a great trip!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 5:57 PM
To: 'Downing, General Wayne'; 'Downing, General Wayne (2)'
Subject: Scanned ITO
Attachments: Downing ITO.tif

hi sir,
here are your travel orders so that you will have a copy when you depart. i hope you were able to get your flights squared away. please let me know as soon as you have your itinerary firmed up. i will get the hotel information for you first thing in the morning.

thanks

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1171



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SEP 8 2006

Total Travel Costs: \$0

General Wayne Downing (USA, Retired) MSNBC

(b)(6)

SSN: (b)(6)

Dear General Downing:

You are invited to travel from Washington, DC to Iraq and Kuwait, and return to Washington, DC, from September 14, 2006 thru September 19, 2006. The purpose of this travel is to attend an OSD(PA) Retired Military Analysts Outreach.

Travel by rail, military aircraft, commercial air is limited to the most economical accommodations to satisfy mission requirements, as may be determined by the appropriate transportation officer.


This is a no cost travel order.

9760103.1120 M209 2303 2101 2102 S49447 DSTD6M209
1 A A Z 6 M209 S49447


Requested by:

Authenticated by:

Approved by:


Dallas Lawrence
Director, CR&PL


Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs/IC/PL


Jennifer S. Spaeth
Director A&M, OASD(PA)



(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 5:53 PM
To: 'McCausland, Jeffrey'
Subject: travel orders
Attachments: McCausland ITO.tif

hi there. here is a scanned copy of your travel orders so that you'll have them with you when you depart.
looking forward to a great trip!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1173



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SEP 8

Total Travel Costs: \$0

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) CBS
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
SSN: (b)(6)

Dear Dr. McCausland:


You are invited to travel from Washington, DC to Iraq and Kuwait, and return to Washington, DC, from September 14, 2006 thru September 19, 2006. The purpose of this travel is to attend an OSD(PA) Retired Military Analysts Outreach.

Travel by rail, military aircraft, commercial air is limited to the most economical accommodations to satisfy mission requirements, as may be determined by the appropriate transportation officer.

This is a no cost travel order.

9760103.1120 M212 2303 2101 2102 S49447 DSTD6M212
1 A A Z 6 M212 S49447


Requested by:


Dallas Lawrence
Director, CR&PL

Authenticated by:


Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs/IC/PL

Approved by:


Jennifer S. Spaeth
Director A&M, OASD(PA)



(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 5:52 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: packing and trip preparation

Gentlemen,

I wanted to give you a few hints on packing for our trip and a few miscellaneous details. MNF-I gave me the following tips to pass along to you:

- Recommend hiking boots or sneakers – broken in already. Blisters are no fun in the hot environment.
- Recommend light-colored Dockers-type pants, or cargo pants. Go beige or light brown or light green. Lots of dust, sand – so dark fabrics are dirty from the moment you put it on.
- Lip balm / sunscreen – as we will be outside each afternoon.
- Head gear – hat or something to escape the sun. There is no rain in the forecast.
- Sunglasses.
- Bring your own towel / washcloth / hand towel / whatever you use.
- You carry what you bring over – so the lighter the load, the better.
- A small flashlight that fits on a key ring might come in handy (not a necessity).
- Power supply is 220v – so laptops, hair dryers, etc, must switch over to that voltage.
- Last, but not least, don't bring anything that you will be heartbroken if you lose or if something happens to it. We'll be crawling in and out of vehicles and helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft – anything can happen.

In addition, I would suggest that you bring a light jacket or windbreaker as it can get chilly when traveling in open aircraft. It is up to you if you wish to pack a blazer, although most of the dv's who visit wear polos or collared shirts with rolled up sleeves. Please also feel free to bring your cameras.

Our party will be met in Kuwait by an officer from the Joint Visitor's Bureau, who will assist us in processing into the country and getting to our hotel, and then will get us to the airport the following morning. You will be issued your protective gear at the airport prior to departure. Once we arrive in Kuwait, I will have a travel book for each of you that will give you the details of our movements so that you will know when you need to be where. I have invitational travel orders for each of you that I will email you an advance copy of so that you will have it with you when you depart.

We have a robust itinerary while in country that I think will be very informative and beneficial for you. We are looking forward to a great trip. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
 Community Relations and Public Liaison
 (b)(2) The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(6)

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, September 10, 2006 12:30 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] RE: Bio for Jeff McCausland

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

You're awesome. Thanks (b) I'll get back with you later today with some thoughts on traveling over here... Try to enjoy your Sunday off! (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, September 10, 2006 12:49 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: Fw: Bio for Jeff McCausland

And straight on to you. Hope that gets the monkey off your back!! :)
Thx
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: McCausland, Jeffrey
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Sat Sep 09 16:20:12 2006
Subject: Bio for Jeff McCausland

H <<BioRptAug2006.doc>> ere you go.

Jeff

12/3/2007

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 4:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Bio for Jeff McCausland

Attachments: BioRptAug2006.doc

And straight on to you. Hope that gets the monkey off your back!! :) Thx (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: McCausland, Jeffrey
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Sat Sep 09 16:20:12 2006
Subject: Bio for Jeff McCausland



BioRptAug2006.doc
(26 KB)

Here you go.
Jeff

Biographical Summary for Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland

Dr. Jeff McCausland was appointed Director of the Leadership in Conflict Initiative at Dickinson College in January 2003. He completed his active duty service in the United States Army in 2002 culminating his career as Dean of Academics, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Upon retirement Dr. McCausland accepted the Class of 1961 Chair of Leadership at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland and served there from January 2002 to July 2004. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1972 and was commissioned in field artillery. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army airborne and ranger schools as well as the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds both a Masters and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

During his military career Dr. McCausland served in a variety of command and staff positions both in the United States and Europe. This included Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council Staff during the Kosovo crisis. He also worked on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a member of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army Staff, the Pentagon. Following this assignment he assumed command of a field artillery battalion stationed in Europe and deployed his unit to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Storm in 1990 and 1991.

He has both published and lectured broadly on military affairs, European security issues, the Gulf War, and leadership throughout the United States and over twelve countries. He has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany; George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany; and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

He has also served as a member of numerous panels on leadership and character development. These include the Chief of Staff Army's Blue Ribbon Panel on Training and Leader Development; the Character Review Panel for the Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy; as well as providing advice and assistance to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's Aerospace Leader Development Panel.

Dr. McCausland is an adjunct fellow at both the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as well as the RAND Corporation in Washington. He also serves on the Board of Advisers to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York and the Global Strategy Institute at CSIS. In September 2006 he was named Director of National Security Affairs for the Buchanan, Ingersoll, and Rooney law firm based in Washington, DC.

He also serves as a national security consultant to CBS television and radio. He has been a frequent commentator on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan for CBS since early 2003. Dr. McCausland has also appeared on MSNBC, CSPAN, CNN, and the CBS Morning Show as well as being interviewed by the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, and Boston Globe. He is married to the former Marianne Schiessl and has three children – Tanya, Nicholas, and Phillip.

(b)(6)

CPO, DoD OGC

From: McCausland, Jeffrey (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 4:20 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Bio for Jeff McCausland
Attachments: BioRptAug2006.doc

Here you go.

Jeff

12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1179

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He has also served as a member of numerous panels on leadership and character development. These include the Chief of Staff Army's Blue Ribbon Panel on Training and Leader Development; the Character Review Panel for the Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy; as well as providing advice and assistance to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's Aerospace Leader Development Panel.

Dr. McCausland is an adjunct fellow at both the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as well as the RAND Corporation in Washington. He also serves on the Board of Advisers to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York and the Global Strategy Institute at CSIS. In September 2006 he was named Director of National Security Affairs for the Buchanan, Ingersoll, and Rooney law firm based in Washington, DC.

He also serves as a national security consultant to CBS television and radio. He has been a frequent commentator on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan for CBS since early 2003. Dr. McCausland has also appeared on MSNBC, CSPAN, CNN, and the CBS Morning Show as well as being interviewed by the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, and Boston Globe. He is married to the former Marianne Schiessl and has three children – Tanya, Nicholas, and Phillip.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 1:29 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF
Subject: RE: [U] HELP: Bios
Attachments: Bing West bio.doc; Garrettbio.pdf; WASHINGTON-JCG_combat_experience.DOC; Wayne Simmons Bio.doc; Downing_Wayne.bio.doc

hey (b)(6)

i was just mentioning to my colleague (after getting a call at my desk from a girlfriend) how sad it is that people know to try my office number if they can't find me on a saturday!! lol. i love my job – and it's a good thing! :)

here are the bios. sorry for the delay on this. i am waiting on dr. mccausland. i just talked to him and he promised he would send it to me within the next hour or so... as soon as i get it i will shoot it to you. i wanted to send them all together, but i don't want to make you wait anymore!

also, when you get a chance (wink) could you send me any tips for the analysts who may not have previously been... (and for me!). what the weather is like, what not to bring, any other useful hints you think we should know...? i've heard that you cannot wear short sleeves on some of the air transport. true?

thanks much.
 chat soon,

(b)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 1:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: [U] HELP: Bios

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) now the suspense monkey is draped around my neck. Please, please, please I need bios... Can you help soonest? J And quit taking weekends off! (b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)
 MNF-I Strategic Effects, Communications Division

(b)(2)
 Stay informed! <http://mnf-iraq.com/>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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12/3/2007

NY TIMES

1181

Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense, is a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly. West served in Marine infantry in Vietnam (Combined Action Platoon and Recon). He has been to Iraq ten times, accompanying over 20 battalions on operations. His articles have appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall St. Journal. His books include *The Village: a Combined Action Platoon in Vietnam*, *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the US Marines*, and *No True Glory: a Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*. He appears regularly on The News Hour.



COLONEL JOHN C. GARRETT

Senior Defense Policy Advisor

Defense and National Security
International Trade and Transactions
Public Policy and Lobbying

2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
T: 202-457-5207 F: 202-457-6315
jgarrett@pattonboggs.com

Education

- Georgetown University, M.A., 1986
- Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, B.S., 1969

Through daily contact with U.S. government requirements and procurement agencies, Col. John Garrett, USMC (retired) helps clients identify federal grants and contracting opportunities, for government projects in the United States and abroad. Domestically, Col. Garrett's work focuses on programs and procurements in the homeland security arena; internationally, his efforts emphasize such areas as Iraq reconstruction and Afghanistan reconstruction. Once an opportunity is identified, Col. Garrett helps clients navigate the complex process of defining the government's specific program requirements and then developing comprehensive capability statements that communicate that the client provides the best value and is best able to meet government requirements.

In nearly 30 years of developing relationships throughout the U.S. government and defense industry, Col. Garrett has developed strong networks with policy and decision makers in the U.S. Congress; the Departments of State, Defense and Energy; and the Department of Homeland Security. The access that comes with these relationships allows Col. Garrett to know in advance—and in detail—how best to meet the needs of each agency's procurement programs.

Additionally, Col. Garrett assists clients in a variety of issues regarding export control and licensing, and enjoys unique access to key administrative professionals at the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and to the key players at other agencies, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce. His involvement with the DDTC enables him to regularly facilitate and expedite clients' export license applications for defense and security related articles and technologies. His association with policymakers allows him to successfully argue and prevail in removing presumptions of license denial for several countries to whom our clients now export millions of dollars in merchandise.

Col. Garrett also serves foreign sovereign governments and their embassies in the planning and implementation of political, security and economic strategies as well as programs with the U.S. government and with U.S. commercial business and investment entities.

In conjunction with Patton Boggs' vast network of international contacts, Col. Garrett develops joint venture partnerships and other relationships in virtually all fields of commercial endeavor, to include security/defense, infrastructure, and logistics.

ARTICLES

Middle East Contracting Newsletter - May 2006
May 2006

Middle East Contracting Newsletter - January 2006

January 2006

Middle East Contracting Newsletter - September 2005
September 2005

- Speaker, "Contracting with the United States Government in the Middle East: Fundamentals of Understanding and Making the United States Procurement Process Work for You," Doha, Qatar (May 2005)
- Col. Garrett is a regular commentator on *The Fox News Channel*, presenting observations and analysis on the war on terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and a range of topics relating to national and homeland security. He was Dan Rather's featured guest on *60 Minutes II*, regarding the history of U.S. anti-terrorism programs. He has also appeared on *Radio America* and *Canada TV* regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- Col. Garrett is a member of the Department of Defense Media Military Analysts Group, which receives weekly access and briefings with the secretary of Defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high level policymakers in the Administration. He is also a frequent speaker and panelist on homeland security, Iraq reconstruction, and national security at conferences and seminars throughout the country.

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www.pattonboggs.com

Col. John C. Barrett, SMC et.
Summary of relevant experience

Operations highlights

- Infantry platoon and Company Commander, Vietnam, 1969-70
- Infantry Battalion Commander, Desert Shield/Desert Storm
- Led U.S. Marines in support of the Saudi Arabian forces that attacked and regained the town of Dhafji in northern Saudi Arabia, January 1991
- Commanded the first American combat unit to breach the Iraqi defenses on 28 February 1991, and continued the attack to ultimately secure Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait City
- Commander, Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable, 1991
- Conducted ship seizure of Syrian flagged ship, a sanctions violator, on Christmas Day 1991, in the Arabian Gulf
- Commanded a multinational force which protected the final withdrawal of 1,000 UN peacekeepers from the Somali Brigade and Bangladesh Infantry Battalion and closed the UN occupation in Somalia, February-March 1991
- Planned and executed antiterrorism and counterterrorism missions during the course of two deployments to Southwest Asia and the Middle East

20 years Training Advisor Combined Operational experience with the command, ground operations, aviation, and logistics forces of Thailand, Singapore, AUSAID, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Australia, etc.



Wayne Simmons
Former CIA Operative
Intelligence & Terrorism Analyst

Recruited by the CIA in 1973 while in the U.S. Navy, Wayne Simmons became part of an outside paramilitary special operations group that was not only prepared to die for America, but they were prepared to go anywhere and do virtually anything when ordered. He spent his career in the Caribbean, Europe, the Far East and Central Asia working against, narco-terrorists, arms smugglers, counterfeiters, cyber-terrorists and industrial and economic espionage. He spearheaded deep cover intel ops against some of the world's most dangerous drug cartels from central and South America and the Middle East.

For 8 of his 27 years in the intelligence business, Wayne Simmons ate slept and drank with narco-terrorists and smugglers while helping to conduct some of his nation's most important anti-drug, intelligence gathering efforts on behalf of the central intelligence agency. His deep cover intelligence operations helped lead to the seizures of marijuana, cocaine and heroin with a combined value of over \$1 billion dollars.

Simmons is riveting with his simple message: stop restricting the ability of the CIA and other U.S. Intelligence Agencies to operate inside and outside the United States, or face the catastrophic consequences of terrorism.

Simmons harshly criticizes those who unfairly attack the CIA and believes that 99.99% of the men and women employed by the CIA and all of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, are the very finest, most moral, upstanding, patriotic people on earth, sacrificing daily to protect the American people.

GENERAL WAYNE A. DOWNING

US Army (Retired)

General Wayne Downing served in a variety of command assignments in infantry, armored, special operations, and joint units, culminating in his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. He served two combat tours in Vietnam as a junior infantry officer. As a general officer, he commanded the special operations of all services during the 1989 invasion of Panama and commanded a joint special operations task force operating deep behind the Iraqi lines during Operation DESERT STORM.

Following retirement, General Downing was appointed by the President to assess the 1996 terrorist attack on the U.S. base at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and to make recommendations on how to protect Americans and U.S. facilities worldwide from terrorist attack.

From 1999-2000, General Downing was a member of the Congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission) charged with examining the terrorist threat to the US, evaluating America's laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism directed at US citizens, and recommending corrective actions.

General Downing most recently served in the White House as National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. As the President's principal advisor on matters related to combating terrorism, he was responsible for the close coordination among the military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, information, and financial operations of our war on terror, and for developing and executing a strategy that integrated all elements of national power.

General Downing is the Chairman of the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The Center seeks to better understand foreign and domestic terrorism threats, to educate future leaders, and to provide political analysis and advice to counter future terrorist activities. He serves on two boards in the private sector and has served on three government advisory panels. General Downing is a visiting faculty member at the University of Michigan Business School conducting seminars on leadership and transformation management

His awards include twelve decorations for valor on the battlefield and the Purple Heart. General Downing has earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge. He is a Military Free Fall Jumpmaster, a Master Parachutist, and an Army Ranger. General Downing is a Commander in the French Legion of Honor.

General Downing has a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a Masters degree in Business Administration from Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 9:58 AM
To: 'Schiffer Report'; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Hezbollah and Israel

To: Paul Valley
Subject: Re: Hezbollah and Israel

Israel, Hezbollah are worlds apart

By Fred Gedrich
and Paul E. Valley

Many statesmen, diplomats and others cast the prime warring parties in Lebanon - Israel and the terror group Hezbollah - as morally equivalent. Espousing this view enables them to argue that diplomacy alone can resolve this conflict. They're wrong.

During the dark days leading to World War II, many European and American leaders mistakenly thought they could bargain with, or isolate their countries from, sinister forces threatening mankind. Their failure to recognize right from wrong, and good from evil, prevented them from promptly acting collectively against that gathering threat. As a result, 60 million died, including 6 million Jews.

With the dark cloud of Islamic fascism hovering over the world today, another generation of appeasers, pacifists and isolationists clamor incessantly for diplomatic solutions to this global threat - even if it means cutting deals with untrustworthy terror masters and maintaining the status quo in the freedom-deprived Middle East region. According to the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur, such behavior "begets new and bloodier war." It has already resulted in substantial spilling of innocent blood, and its full consequences are yet to be determined.

Israel, the lone democratic outpost in the Arab region, sits in the most precarious position of all Free World nations. It is flanked by many hostile Arabs on northern, eastern and southern borders with the Mediterranean Sea to its West. This nation exists on 8,000 square miles of land (roughly the size of New Jersey) with 6.4 million residents, about three-quarters of them Jews.

The Jewish state is dwarfed in size and population by neighbors. The Arab world consists of 21 countries and the area controlled by the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank. Its land mass encompasses 5.2 million square miles and it is populated by 333 million people. It also owns the distinction of being the world's pre-eminent terrorist breeding ground.

Suffering devastating losses in five major conventional wars, Israel's Arab enemies have resorted to terrorism as a way to achieve their penultimate aim of destroying the Jewish state and greatly diminishing U.S. regional and global influence. They view Israel as an illegal, Western foreign imposition on their soil and their hatred extends to the United States because it is viewed as the ultimate guarantor of Israel's survival.

Ironically, many of Israel's critics have described the current conflict in Lebanon in David and Goliath terms, with Israel being the villain simply because of its military's superior firepower. In doing so, they endanger the very foundation of the international nation-state system.

Israel is a law-abiding state rooted in democratic principles and liberal ideals, seeking to live in peace with its neighbors within borders established by the United Nations after it became an internationally recognized state in 1948. It abides by the laws and customs of war. Its soldiers wear military uniforms, carry arms openly and do not purposely target civilian non-combatants during operations.

Hezbollah is the antithesis of Israel. It has defied the international mandate to dismantle and disarm as required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 and is the provocateur in the latest conflict. The group is tethered to a nexus of terror lifeline stretching from Iran to Syria to its base of operations in Southern Lebanon. During the current conflict with Israel, its Khomeini-inspired Shiite militia disguise themselves as civilians, embed in civilian populations, and use civilians as shields. They also store

weapons in, and fire them from, mosques, schools, hospitals and civilian residences. They have also intentionally targeted Israeli civilian non-combatants for death with suicide bombers and Katyusha.

In the 1980s, Hezbollah suicide bombing missions destroyed two U.S. embassies in Beirut as well as barracks containing U.S. Marine and French troops with heavy loss of life. They also are responsible for a series of kidnappings and killings of Americans.

The U.N. Security Council cease-fire resolution is doomed to fail because it doesn't authorize international peacemakers to do what the Lebanese military is unable or unwilling to do, forcibly defang the terror group.

A sustainable peace can only emerge after the civilized world collectively accepts and acts on the fact that Hezbollah leaders and militia, and others like them, are not "freedom fighters" and morally equivalent to free-state leaders and armies, but despicable "war criminals" seeking to destroy the civilized way of life.

Gedrich has worked as an analyst in the State and Defense Departments, and Vallely, of Bigfork, is a military analyst for Fox News and host of "Stand Up America."

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 08, 2006 3:12 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FINAL John Garrett flight itinerary

Attachments: GarrettTravelPlans.pdf



GarrettTravelPlans.pdf (31 KB)...

Here goes.....

Have a good weekend.

(b)(6)

<<GarrettTravelPlans.pdf>>

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Travel Arrangements for JOHN C GARRETT

Record Locator **NX9KF5**
Trip ID **31446595745**

Agent ID : LC

4050 Piedmont Pkwy - Suite 309 - High Point, NC 27265
Fax: (336) 878-1301
JOHN GARRETT
PATTON BOGGS
JOHN C GARRETT
2550 M STREET NW
WASHINGTON DC 20037

Itinerary Details

*** Itinerary Only ***

Travel Details

Thursday September 14, 2006

Flight Information

Airline	DELTA AIR LINES	Estimated time	1 hour 19 minutes
Flight	4954	Distance	213 Miles
	OPERATED BY COMAIR INC.		
Origin	Washington Reagan, DC	Meal Service	No Meal Service
Destination	New York JFK, NY	Plane	Cr2
Departing	5:30 PM		Non-smoking
Arriving	6:49 PM		
Departure Terminal	DCA TERMINAL B -		
Arrival Terminal	JFK TERMINAL 3		
Seat	03C		
Class	Coach		

Flight Information

Airline	EMIRATES AIRLINES	Estimated time	13 hours 0 minutes
Flight	202	Distance	6,850 Miles
Origin	New York JFK, NY	Meal Service	Meal
Destination	Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Plane	Airbus a340-500
Departing	11:00 PM		Non-smoking
Arriving	8:00 PM		
Departure Terminal	JFK TERMINAL 4 -		
Arriving on	September 15, 2006		
Arrival Terminal	DXB TERMINAL 1		
Seat	Confirmed		
Class	Economy		

Travel Details

Friday September 15, 2006

Flight Information

Airline	EMIRATES AIRLINES	Estimated time	1 hour 40 minutes
Flight	859	Distance	530 Miles



Origin	Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Meal Service	Meal
Destination	Kuwait, KUWAIT	Plane	Airbus a330-200
Departing	9:20 PM		Non-smoking
Arriving	10:00 PM		
Departure Terminal	DXB TERMINAL 1		
Seat	Confirmed		
Class	Economy		

Travel Details

Tuesday September 19, 2006

Flight Information

Airline	EMIRATES AIRLINES	Estimated time	1 hour 35 minutes
Flight	854	Distance	530 Miles
Origin	Kuwait, KUWAIT	Meal Service	Meal
Destination	Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Plane	Airbus a330-200
Departing	3:45 AM		Non-smoking
Arriving	6:20 AM		
Arrival Terminal	DXB TERMINAL 1		
Seat	Confirmed		
Class	Economy		

Flight Information

Airline	EMIRATES AIRLINES	Estimated time	14 hours 10 minutes
Flight	201	Distance	6,850 Miles
Origin	Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Meal Service	Meal
Destination	New York JFK, NY	Plane	Airbus a340-500
Departing	8:30 AM		Non-smoking
Arriving	2:40 PM		
Departure Terminal	DXB TERMINAL 1 -		
Arrival Terminal	JFK TERMINAL 4		
Seat	Confirmed		
Class	Economy		

Flight Information

Airline	DELTA AIR LINES	Estimated time	1 hour 17 minutes
Flight	5283	Distance	213 Miles
	OPERATED BY COMAIR INC.		
Origin	New York JFK, NY	Meal Service	No Meal Service
Destination	Washington Reagan, DC	Plane	Canadair regionaljet
Departing	6:15 PM		Non-smoking
Arriving	7:32 PM		
Departure Terminal	JFK TERMINAL 3 -		
Arrival Terminal	DCA TERMINAL B		
Seat	12A		
Class	Coach		

Loyalty Programs

Vendor	Account	Traveler
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	J GARRETT

Airline Record Locators

Airline Reference	Carrier
CLWW36	EMIRATES AIRLINES
D1AMJF	DELTA AIR LINES

Additional Messages

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VISA REQUIRED FOR KUWAIT CAN BE OBTAINED ON ARRIVAL

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Rhode Island Registration Number: ML#1192; Nevada Seller of Travel Registration No.: NV#2001-0126; Iowa: TA# 002 Registered Iowa Travel Agency

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 08, 2006 1:20 PM
To: Bing West; (b)(6) LTC CPIC DIRECTOR; marine PAO (b)(6) LtCol (b)(6) MNFW-PAO
Cc: (b)(6) SGT 124TH MPAD; Capt (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I V CORPS PAO; (b)(6) MAJ MNC-I V CORPS PAO DEPUTY; (b)(6) CPT MNC-I V CORPS PAO; (b)(6) Col MNC-I IAG PAO; (b)(6) LTC CPIC DIRECTOR
Subject: [U] RE: Bing West ItinerarySept 06

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sir, confirming that I received your e-mail. I've also cc'd CPIC and the Corps PA experts who will take your request and run with it. FYSA, Sir, your visit with us concludes the evening of 18 Sep. Look forward to meeting you. v/r (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Bing West [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 08, 2006 7:47 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) LTC CPIC DIRECTOR; marine PAO (b)(6) LtCol (b)(6) MNFW-PAO
Cc: (b)(6) SGT 124TH MPAD; Capt (b)(6)
Subject: Bing West ItinerarySept 06

Hi. As I understand it, (b)(6) is my principal point of contact in Baghdad when I arrive on 16 Sept as part of the OSD group. That group leaves on 19 Sept. I would like to stay on and visit, if possible, the Counterinsurgency School north of Baghdad for a day, and then spend a few days with LTC (b)(6) battalion in the south suburb of Baghdad, whom I embedded with in May of 06. He is aware I will be in theater. I think he might be able to pick me up at Victory by humvee.

LTC (b)(6)
COMMANDER, 1ST SQUADRON 61ST CAVALRY
506TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) FOB RUSTIMIYA -- BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(b)(6)

Thereafter, I would like to go to the MEF and be in LtCol (b)(6) capable hands.

Don't mean to be a bother to anyone!

S/F Bing West

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(b)(6)

From: Bing West (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, September 08, 2006 11:47 AM
To: (b)(6) LIC (b)(6) marine PAO (b)(6) LtCol (b)(6) MNFW-PAO
Cc: Sgt (b)(6) Capt (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Bing West Itinerary Sept 06

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, September 08, 2006 11:28 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Any help on Iraqis taking over own Army?

RE Iraqis taking over army: Here's something I wrote for the Iraq Newsletter (languishing in speechwriters). I copied off Sara Woods story.

Iraq's prime minister (Sept. 7 – Thursday) takes operational control of the country's ground forces command structure and Iraq's air force and navy.

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, characterized the Sept. 7 ceremony for the transfer of control as a "huge, significant event."

"It's the one event that puts the prime minister directly in the operational control of his military forces as his role as the commander in chief," Caldwell told press in Baghdad on Sept. 6.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will take control of the air force, navy and one army division – the 8th Iraqi Army Division. It is Maliki's decision how quickly to take over more divisions, but he will probably assume control of about two divisions a month, Caldwell said.

Currently six of 10 Iraqi army divisions are in the lead in their areas of operations, and underneath the divisions are 26 brigades and 88 battalions in the lead.

[Over the past three years, Iraq's armed forces have been built from the ground up as a modern and effective fighting force.]

[Iraqi army divisions have fought alongside Coalition forces under the commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Coalition forces work to train Iraqi forces, which now stand at about 129,000 trained and equipped soldiers. The goal is to have around 137,000 troops in the Iraqi military.]

Links: Caldwell [transcript](#); American Forces Press Service [story](#)